

identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529 - 2090

PUBLIC COPY



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

41

FILE:

MSC-06-102-10571

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date:

SEP 14 2009

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:


Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.


John F. Grissom
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Los Angeles. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period.

On appeal, the applicant submits a statement explaining the inconsistencies noted by the director in his denial.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant’s own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and lived in continuous unlawful status during the requisite period consists of affidavits, letters, and other documents. Some of the evidence submitted indicates that the applicant resided in the United States after May 4, 1988; however, because evidence of residence after May 4, 1988 is not probative of residence during the requisite time period, it shall not be discussed.

The affidavits from [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] all contain statements that the affiants have known the applicant for years and that attest to the applicant being physically present in the United States during all or part of the required period. These affiants fail, however, to establish the applicant's continuous unlawful residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality; an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony; and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility.

As noted by the director, all of the affidavits submitted contain information that is inconsistent with the applicant's Form I-687 and the record of proceeding. In his Form I-687 and a previous prepared Form I-687, the applicant listed two addresses during the requisite time period: [REDACTED]

Long Beach, California from January 1981 to December 1987 and [REDACTED] Park, California from January 1988 to December 1989. The affidavit submitted by [REDACTED] states that the applicant lived in Glasgow, Inglewood, California from 1981 to 1984 and in Los Angeles, California from 1984 to mid 1990. The record contains a second affidavit of [REDACTED] dated 1991 stating that the applicant lived in Glasgow, Los Angeles from January 1990 to June 1991. In his affidavit, [REDACTED] stated that the applicant lived in Inglewood, California from 1983 to 1987 and in Los Angeles, California from 1987 to 1991. In her affidavit, [REDACTED] stated that the applicant lived in Inglewood, California from 1983 to 1987 and in Los Angeles, California from 1987 to 1991.

On appeal, the applicant claims that he lived at [REDACTED] from 1981 to 1984 and at [REDACTED] Inglewood, California from 1984 to 1987. The applicant states that the address information provided by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was incorrect. However, the applicant does not submit a new affidavit from [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] and does not provide other evidence that he lived in Inglewood, California from 1984 to 1987. In addition, the applicant states that the affidavit signed by [REDACTED] should state that he left in the month of September and not in June. Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for the purpose of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

None of the witness statements provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with him, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence during the time addressed in the affidavits. To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. Upon review, the AAO finds that, individually and together, the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true. Therefore, they have little probative value.

The applicant submitted an employment letter signed by [REDACTED] and dated August 20, 1991. The letter states that the applicant worked for The Picasso from 1981 to 1987 and from 1988 to 1990. The letter does not state the applicant's position, his wages, or the source of the information. The record of proceeding also contains an affidavit signed by [REDACTED] and dated October 28, 1991. The affidavit states that the applicant was employed as a "labor/maintenance" from January 1982 to December 1990. The affidavit also states that the applicant was paid in cash and that there are no payroll records. The AAO notes that [REDACTED] letter and affidavit provide inconsistent starting dates for the applicant. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *See Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i), the employer letters submitted do not provide sufficient information. Given these deficiencies, these letters have minimal probative value in supporting the applicant's claims that he entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and resided in the United States for the entire requisite period.

The record of proceeding also contains copies of postmarked envelopes dated November 11, 1983; July 1984; June 5, 1985; and September 12, 1987. All of the envelopes are addressed to the applicant at [REDACTED]. On appeal, the applicant stated that he lived in Inglewood California from 1984 to 1987. Therefore, the addresses on the envelopes are inconsistent with the applicant's statement on appeal. Further, the AAO notes that the envelope postmarked November 11, 1983 contains a stamp that, according to *Scotts Catalogue 2009*, was first issued on December 2, 1992. As stated previously, doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *See Matter of Ho, supra.*

The record of proceeding also contains receipts dated August 4, 1983; March 27, 1984; July 18, 1985; February 13, 1986; November 14, 1986; and September 10, 1987. Although the receipts include the applicant's name, only the receipt dated September 10, 1987 lists an address for the applicant. The address on the 1987 receipt is [REDACTED]. On appeal, the applicant stated that he in fact lived in Inglewood, California from 1984 to 1987. As stated previously, doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *See Matter of Ho, supra.* Therefore, the address on the receipt is inconsistent with the applicant's statement on appeal. Receipts may indicate presence in the United States on the date issued but they can only be accorded minimal weight as evidence of residence.

The remaining evidence in the record is comprised of the applicant's statements and application forms, in which he claims to have entered the United States in 1981. The AAO notes that the record of proceeding contains inconsistent information regarding the applicant's first entry into the United States. In the Form I-687, the applicant states that he lived in Long Beach, California beginning in January 1981. In the Form I-589, Request for Asylum in the United States the applicant states that the date of his first entry was May 1, 1981. In a class membership form signed by the applicant, the applicant states that he first entered the United States in January 1981. As stated previously, doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *See Matter of Ho, supra.* The applicant has not submitted any additional evidence in support of his claim that he was physically present or had continuous residence in the United States during the entire requisite period or that he entered the United States in 1981.

Upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO agrees with the director that the evidence submitted by the applicant has not established that he is eligible for the benefit sought.

An alien who has been convicted of a felony or of three or more misdemeanors committed in the United States is ineligible for adjustment to temporary resident status. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(c)(1). On appeal, the applicant stated that has only one misdemeanor conviction. The AAO notes that the record of proceeding contains two dispositions for the applicant. On December 7, 1995, the applicant was arrested and charged with Section 484 A PC Misdemeanor – *Theft of Property*. On January 9, 1996, the applicant was convicted of the charge for theft of property by the Municipal Court of Torrence, County of Los Angeles, State of California and placed on summary probation for two years. On April 29, 1995, the applicant was arrested and charged with Section 374.8(B) PC Misdemeanor – *Deposit Hazardous Substance*. On May 23, 1995, the applicant was convicted of the charge for deposit hazardous substance by the Municipal Court of Torrence, County of Los Angeles, State of California and fined \$100. . These two misdemeanor convictions do not affect applicant's eligibility for temporary resident status.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.