


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090




U.S. Citizenship
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
Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

John F. Grissom
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements) was denied by the director in Houston, Texas. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant a native of Nigeria, who claims to have lived in the United States since November 1981, submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet on September 30, 2005. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that she had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period.

On appeal counsel asserts that the director did not properly evaluate the documentation submitted by the applicant in support of her application. In counsel's view, the evidence in the record is sufficient to establish that the applicant meets the continuous residence requirement in the United States for the requisite period.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b).

“Continuous residence” is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(c)(1)(i) as follows: “An alien shall be regarded as having resided continuously in the United States if no single absence from the United States has exceeded forty-five (45) days, and the aggregate of all absences has not exceeded one hundred and eighty (180) days between January 1, 1982, through the date the application for temporary resident status is filed, unless the alien can establish that due to emergent reasons, his or her return to the United States could not be accomplished within the time period allowed.”

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time.

The applicant claims that she traveled to the United States with her maternal grandmother in November 1981, and that she resided with her grandmother in New York City from November 1981 until 1987, when they both returned to Nigeria. The applicant claims that her grandmother died in Nigeria in 2000 and that she could not obtain any documentation from her grandmother to show their initial entry and continuous residence in the United States during the 1980s. The applicant however, submits a letter from a Law Firm in Nigeria claiming that they represent the interest of the applicant's grandmother. The letter from the solicitor attests that the applicant and her grandmother traveled from Nigeria to Canada and that they left Canada in 1981 for New York where they lived together until 1987. The solicitor, who has never lived in the United States, did not provide any documentation in support of his/her assertions, did not submit any documentation to show that the firm represents the interest of the applicant's grandmother. Thus, the letter from the law firm has little probative value as evidence that the applicant resided in the United States during the requisite period. The applicant did not submit any documentation to show that she did enter the United States in 1981 and resided continuously in the country through 1987. The only objective evidence of the applicant's presence in the United States is a copy of a Form I-94 (arrival/departure record) in the file which shows that the applicant was admitted into the United States through New York City on November 9, 2002 on B-1 visa to attend American Medical Informatics Association Conference in San Antonio, Texas in November 2002..

There is no contemporary documentation from the 1980s that shows the applicant to have resided continuously in the United States during the requisite period for legalization. For someone claiming to have lived in the United States since November 1981, it is noteworthy that the applicant is unable to produce a solitary piece of primary evidence during the following seven years through May 4, 1988. It is noted that the applicant, who claims to have entered the United States with her maternal grandmother in 1981, and resided with her in the United States, was about 9 years old in 1981. The applicant did not submit and the record does not reflect any documentation from her grandmother or any other adult guardian to establish such entry, the grandmother's identity and residence in the United States during the 1980s, the applicant's school records, hospital or medical records, which is expected from a child of 9, to establish her residence in the United States during the 1980s. Also, the applicant did not submit credible documentation from an adult guardian to show who was responsible for her care and wellbeing in the United States during her minor years.

The only documentation submitted by the applicant in support of her claim that she entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and resided continuously in the country through the date of filing the application consists of a single notarized letter dated December 6, 2005, from [REDACTED], a resident of Staten Island, New York, stating that he has known the applicant since May 1981 when "they just arrived to U.S.A. till around 1987," and that they used to live at [REDACTED]. The letter from [REDACTED] is vague with little or no details about the applicant's life in the United States during the six years he claims to have known the applicant such as, the address where she lived, who she lived with, who cared for her, the schools she attended, and the nature and extent to his interaction with the applicant over the years. The

letter is not accompanied by any documentary evidence – such as photographs, letters, and the like – demonstrating the author’s personal relationship with the applicant in the United States during the 1980s. In addition, the letter is contrary to the information provided by the applicant. While [REDACTED] claims that the applicant entered the United States in May 1981, the applicant stated that she entered the United States in November 1981. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant’s evidence also reflects on the reliability of other evidence in the record. See *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). For the reasons discussed above, the letter has limited probative value. It is not persuasive evidence of the applicant’s continuous unlawful residence in the United States from before January 1, 1982 through the date of filing the application.

Beyond the decision of the director, the applicant indicated on the Form I-687 she filed in September 2005 that she left the United States to visit Nigeria in 1987 and that she returned to the United States in 2002. By her own admission, the applicant was absent from the United States for an extended period of time- about 15 years. It is undisputed that the absence from the United States - extending from 1987 to 2002 - far exceeded the 45-day maximum prescribed in the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(c)(1)(i), as well as the 180-day aggregate absence maximum, prescribed in the regulation. Absences of such duration interrupt an alien’s continuous residence in the United States unless (s)he can show that a timely return to the United States could not be accomplished due to emergent reasons. While the term “emergent reasons” is not defined in the regulations, there is some pertinent case law. In *Matter of C-*, 19 I&N Dec. 808 (Comm. 1988), the Board of Immigration Appeals held that *emergent* means “coming unexpectedly into being.”

The applicant has not established that emergent reasons, within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(c)(1)(i), prevented her return to the United States from Nigeria in 1987 within the 45-day period allowed in the regulation. Thus, the applicant’s trip to Nigeria from 1987 to 2002 interrupted her continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period. On this ground as well, therefore, the applicant has failed to establish her eligibility for legalization.

Upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO agrees with the director that the evidence submitted by the applicant has not established that he is eligible for the benefit sought.

Based upon the foregoing analysis of the evidence, the AAO concludes that the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.