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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529 - 2090

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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

LI



FILE: [REDACTED]
MSC-06-089-10941

Office: HARTFORD

Date:

JUN 05 2009

IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Handwritten signature of John F. Grissom in black ink.

John F. Grissom
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, or *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004, (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements) was denied by the director of the Hartford office, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman (LULAC) Class Membership Worksheet. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that she had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite time period.

In addition, the director determined that the applicant failed to establish that she is eligible for class membership pursuant to the terms of the CSS/Newman settlement agreements since the applicant stated at the time of her interview that she applied for legalization in 1987 or 1988, while the applicant's husband testified that he applied for legalization, on behalf of the entire family, some time in 1989. This portion of the director's decision shall be withdrawn. By adjudicating the application on the merits, the director treated the applicant as a class member. The AAO will adjudicate the appeal of the denied application.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the applicant has established her unlawful residence for the requisite time period. The AAO has considered counsel's assertions, reviewed all of the evidence, and has made a *de novo* decision based on the record and the AAO's assessment of the credibility, relevance and probative value of the evidence.¹

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS

¹ The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has long been recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n.9 (2d Cir. 1989).

Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I & N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA).

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period

of time. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of her claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and lived in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of several affidavits and letters, copies of a medical clinic records, and a postmarked envelope. The AAO has reviewed each document in its entirety to determine the applicant's eligibility; however, the AAO will not quote each witness statement in this decision. Some of the evidence submitted indicates that the applicant resided in the United States after May 4, 1988; however, because evidence of residence after May 4, 1988 is not probative of residence during the requisite time period, it shall not be discussed.

The record contains an affidavit from [REDACTED] who states that she rented her mobile home, located at [REDACTED] in Sealy, Texas, to the applicant, her husband and family from June 1980 until December 1982.

The applicant submitted a copy of an affidavit from [REDACTED] who states that he has known the applicant all his life, and has been reacquainted with her in 1980 in Sealy, Texas.

The applicant submitted an original and one copy of a letter from [REDACTED], dated August 29, 1930 (sic) and August 30, 1990, respectively. [REDACTED] states that she met the applicant and her family in 1981 when the affiant was living in Sealy, Texas.

The record contains a copy of an affidavit from [REDACTED] who states the applicant lived at [REDACTED] in Sealy, Texas from 1979 until 1985. She states that she met the applicant and her husband when they came into her restaurant. [REDACTED] statement of the applicant's dates of residence at [REDACTED] in Sealy, Texas is inconsistent with the statements of the applicant in the instant I-687 application. The applicant states that she resided at that address from 1982 until 1985.

The applicant submitted a copy of an affidavit from [REDACTED] who states that she met the applicant and her daughter in 1982 when they lived in Sealy, Texas. [REDACTED] also states that the applicant moved to Connecticut in 1988. However, this is inconsistent with the applicant's statement in the instant I-687 application that she continued to live in Sealy, Texas throughout 1988.

The record contains the affidavit of [REDACTED] who claims to have known the applicant for more than twenty years. He states that in 1987, when he and the applicant were residing in California, he and the applicant, along with the applicant's family, traveled to Mexico on or about December 20, 1987. [REDACTED] states that after he returned to California, he again saw the applicant and her family in California some time in the first week of January of 1988. This statement is inconsistent with the applicant's statement in the instant I-687 application that she resided in Texas in 1987 and 1988. In addition, when the applicant filed the instant Form I-687, she stated that her only absence from the United States was for a period of 30 days in 1984.

The record contains an affidavit from [REDACTED] who states that she first met the applicant and her family in October or November, 1980, and that they lived with her in her trailer home at [REDACTED] in Sealy, Texas for five or six months. The applicant does not list this address as a residence address on the instant I-687 application. [REDACTED] also states that the

applicant moved to California in 1985. This also is inconsistent with the applicant's statement on the instant I-687 application that she lived in Texas for the duration of the requisite statutory period.

The applicant has submitted employment verification letters from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The employment verification letter from [REDACTED] employment manager for Igloo Products Corporation in Houston, Texas states that a [REDACTED] was employed at the company as a shop helper from April 9, 1981 until August 25, 1982. In a statement dated August 1993, the applicant admitted to having used the alias [REDACTED]. The employment verification letter from [REDACTED] states that the applicant was employed at her cousin's restaurant, Sierra Madre, in 1979 until 1981. The employment verification letter from [REDACTED] of Einkauf's Meat Market in Sealy, Texas states that the applicant lived in Sealy, Texas from 1981 until 1988, and that the applicant worked at a restaurant and at Igloo. However, in the instant I-687 application the applicant does not list any employment with either Igloo Products Corporation or Sierra Madre restaurant. The applicant does not list any employment in the United States for the duration of the requisite statutory period.²

Although the witnesses claim to have personal knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period, none of the witness statements provides concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with her, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations, and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. For instance, the witnesses do not state how they date their initial meeting with the applicant, how frequently they had contact with the applicant, and how they had personal knowledge of the applicant's presence in the United States during the requisite period. Upon review, the AAO finds that, individually and together, the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true. In addition, the many discrepancies among the witnesses' statements detract from the credibility of the applicant's claim. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I & N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA). Therefore, they have minimal probative value.

Furthermore, the employment verification letters of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Einkauf fail to conform to the regulatory standards for letters from employers. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) provides that letters from employers must include: (A) Alien's address at the time of employment; (B) Exact period of employment; (C) Periods of layoff; (D) Duties with the company; (E) Whether or not the information was taken from official company records; and (F) Where records are located and whether the Service may have access to the records. If the records are unavailable, an affidavit-form letter stating that the alien's employment records are unavailable and why such records are unavailable may be accepted in lieu of subsections (E) and (F). The employment

² Additionally, [REDACTED] states that the applicant lived at [REDACTED] in Sealy, Texas from June 1979 until November 1985. However, [REDACTED] statement of the applicant's dates of residence at that address is inconsistent with the statement of the applicant in the instant I-687 application, in which the applicant states that she resided at that address from 1982 until 1985. In addition, [REDACTED] states that the applicant resided in Sealy, Texas until 1988, but in the instant application the applicant states that she resided in Sealy, Texas until 1989.

verification letters fail to declare whether the information was taken from company records, to identify the location of such company records, and to state whether such records are accessible, or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable. Further, the letters do not state how the witnesses were able to date the applicant's employment. It is unclear whether the witnesses referred to their own recollection or any records they or the company may have maintained. Lacking relevant information, the letters regarding the applicant's employment fail to provide sufficient detail to verify the applicant's claim of continuous residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite statutory period. Therefore, these documents have minimal probative value.

Additional evidence in record is comprised of copies of medical clinic records and a postmarked envelope. The applicant submitted copies of two pages of medical clinic records. One page contains a statement of the applicant's address on April 13, 1981 as [REDACTED] in Sealy, Texas, and her employer as Igloo. Neither this address nor this employer is listed by the applicant on the instant I-687 application. The other page of the medical clinic records contains the notes of two medical visits, on April 13, 1981 and May 28, 1982. These records do not identify either the medical clinic or the doctor. The applicant's name is handwritten at the top of the page, and no name is mentioned in the typewritten text. The clinic visit note for April 13, 1981 states that the patient is being examined due to an inability to get pregnant. The notes also state that the patient's husband wants to have children, but the patient does not seem too enthusiastic.³ This medical history is inconsistent with information contained in the record that the applicant has two children, both born in the 1960's. Although these medical clinic records are evidence in support of the applicant's residence in the United States in April and May of 1981, they do not establish the applicant's continuous residence for the duration of the requisite statutory period. In addition, the record does not establish that the information contained in the medical clinic records relates to the applicant. Due to these inconsistencies, these documents have minimal probative value.

The record also contains an envelope of a letter sent by the applicant to a recipient in Mexico with a postmark of September 2, 1980 and an address listed for the applicant of [REDACTED] in Sealy, Texas. While this envelope would be evidence of the applicant's presence in the United States on September 2, 1980, it would not establish the applicant's continuous residence for the duration of the requisite statutory period. In addition, the applicant does not list this address on the instant I-687 application. Due to this inconsistency, this document has minimal probative value.

The remaining evidence in the record is comprised of copies of the applicant's statements, the instant Form I-687, a Form I-485 application to adjust to permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act, and applicant's initial Form I-687 application filed in 1990 to establish the applicant's CSS class membership.

The AAO finds in its *de novo* review that the record of proceedings contains many materially inconsistent statements from the applicant regarding her residences in and absences from the United States during the requisite statutory period.

³ The AAO notes that the applicant has two children, both born in the 1960's.

The record reveals that the applicant's initial I-687 application listed residences in Texas from 1979 to 1985, then a residence in California from 1985 through the remainder of the requisite statutory period. Regarding absences from the United States, in a separate class membership worksheet dated December 6, 1990, and in a statement dated December 18, 1990, the applicant stated that she departed the United States on December 20, 1987 and returned on January 4, 1988. However, the initial I-687 application states that the applicant last entered the United States on June 21, 1979.

At the time of filing her I-485 application, the applicant listed residences in Texas from 1980 to 1985, then in Connecticut from 1985 for the remainder of the requisite statutory period.⁴ Regarding her absences, on her Form I-485, the applicant stated that she last entered the United States illegally in January 1986.

Finally, regarding the instant Form I-687, at the time of interview the applicant stated that she first entered the United States in 1979. The instant application lists residences in Texas from 1980 for the duration of the requisite statutory period.⁵ At the time of interview, the applicant stated that she left the United States one time only for one month in 1984.

The applicant's many contradictions are material to her claim in that they have a direct bearing on the applicant's residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. As stated above, doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho, supra*. The contradictions undermine the credibility of the applicant's claim of entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.

As stated previously, to meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all the evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). Here, the applicant has failed to provide probative and credible evidence of her continuous residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. The applicant's evidence lacks sufficient detail, and there are material inconsistencies in the record.

Upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO agrees with the director that the evidence submitted by the applicant has not established that she is eligible for the benefit sought. The various statements and affidavits currently in the record which attempt to substantiate the applicant's residence and employment in the United States during the statutory period are not objective, independent evidence such that they might overcome the inconsistencies in the record regarding the applicant's claim that she maintained continuous residence in the United States throughout the statutory period, and thus are not probative.

⁴ However, the listing of Connecticut, instead of California, may be a typographical error, since the listed street address is the same as the address in California listed on the applicant's initial I-687 application.

⁵ However, the applicant also lists membership in a California church from 1985 for the remainder of the requisite statutory period.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.