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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
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U.S. Citizenship
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FILE:

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IN RE: Applicant:


APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.


John F. Grissom
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, New York. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director determined that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period, and that the evidence submitted by him did not establish his eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not met his burden of proof and was, therefore, not eligible to adjust to temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements. Specifically, the director noted that the applicant failed to overcome the reasons set forth for denial in the director's Notice Of Intent To Deny (NOID). The director noted that witness statements submitted by the applicant were "fill-in-the-blank templates," and did not establish the applicant's residence for the duration of the requisite period.

On appeal, the applicant submits a brief stating that he is entitled to the immigration benefit sought.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony, and the sufficiency of all

evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The record contains the following evidence which is material to the applicant's claim:

- The applicant submitted numerous witness statements in support of his application. The witnesses state generally that they know the applicant, and that the applicant has lived in the United States for all, or a portion of, the requisite period.

As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. The witness statements provided do not provide detailed evidence establishing how the witnesses knew the applicant, the details of their association or relationship, or detailed accounts of an ongoing association establishing a relationship under which the witnesses could be reasonably expected to have personal knowledge of the applicant's residence, activities and whereabouts during the requisite period covered by the applicant's Form I-687. To be considered probative, witness statements must do more than simply state that a witness knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. The statements must contain sufficient detail, generated by the asserted contact with the applicant, to establish that a relationship does in fact exist, how the relationship was established and sustained, and that the witness does, by virtue of

that relationship, have knowledge of the facts asserted. The witness statements submitted by the applicant, therefore, are not deemed probative and are of little evidentiary value.

- The applicant submitted a copy of an envelope addressed to him from an individual in Bangladesh. The envelope bears a postmark date of December 3, 1987, and postage is affixed by a postage meter. The record contains no information about the envelope or the circumstances of its mailing. It is not considered probative and is of no evidentiary value.
- The applicant submitted a copy of a handwritten merchandise receipt on a receipt form bearing the name of Bedding & Furniture Discounts in Brooklyn, NY. The record contains no information about the receipt or the circumstances of its issuance. The name of the salesman issuing the receipt is not disclosed even though there is a blank on the form for the salesman's name. Thus, the receipt and sale that it represents are not verifiable and the receipt is of no evidentiary value.
- The applicant submitted a copy of a letter from AT&T dated June 15, 1987, and addressed to the applicant at [REDACTED]. The letter is one welcoming the applicant as a customer and explaining available services. The above mentioned address is not listed by the applicant on the Form I-687 as one of his former addresses. The letter is of no evidentiary value.

The applicant submitted two employment letters in support of his claim.

- One employment letter is signed by [REDACTED], Manager, L. Edwards Home Improvement, and states that the applicant worked for his company as a part-time construction helper from May of 1981 until December of 1995 earning \$6.00 per hour. [REDACTED] states that the applicant was paid in cash because the applicant was undocumented. The applicant does not list this employer on his Form I-687 where he stated that he was self employed from August of 1981 until the filing of the Form I-687 "as a door to door daily basis labor."

The second employment letter submitted is signed by [REDACTED] of Pompano, FL who states that the applicant was employed by his company (the company name is not disclosed) from May 1, 1985 until May 1, 1986 in agricultural labor. The applicant lists no such employment on the Form I-687, nor does he state that he ever resided in the State of Florida.

The employment information set forth in these two letters is inconsistent with the information provided by the applicant on the Form I-687. The inconsistencies are not explained in the record, and are material to the applicant's claim as they have a direct bearing on the applicant's activities and whereabouts during the requisite period. . It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may lead to a

reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). The employment evidence submitted in support of the applicant's claim lacks credibility, and it cannot be determined from the record where the truth actually lies with regard to the applicant's claim. The employment letters are also of no evidentiary value because they fail to comply with the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i).

The applicant has further contradicted his claim of continuous residence during the requisite period on a Form G-325A, Biographic Information Form, wherein he states that he lived in Bangladesh from January of 1966 until October of 1985. On a Form I-765, Application For Employment Authorization, executed on April 22, 2002, the applicant states that he last entered the United States on October 19, 1985. The applicant does not state on his Form I-687, nor in his sworn statement dated March 16, 2005, that he was out of the country in 1985. These inconsistencies are not explained in the record and are material to the applicant's claim as they have a direct bearing on the applicant's claim of continuous residence during the requisite period.

The only other evidence submitted by the applicant in support of his application are his own statements. The applicant's statements, however, will not sustain his claim. As previously noted, in order to meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The absence of sufficiently detailed documentation to corroborate the applicant's claim of continuous residence for the entire requisite period seriously detracts from the credibility of his claim. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, and the contradictions in the record concerning the applicant's activities and whereabouts during the requisite period, it is concluded that the evidence submitted fails to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States during the requisite period.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he has continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.