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[Redacted]

FILE: [Redacted]  
MSC-05-196-10100

Office: LOUISVILLE

Date:

SEP 10 2009

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

John F. Grissom  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Louisville. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period.

On appeal, the applicant, through counsel asserts that he has established his continuous unlawful residence for the requisite time period and submits new evidence. On the Form I-694, counsel indicated that he would submit a brief within 30 calendar days. As of this date, the AAO has not received any additional evidence from counsel or the applicant. Therefore, the record is complete.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant’s own

testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and lived in continuous unlawful status during the requisite period consists of affidavits and letters. Some of the evidence submitted indicates that the applicant resided in the United States after May 4, 1988; however, because evidence of residence after May 4, 1988 is not probative of residence during the requisite time period, it shall not be discussed.

The affidavits from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] all contain statements that the affiants have known the applicant for years and that attest to the applicant being physically present in the United States during all or part of the required period. These affiants fail, however, to establish the applicant's continuous unlawful residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality; an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony; and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility.

The AAO notes that in his affidavit dated June 27, 1992, [REDACTED] stated that he had known the applicant in the United States since June 1981. This statement is inconsistent with the applicant's statement that he first entered the United States in November 1981. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *See Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

None of the witness statements provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with him, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence during the time addressed in the affidavits. To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. Upon review, the AAO finds that, individually and together, the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true. Therefore, they have little probative value.

The record of proceeding also contains a letter from [REDACTED] on St. Joseph College Seminary, Loyola University and is dated December 9, 2005. [REDACTED] states that he was the pastor of the Maternity B.V.M Church from 1976 to 1988 and during that time he baptized [REDACTED] on February 8, 1986 and the applicant attended the baptism as the godfather. [REDACTED] also states that the applicant lived in the parish and attended mass and parish activities. Finally, he states that the applicant lived in the parish from 1981 to 1986. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v) provides requirements for attestations made on behalf of an applicant by churches, unions, or other organizations. Attestations must: (1) Identify applicant by name; (2) be signed by an official (whose title is shown); (3) show inclusive dates of membership; (4) state the address where applicant resided during membership period; (5) include the seal of the organization impressed on the letter or the letterhead of the organization, if the organization has letterhead stationery; (6) establish how the author knows the applicant; and (7) establish the origin of the information being attested to. The letters submitted do not provide all of the information required by 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v). Given these deficiencies, this letter has minimal probative value in supporting the applicant's claims that he entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and resided in the United States for the entire requisite period.

The record of proceeding also contains an employer letter on American Body Shop signed by [REDACTED] owner and dated October 26, 1993. The letter states that the applicant worked from December 1981 to August 1984 as a position helper. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records

are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable. The letters submitted do not provide all of the information required by 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i). Given these deficiencies, this letter has minimal probative value in supporting the applicant's claims that she entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and resided in the United States for the entire requisite period.

The record of proceeding contains an employer letter on Brookfield Farms letterhead signed by [REDACTED], plant supt. and dated May 6, 1996. Mr. [REDACTED] states that the applicant worked as a full-time laborer in the cleaning department from August 30, 1984 to September 1994. Mr. [REDACTED] states that the applicant was paid \$5.69 per hour and was never laid off. Finally, he states that the applicant worked under the name [REDACTED] and used [REDACTED] social security number. The record of proceeding also contains time sheets, employment records, and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Forms W-2 for [REDACTED] listing Brookfield Farms as the employer from 1984 to 1988. These documents are evidence of [REDACTED] residence in the United States from 1984 to 1988. In addition, in his affidavit, [REDACTED] states that he was the applicant's supervisor at Brookfield Farms from August 1984 to September 1994. Mr. [REDACTED] states that the applicant used the name [REDACTED] and his corresponding social security number during his employment for Brookfield Farms. Mr. [REDACTED] also provides the dates that the applicant took for vacation, but he does not state how he remembers the applicant's dates of employment or the source of the information provided.

The AAO notes that [REDACTED] is the applicant's father and that the record of proceeding contains IRS Form 1040A for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], the applicant's parents, for 1987. The tax form only includes the wages from the Brookfield Farms 1987 IRS Forms W-2. Although Mr. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] stated that the applicant used the name [REDACTED] the use of the 1987 IRS Form W-2 in [REDACTED] income tax filing creates doubt that the applicant in fact worked under the name [REDACTED]. As stated previously, doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *See Matter of Ho, supra.*

The record of proceeding contains two baptism certificates and a receipt. The baptism certificates indicate that the applicant was the godfather and was in attendance on February 25, 1984 and June 28, 1986. The record of proceeding also contains a receipt dated May 7, 1986. Although the certificates and receipt may indicate presence in the United States on the date issued, they can only be accorded minimal weight as evidence of residence.

The remaining evidence in the record is comprised of the applicant's statements and application forms, in which he claims to have entered the United States in November 1981. The applicant has not submitted any additional evidence in support of his claim that he was physically present or had continuous residence in the United States during the entire requisite period or that he entered the United States in 1981.

Upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO agrees with the director that the evidence submitted by the applicant has not established that he is eligible for the benefit sought.

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Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.