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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529 - 2090



**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**

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FILE:



Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

Date:

**AUG 17 2010**

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the director of the Texas Service Center. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant was ineligible for adjustment to temporary resident status because she had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that she had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant asserts that the evidence which the applicant previously submitted establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that she continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. The applicant has submitted additional evidence on appeal. The AAO has considered the applicant's assertions, reviewed all of the evidence, and has made a *de novo* decision based on the record and the AAO's assessment of the credibility, relevance and probative value of the evidence.<sup>1</sup>

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The

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<sup>1</sup> The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. The AAO's *de novo* authority is well recognized by the federal courts. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I & N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA).

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she has resided in the United States for the requisite statutory period. The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has established that she (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of her claim to have arrived in the United

States before January 1982 and lived in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of witness statements and documents. The AAO has reviewed each document in its entirety to determine the applicant's eligibility. Some of the evidence submitted indicates that the applicant resided in the United States after May 4, 1988; however, because evidence of residence after May 4, 1988 is not probative of residence during the requisite time period, it shall not be discussed.

The applicant has submitted witness statements from [REDACTED]. The statements are general in nature and state that the witnesses have knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States for all, or a portion of, the requisite period.

Although the witnesses claim to have personal knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period, the witness statements do not provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with her, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations, and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. To be considered probative and credible, witness statements must do more than simply state that a witness knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that it probably did exist and that the witness, by virtue of that relationship, does have knowledge of the facts alleged. For instance, the witnesses do not state how they date their initial meeting with the applicant in the United States or specify social gatherings, other special occasions or social events when they saw and communicated with the applicant during the requisite period. The witnesses do not provide sufficient details that would lend credence to their claimed knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. For these reasons the AAO finds that the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true.

The record contains employment verification letters from [REDACTED] M.D., [REDACTED].

The employment verification letter of [REDACTED] states that she hired the applicant, who worked as a part-time housekeeper for her father for two years. However, although the witness states that she has known the applicant since January 1982, the witness does not state which years she employed the applicant. In addition, in the instant I-687 application, in the initial I-687 application filed in 1992, and at the time of an interview on May 12, 2004, the applicant did not list any employment as a housekeeper during the requisite statutory period. For these reasons, this letter will be given no weight.

In two employment verification letters, [REDACTED] M.D. states that the applicant was employed as a part-time housekeeper by his mother between 1981 and 1986. However, as stated above, in the instant I-687 application, in the initial I-687 application filed in 1992, and at the time of an interview on May 12, 2004, the applicant did not list any employment as a

housekeeper during the requisite statutory period. For this reason, these letters will be given no weight.

The employment verification letter of [REDACTED] states that the applicant worked for his father as a part-time housekeeper from December 1981 through to the end of the requisite period. However, as stated above, in the instant I-687 application, in the initial I-687 application filed in 1992, and at the time of an interview on May 12, 2004, the applicant does not list any employment as a housekeeper during the requisite statutory period. For this reason, this letter will be given no weight.

The employment verification letter of [REDACTED] states that the applicant worked for The [REDACTED] from 1981 through the end of the requisite period. However, a review of the letter clearly shows that it has been altered, front and back, with whiteout. The letter was altered to reflect the applicant's first name and the position of typist. The altered name is material to the applicant's claim, in that it has a direct bearing on the applicant's residence during the requisite period. Therefore, this document will be given no weight. Furthermore, doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I & N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA). This alteration undermines the credibility of the applicant's claim of entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.

In addition, the employment verification letters of [REDACTED], M.D., [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] do not meet the requirements set forth in the regulations, which provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) provides that letters from employers must include: (A) Alien's address at the time of employment; (B) Exact period of employment; (C) Periods of layoff; (D) Duties with the company; (E) Whether or not the information was taken from official company records; and (F) Where records are located and whether the Service may have access to the records. If the records are unavailable, an affidavit-form letter stating that the alien's employment records are unavailable and why such records are unavailable may be accepted in lieu of subsections (E) and (F). The employment verification letters fail to comply with the above cited regulation because they lack considerable detail regarding the applicant's employment. For instance, the witnesses do not state the number of hours the applicant was employed, her employment duties or the exact period of her employment. Furthermore, the witnesses do not state how they were able to date the applicant's employment. It is unclear whether they referred to their own recollection or any records they may have maintained. For these reasons, the employment verification letters are of little probative value.

The applicant has submitted a copy of several pages from her Brazilian passport number [REDACTED], obtained in Brazil on September 15, 1986. Pages 8 and 9 of the passport contain a copy of a nonimmigrant B-2 visitor's visa obtained in Sao Paulo on September 16, 1986, and a copy of an Orlando entry stamp dated October 11, 1986. The also contains a Form I-94, arrival/departure record, which contains an Orlando entry stamp dated October 11, 1986. The

applicant has also submitted a copy of a ticket and baggage check coupon listing a flight scheduled from Orlando to Newark on October 13, 1986.

The record contains a copy of a shipping receipt dated January 6, 1987. The record also contains a copy of a certificate stating the applicant's attendance in ESL classes in New Rochelle, New York in the fall of 1987 to the spring of 1988.

These documents are some evidence in support of the applicant's residence in the United States during some part of 1986, 1987 and 1988.

While the documents listed above indicate that the applicant resided in the United States for some part of the requisite period, considered individually and together with other evidence of record, they do not establish the applicant's continuous residence for the duration of the requisite period.

The remaining evidence in the record is comprised of copies of the applicant's statements, the instant I-687 application, the initial I-687 application, filed in 1992 to establish the applicant's CSS class membership, and a Form I-485, application to adjust to permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act. The AAO finds in its *de novo* review that the record of proceedings contains materially inconsistent statements from the applicant regarding the date of her initial entry into and absences from the United States during the requisite statutory period.

In the instant I-687 application, the applicant stated that she first entered the United States on August 18, 1981, and listed one absence from the United States from September to November 1986.

In the initial I-687 application, filed in 1992, the applicant listed one absence from the United States from September 8, 1986 to October 11, 1986.

The record contains a Form G-325A, biographic information sheet, filed contemporaneously with the I-485 application and signed by the applicant on May 16, 2002. The Form G325A requests applicants to list their last address outside the United States of more than one year. In the Form G-325A, the applicant stated that she resided in S. Paulo, Brazil, from 1980 to October 1981.

In a Form G-325A signed by the applicant in 2007, the applicant stated that she resided in S. Paulo, Brazil, from 1980 to August 1981.

The applicant has failed to provide probative and credible evidence of her continuous residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. The inconsistencies regarding the dates of the applicant's first entry into the United States and absence from the United States are material to the applicant's claim, in that they have a direct bearing on the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. No evidence of record resolves these inconsistencies. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining

evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I & N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA). These contradictions undermine the credibility of the applicant's claim of entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.

Upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO finds that the evidence submitted by the applicant has not established that she is eligible for the benefit sought. The various statements currently in the record which attempt to substantiate the applicant's residence and employment in the United States during the statutory period are not objective, independent evidence such that they might overcome the inconsistencies in the record regarding the applicant's claim that she maintained continuous residence in the United States throughout the statutory period, and thus are not probative.

Based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.