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U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
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U.S. Citizenship
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FILE:

MSC 05 248 10583

Office: NEW YORK

Date:

JUN 29 2009

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C § 1255a.

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the National Benefits Center. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, or *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004, (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements) was denied by the Director, New York, New York, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director determined that the applicant had not established that she resided in the United States in a continuous unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through the date of attempted filing during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant asserts that the applicant has submitted sufficient evidence to establish her eligibility for Temporary Resident Status. Counsel submits additional evidence on appeal.

An applicant for temporary resident status – under section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) – must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. See section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. See section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. See CSS Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant’s employment must: provide the applicant’s address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant’s duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The applicant, a native of Brazil who claims to have resided in the United States since December 1981, filed her application for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act (Form I-687), together with a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman (LULAC) Class Membership Worksheet, on June 5, 2005.

In the Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID), dated March 8, 2006, the director stated that the applicant failed to submit sufficient evidence demonstrating her continuous unlawful residence, and continuous physical presence, in the United States during the requisite period. The director noted that the applicant submitted affidavits that were neither credible, nor amenable to verification. The director granted the applicant thirty (30) days to submit additional evidence.

In the Notice of Decision, dated June 1, 2007, the director denied the instant application based on the reasons stated in the NOID. The director noted that the applicant responded to the NOID, but failed to overcome the reasons for denial stated in the NOID.

Although the district director also determined that the applicant had not established that he was eligible for class membership pursuant to the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the district director treated the applicant as a class member in adjudicating the Form I-687 application on the basis of whether the applicant had established continuous residence in the United States for the requisite period. Consequently, the applicant has neither been prejudiced by nor suffered harm as a result of the district director's finding that the applicant had not established that he was eligible for class membership. The adjudication of the applicant's appeal as it relates to his claim of continuous residence in the United States since prior to January 1, 1982 shall continue.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that she continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through the date she attempted to file a Form I-687 during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988. After reviewing the entire record, the AAO determines that she has not.

Employment Letter

The applicant submitted a notarized letter of employment from [REDACTED] dated June 17, 2004, stating that the applicant has been employed as "per diem employee" doing housekeeping since August 1981.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i), letters from employers should be on employer letterhead stationery. The letter of employment failed to provide the applicant's address at the time of employment as required under 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i). Under the same regulations, the affiant also failed to declare whether the information was taken from company records, and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

Affidavits and letters

The applicant provided the following:

- 1) An affidavit from [REDACTED], attesting to having known the applicant since December 1981. [REDACTED] also attests that he met the applicant's husband, [REDACTED] at a Westchester furniture stripping company where he and [REDACTED] worked from 1981 to 1986, and that he had dinner with [REDACTED] and his wife at their residence when he resided at [REDACTED], Mt. Vernon, NY 10553. The affiant, however, does not indicate how frequently he had contact with the applicant; and, whether the applicant has been a continuous resident since 1981.
- 2) Two affidavits from [REDACTED] attesting to having known the applicant to have resided in the United States since August 1981. [REDACTED] also attests that she and the applicant became friends and have been in touch with each other periodically; that the applicant helps her at her house; she teaches English to the applicant; and, she attests to the

applicant's character. The affiant, however, does not indicate how she dates her acquaintance with the applicant, how frequently she had contact with the applicant, and whether the applicant has been a continuous resident since 1981.

In addition, the applicant provided numerous rent receipts for the years from January 1981 through December 1987, issued to [REDACTED]. It is noted, however, that the receipts are questionable as they appear to be produced as a batch. The receipts are all written by [REDACTED] to [REDACTED],” or [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], which is the applicant's husband's name, but they do not show the applicant's name.

Contrary to her assertion, the applicant has failed to submit sufficient evidence to establish her continuous residence since prior to January 1, 1982. As noted above, the affidavits and employment letter provided lack essential detail. As such, the evidence provided is insufficient to establish the requisite continuous residence. The applicant has not submitted any additional evidence in support of her claim that she entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982, and she had resided continuously in the United States during the entire requisite period.

This complete lack of reliable evidence casts doubt on whether the applicant has resided in the United States since August 1981, as she claims. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1988). The applicant has failed to submit any objective evidence to explain or justify the discrepancies in her testimony and in the record. Therefore, the reliability of the remaining evidence offered by the applicant is suspect and it must be concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that she continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status during the requisite period.

As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, it is concluded that she has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988.

Based on the foregoing analysis of the evidence, the AAO concludes that the applicant has failed to establish her continuous unlawful residence in the United States throughout the requisite period. Thus, the record does not establish that the applicant entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status from that date through the date she attempted to file a Form I-687 during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988. Accordingly, the applicant is ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A(a)(2) the Act.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.