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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE: [redacted]
MSC 06 088 14087

Office: DALLAS

Date:

JUN 29 2009

IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C § 1255a.

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the National Benefits Center. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, or *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004, (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements) was denied by the Director, Dallas, Texas, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director determined that the applicant had not established that he resided in the United States in a continuous unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through the date of attempted filing during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant asserts that the applicant has submitted evidence to establish his eligibility for Temporary Resident Status. Counsel submits additional evidence on appeal.

An applicant for temporary resident status – under section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) – must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. See section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. See section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. See CSS Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In

evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant’s employment must: provide the applicant’s address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant’s duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The applicant is a native of Mexico who claims to have resided in the United States since November 1981, and he filed an application for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act (Form I-687), together with a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman (LULAC) Class Membership Worksheet, on December 27, 2005.

In the Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID), dated April 26, 2007, the director stated that the applicant failed to submit sufficient evidence demonstrating his continuous unlawful residence, and continuous physical presence, in the United States during the requisite period. The director granted the applicant thirty (30) days to submit additional evidence.

In the Notice of Decision, dated June 11, 2007, the director denied the instant application based on the reasons stated in the NOID. The director noted that the applicant failed to respond to the NOID.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through the date he attempted to file a Form I-687 during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988. After reviewing the entire record, the AAO determines that he has not.

Affidavits and letters

The evidence provided by the applicant consists of the following:

- 1) An affidavit from [REDACTED], attesting to having known the applicant since 1981. Mr. [REDACTED] also attests that for many years he and the applicant worked together as painters, and were neighbors from 1986 to 1987; that the applicant is a hard worker and a good friend. The affiant, however, does not indicate how he dates his acquaintance with the applicant, whether and how frequently he had contact with the applicant since they became acquainted in 1981, and whether the applicant has been a continuous resident since that time. Also, the affiant does not indicate whether he had been in contact with the applicant after 1987 when they no longer were neighbors.
- 2) An affidavit, dated November 20, 2006, from [REDACTED] stating that he has known the applicant since 1981, and that he and the applicant have worked various jobs, such as landscaping, painting, and carpentry, together for 25 years. [REDACTED] also attests that for many years he and the applicant worked together as painters, and were neighbors from 1986 to 1987; that the applicant is a hard worker and a good friend; that their wives get along with each other; that the applicant sometimes comes to his home for dinner; and that he and the applicant enjoy spending time together. The affiant, however, does not indicate how he dates his acquaintance with the applicant, how frequently he and the applicant worked together or had contact since they became acquainted in 1981, and whether the applicant has been a continuous resident since that time.
- 3) An affidavit from [REDACTED], attesting to having known the applicant since 1981. [REDACTED] also attests that he met the applicant on a job site where the applicant worked as a painter, and he worked as a plumber; and, that he and the applicant would meet each other at plumbing stores, and after work they would "hang out together." The affiant, however, does not indicate how he dates his acquaintance with the applicant, whether and how frequently he had contact with the applicant since they became acquainted in 1981, and whether the applicant has been a continuous resident since that time.

Contrary to counsel's assertion, the applicant has failed to submit sufficient evidence to establish his continuous residence. As noted above, the affidavits provided lack essential details. As such, the evidence provided is insufficient to establish the requisite continuous residence. The applicant has not submitted any additional evidence in support of his claim that he entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982, and he had resided continuously in the United States during the entire requisite period.

As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, it is concluded that he has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988.

Based on the foregoing analysis of the evidence, the AAO concludes that the applicant has failed to establish his continuous unlawful residence in the United States throughout the requisite period. Thus, the record does not establish that the applicant entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status from that date through the date he attempted to file a Form I-687 during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988. Accordingly, the applicant is ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A(a)(2) the Act.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.