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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090

**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**

LI

FILE: [REDACTED]  
MSC 06 026 13168

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date:

**JUN 24 2009**

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John F. Grissom".

John F. Grissom  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Los Angeles. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman (LULAC) Class Membership Worksheet. The director denied the application because the applicant did not establish that he continuously resided in the United States for the duration of the requisite period.

On appeal, counsel states the applicant has met his burden of proof regarding the matters relevant to his application and that the director's decision is incorrect. Counsel outlines some of the evidence already considered by the director.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application

pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine the evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the facts to be proven are probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

The pertinent evidence in the record is described below.

1. A copy of the applicant’s California driver’s license that appears to have been altered to show that it was issued on July 22, 1986 and expires on his birthday in 1990.
2. The applicant’s Form I-687 signed on August 27, 1990, indicating that his daughter Fatima was born in Mexico on August 21, 1983.
3. The applicant’s declaration dated October 24, 2001, in which he states that he worked full-time from approximately September 1978 at “Rods Grill” in Arcadia, California, under the alias of [REDACTED]. He also declares that he worked full time at a restaurant called Cheyenne Supper Club in Arcadia, California, from “approximately 1983 to approximately 1994” under the alias [REDACTED].
4. An “Affidavit of Employment Witness” from [REDACTED], the owner of Mendoza Gardening Service in Duarte, California stating the applicant was employed by the firm from February 1983 until December 1984.
5. An employment verification letter from [REDACTED], president of a firm named Greenscapes in Arcadia, California, indicating that a person named [REDACTED], the applicant’s claimed alias, was employed by the company for a thirteen week period in 1985.
6. An “Affidavit of Employment” from [REDACTED] in Los Angeles, California, who states the applicant worked for him from January 1987 to August 1989.

The copy of the applicant’s apparently altered California driver’s license (Item # 1 above) does not help his claim. The record contains the applicant’s declaration dated August 7, 2006 that his spouse first entered the United States in October 1979 and that she has been “living here on and off since then.” However, absent evidence to the contrary, he was probably residing abroad subsequent to August 21, 1983 at the time of the conception of his daughter born in Mexico (Item # 2). On his Form I-687 that he signed on September 1, 1990, the applicant did not claim to have ever worked at

Rods Grill (Item # 3). On his Form I-687 signed September 1, 1990 he claimed to have worked the Cheyenne Supper Club from January 1982 to February 1983 while on his declaration (Item # 3) he stated that he worked for that restaurant from approximately 1983 to approximately 1994. On his September 1, 1990 Form I-687, the applicant did not claim to have worked at Greenscapes (Item # 5). Additionally, the employment verification documents (Items # 4 through # 6) do not provide the applicant's address at the time of employment and identify the location of company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable as is required of employment letters by 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i).

Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. Further, the applicant must resolve any inconsistencies in the record with competent, independent, objective evidence. Attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence sufficient to demonstrate where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). These inconsistencies cast doubt not only on the evidence containing the conflicts, but on all of the applicant's evidence and all of his assertions.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982, and continuous residence during the requisite period. The applicant's asserted employment and residential histories on his Form I-687 are accompanied by inconsistent evidence.

The evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility, and its amenability to verification. Given the absence of credible supporting documentation, the applicant has failed to meet his burden of proof and failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States during the requisite period. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act. The application was correctly denied on this basis, which has not been overcome on appeal. Consequently, the director's decision to deny the application is affirmed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.