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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
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U.S. Citizenship  
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FILE: [REDACTED]  
MSC 06 098 15018

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date: **SEP 17 2009**

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

John F. Grissom  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Los Angeles . The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director determined that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period, and that the evidence submitted by him did not establish his eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not met his burden of proof and was, therefore, not eligible to adjust to temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements. Specifically, the director noted that the applicant supplied conflicting information about his original entry into the United States and his residence here during the requisite period.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief stating that a Notice Of Intent To Deny (NOID) should have been submitted prior to the director's denial of the application, and that the evidence of record is sufficient to sustain the claim.

The applicant incorrectly asserts on appeal that the director was required to issue a NOID pursuant to paragraph 7 of the CSS Settlement Agreement. According to the settlement agreement, the director shall issue a NOID before denying an application for class membership. Here, the director adjudicated the Form I-687 application on the merits. As a result, the director is found not to have denied the application for class membership.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The record contains the following evidence which is material to the applicant's claim:

- **The applicant submitted numerous witness statements in support of his application.** The statements are general in nature and state that the witnesses have knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States for all, or a portion of, the requisite period.

As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. The witness statements provided do not provide detailed evidence establishing how the witnesses knew the applicant, the details of their association or relationship, or detailed accounts of an ongoing association establishing a relationship under which the witnesses could be reasonably

expected to have personal knowledge of the applicant's residence, activities and whereabouts during the requisite period covered by the applicant's Form I-687. To be considered probative, witness statements must do more than simply state that a witness knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. The statements must contain sufficient detail, generated by the asserted contact with the applicant, to establish that a relationship does in fact exist, how the relationship was established and sustained, and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts asserted. The witness statements submitted by the applicant, therefore, are not deemed probative and are of little evidentiary value.

It should further be noted that the witness statements contradict the sworn testimony given by the applicant in other United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) proceedings, and contradict information provided by the applicant on the Form I-687. Some of the witnesses provided more than one statement and the information contained in their statements is contradictory.

- Many of the witnesses attest to the applicant's residence in the United States prior to January 1, 1982. The applicant testified under oath on July 1, 1998 in removal proceedings that he first arrived in the United States on October 20, 1986. The applicant signed a Form G-325A, under penalty of law for providing false information, stating that he lived in Mexico from January of 1967 until October of 1986.
- [REDACTED] submitted an affidavit on April 8, 1998 stating that he has known the applicant since October of 1986 and to the best of his knowledge the applicant has been living in Santa Ana, California. In an affidavit dated November 27, 2005, the same affiant states that he is the applicant's cousin and that the applicant first came to the United States in 1981 and lived with him at that time.
- [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] submitted an affidavit dated April 3, 1998 stating that they have personal knowledge that the applicant came to the United States on October 1, 1986. In an affidavit dated October 8, 1990, [REDACTED] states that she had knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States from November of 1981 until October of 1986.
- [REDACTED] submitted an affidavit dated October 8, 1990 wherein she stated that the applicant resided in Fountain Valley, California from November of 1986 until June of 1987. The applicant states on the Form I-687 that he resided at [REDACTED] Santa Ana, California from October of 1986 until December of 1988.

The inconsistencies noted have not been explained and are material to the applicant's claim because they have a direct bearing on the applicant's activities and whereabouts during the requisite period. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the

remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). The noted inconsistencies bring into question the probative value and credibility of all of the applicant's evidence.

- Additional evidence was also submitted in support of the applicant's claim: copies of stamped registered mail receipts for the years: 1986, 1987, and 1988; copies of pay stubs for the years: 1986, 1987, and 1988; copies of merchandise receipts, a tax return and a California identification card for 1987; and a W-2 form, a California drivers license and a tax return for 1988.
- The applicant submitted copies of stamped envelopes addressed to the applicant during the requisite period. The envelopes, however, do not contain legible post marks to establish the date of mailing. They are, therefore, of no probative value.

The applicant submitted two employment statements in support of his claim:

- [REDACTED], submitted a statement indicating that the applicant had worked for his organization since October of 1986, and that the applicant currently holds the position of General Manager.
- [REDACTED] submitted an affidavit wherein he states that the applicant worked for him in his landscaping business from November of 1981 until October of 1986.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable. The employment statements submitted by the applicant fail to provide the information required by the above-cited regulation. The statements do not provide: the applicant's address at the time of employment; show periods of layoff (or state that there were none); declare whether the information provided was taken from company records; or identify the location of such company records and state whether they are accessible or in the alternative why they are unavailable. As such, the employment statements are not deemed probative and are of little evidentiary value.

The applicant also submitted his personal statements in support of his application. The applicant's statements, however, in the absence of other credible and relevant evidence establishing his residence in the United States during the requisite period, will not sustain his claim. This is especially true given the inconsistencies attributed to the applicant discussed above. As previously noted, in order to meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The absence of sufficiently detailed documentation to corroborate the applicant's claim of continuous residence for the entire requisite period, and the inconsistencies noted of record, seriously detract from the credibility of his claim. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value and inconsistencies in the record, it is concluded that the evidence submitted fails to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States during the requisite period.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he has continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

On September 3, 2004, the applicant was convicted of the offense of *unlawfully enter and attempt to enter the United State at a place other than as designated by Immigration officers*, in violation of Title 8, U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). ( [REDACTED] )

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.