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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



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SEP 30 2009

FILE: [REDACTED] Office: DALLAS Date:
MSC-06-089-12803

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

John F. Grissom
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Dallas. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. Specifically, the director noted that the applicant was absent from the United States from April 1999 until July 1999. The director concluded that this absence represented a break in the applicant's continuous residence since it exceeded 45 days. The director also noted that the applicant had not established that his return to the United States was delayed for an emergent reason.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that he has established his unlawful residence for the requisite time period and that his absence in 1999 is irrelevant to his eligibility for the benefit sought.

The AAO has conducted a *de novo* review, evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in the record according to its probative value and credibility as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). In this case, the AAO agrees with the applicant that his absence in 1999 is irrelevant to his eligibility for temporary resident status.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to

timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10. Thus, his absence in 1999 is outside the relevant period. This portion of the director's decision will be withdrawn.

However, the AAO finds that the director's determination that the applicant has not established his continuous residence for the entire relevant period is supported by the evidence contained in the record.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v.*

Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and lived in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of two affidavits and one employment letter. The AAO has reviewed each document to determine the applicant's eligibility; however, the AAO will not quote each witness statement in this decision.

The first affiant, [REDACTED] indicates that the applicant lived in his home from August 1979 until November 1986. He indicates that his home address is [REDACTED] in Dallas, Texas. He does not indicate any other address or whether the applicant lived at this address. He offers no additional information. On his Form I-687 application, the applicant indicates that he lived at [REDACTED] in Garland, Texas from August 1979 until November 1986. Since the affiant does not provide sufficient information to establish where the applicant lived, and the only address provided is inconsistent with the applicant's Form I-687, this affidavit will be given no evidentiary weight.

The second affiant, [REDACTED] indicates that the applicant lived at [REDACTED] from 1986 until January 1987; [REDACTED] from January 1987 until November 1987; and [REDACTED] from November 1987 until November 1988. While these addresses are consistent with the addresses provided by the applicant on his Form I-687 the affiant has not provided enough information to be considered credible. Specifically, he does not indicate how he dates his initial meeting with the applicant, how frequently he had contact with the applicant, or how he has personal knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States.

Finally, the record of proceedings contains a letter, dated December 28, 1989, signed by [REDACTED], Personnel Administrator of Continental Steel Company. Ms. [REDACTED] indicates that [REDACTED] was hired with the company from February 28, 1980 until March 52, 1982. He was rehired in May 1982 and left the company in December 1983. He was then re-hired in June 1984 under the name [REDACTED] and remained with the company until February 1987. The affiant notarized her own signature. The letter also fails to meet certain regulatory standards set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i), which provides that letters from employers must include the applicant's address at the time of employment; exact period of employment; whether the information was taken from official company records and where records are located and whether CIS may have access to the records; if records are unavailable, an affidavit form-letter stating that the employment records are unavailable may be accepted which shall be signed, attested to by the employer under penalty of perjury and shall state the employer's willingness to come forward and give testimony if requested. The statement by [REDACTED] does not include

much of the required information and can be afforded minimal weight as evidence of the applicant's residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period.

Accompanying the letter are W-2 forms for 1980-1987. However, these documents all contain different addresses and names. The records for 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983 are all in the name "[REDACTED]" While the applicant indicates that he used this name. In cases where an applicant claims to have met any of the eligibility criteria under an assumed name, the applicant has the burden of proving that the applicant was in fact the person who used that name. The applicant's true identity is established pursuant to the requirements of paragraph (b)(4)(1) and (ii) of this section. The assumed name must appear in the documentation provided by the applicant to establish eligibility. To meet the requirement of this paragraph, documentation must be submitted to prove the common identity, i.e., that the assumed name was in fact used by the applicant. **8 C.F.R. § 245a.4(b)(4)(iii).** In this case, the applicant has not submitted any documentation, other than the affidavit from [REDACTED], which would indicate that he used the name "[REDACTED]"

It is also noted that On May 13, 1997, the applicant pled guilty to violating 8 USC 1325(a)(3) *Attempted Illegal Entry by False and Misleading Representation*. The applicant was convicted of the offense and served 180 days imprisonment.

According to a report based upon the applicant's fingerprints, the Garland police department arrested the applicant on March 27, 1994 and charged him with *driving while intoxicated*. The report indicates that the applicant was arrested on October 4, 1998 and on November 30, 1998 and charged with *attempting illegal entry* into the United States.

An applicant for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides:

Misrepresentation. – (i) In general. – Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

The AAO finds that the applicant's act of willfully misrepresenting a material fact renders him inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).

Section 245A(d)(2)(B)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(i), permits the Secretary of Homeland Security to waive certain grounds of inadmissibility, including inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, “in the case of individual aliens for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.” However, the applicant has not filed a Form I-690 Waiver at this time.

Upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO agrees with the director that the evidence submitted by the applicant has not established that he is eligible for the benefit sought.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M-*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.