



U.S. Citizenship  
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FILE:



Office: BALTIMORE

Date:

JUN 10 2009

MSC-05 239 11039

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

John F. Grissom

Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements) was denied by the District Director, Baltimore, Maryland. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant, a native of Pakistan who claims to have lived in the United States with his parents from before January 1, 1982, submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet on June 27, 2005. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period.

On appeal the applicant submitted additional documentation and asserts that the evidence in the record is sufficient to establish that he meets the continuous residence requirement for legalization.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of

continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time.

The record includes a photocopy of the applicant's 2<sup>nd</sup> grade transcript from Fairfax Muslim Elementary school for the school year 1983 to 1984. While the transcript clearly shows that the applicant resided in the United States in 1983 and 1984, it did not establish the applicant's residence in the United States from before January 1, 1982 or after the end of the 1984 school year. Thus, the school transcript has limited probative value as evidence of the applicant's continuous unlawful residence in the United States during the requisite period.

The record also includes a letter from the applicant's father (who is currently residing in Pakistan), as well as copies of a postcard addressed to the applicant's father at a P.O. Box in Alhambra, California, with a United States postmark date of January 18, 1980, and another postcard addressed to him at an East Elmhurst, New York address with a United States postmark date of June 12, 1988. The letter from the applicant's father indicated that he and his family, including the applicant lived in the United States from November 1979 to April 1990, and that he moved the family back to Pakistan in 1990. The letter did not include any evidence of his alleged residence in the United State of more than ten years, except the two postcards indicated above. The postcards, addressed to the applicant's father, are not credible evidence that the applicant resided in the United States during those years much less for the duration of the requisite period. Furthermore, the letter from the applicant's father is not accompanied by any documentary evidence of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. Therefore, the letter as well as the postcards has little probative value as evidence of the applicant's continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.

As for the letter from [REDACTED] a resident of the United Kingdom, it has no probative value. The information about the applicant is not based on [REDACTED] personal knowledge, but rather on the information related to him by other people. Although [REDACTED] indicated that he "mildly remembered [the applicant] and his family leaving in the United States in late 1979, he could not attest to the applicant's continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period because he never resided in the United States at anytime.

Upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO agrees with the director that the evidence submitted by the applicant has not established that he is eligible for the benefit sought.

Given the paucity of the evidence in the record, the AAO concludes that the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.