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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529 - 2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

LA

[Redacted]

FILE:

MSC-05-046-10147

Office: CHICAGO

Date:

AUG 25 2010

IN RE:

Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

[Redacted Signature]  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

at the time of the...  
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**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, or *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004, (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements) was denied by the director of the Chicago office and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.


The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman (LULAC) Class Membership Worksheet. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. The director also denied the application, stating that testimony from other sources, including other applicants who employed the same preparer for their application, established that documents submitted by the applicant in support of the application were fraudulent. However, this basis of denial is erroneous, since the director, in not identifying the documents alleged to be fraudulent, did not permit the applicant an opportunity to respond to the allegations. However, the director's error is harmless because the AAO conducts a *de novo* review, evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in the record according to its probative value and credibility as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).<sup>1</sup>

On appeal, counsel for the applicant asserts that the evidence which the applicant previously submitted establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. Counsel has submitted two briefs on appeal. The applicant has submitted additional evidence on appeal.<sup>2</sup>

The applicant also asserts a claim based upon ineffective assistance of counsel concerning the preparer of the application, whom the applicant mistakenly believed to be an attorney, but who is neither an attorney nor an accredited representative. The applicant alleges that he mistakenly believed that his representative could provide legal advice regarding his application. It is noted that any appeal based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires: (1) that the claim be supported by an affidavit of the allegedly aggrieved applicant setting forth in detail the agreement that was entered into with counsel with respect to the actions to be taken and what representations counsel did or did not make to the applicant in this regard, (2) that counsel whose integrity or competence is being impugned be informed of the allegations leveled against him and be given an opportunity to respond, and (3) that the appeal reflect whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate disciplinary authorities with respect to any violation of counsel's ethical or legal responsibilities, and if not, why not. *Matter of Lozada*, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), *aff'd*, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988). Although counsel notes that the applicant was not assisted by an attorney but by an individual whom the applicant believed to be an attorney, there is no remedy available for an applicant who assumes the risk of authorizing an unlicensed attorney or unaccredited representative to undertake representations on his behalf. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 292.1. The AAO only considers complaints based upon ineffective

<sup>1</sup> The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. The AAO's *de novo* authority is well recognized by the federal courts. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

<sup>2</sup> The record reflects that the applicant's FOIA request HOU96000293 was processed on July 18, 1996.



assistance against accredited representatives. [REDACTED] 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), *aff'd*, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988) (requiring an appellant to meet certain criteria when filing an appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel). In addition, the applicant failed to fulfill the requirements listed above. Specifically, the applicant failed to provide an affidavit describing the agreement with the representative, evidence that the prior representative was informed of the allegations and given an opportunity to respond, and information regarding whether a complaint has been filed with disciplinary authorities. Therefore, the applicant is found not to have established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.


An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the [REDACTED] Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of



the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I & N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA).


The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has established that he (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and lived in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of witness statements and documents. The AAO has reviewed each document in its entirety to determine the applicant's eligibility. Some of the evidence submitted indicates that the applicant resided in the United States after May 4, 1988; however, because evidence of residence after May 4, 1988 is not probative of residence during the requisite time period, it shall not be discussed.

The applicant has submitted witness statements from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] cousins).

and [REDACTED] are general in nature and state that the affiants have knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States for all, or a portion of, the requisite period.

Although these witnesses claim to have personal knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period, the witness statements do not provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with him, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations, and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that it probably did exist and that the witness, by virtue of that relationship, does have knowledge of the facts alleged. For instance the witnesses do not state how they date their initial



meeting with the applicant in the United States or specify social gatherings, other special occasions or social events when they saw and communicated with the applicant during the requisite period. The affiants also do not state how frequently they had contact with the applicant during the requisite period. The affiants do not provide sufficient details that would lend credence to their claimed knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. For these reasons the AAO finds that these witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true.

In addition, [REDACTED] states that, after entering the United States with the applicant in 1981, he lived in several places before returning to Mexico, although he does not state when he returned to Mexico. Therefore, the witness may have been living in Mexico during the requisite period and, therefore, would not have first-hand knowledge of the applicant's continuous residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. For this additional reason, the witness's statement has minimal probative value.


In addition, the applicant submitted employment verification letters from [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] Tile Company in Houston and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] states that the applicant was employed with Quinones Tile Company from August 1981 to December 1985 as a tile setter, also performing the duties of fencing and planting grass.

[REDACTED] states that the applicant worked for her as a maintenance worker from July 1986 through the end of the requisite period.

The employment verification letters of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] do not meet the requirements set forth in the regulations, which provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) provides that letters from employers must include: (A) Alien's address at the time of employment; (B) Exact period of employment; (C) Periods of layoff; (D) Duties with the company; (E) Whether or not the information was taken from official company records; and (F) Where records are located and whether the Service may have access to the records. If the records are unavailable, an affidavit-form letter stating that the alien's employment records are unavailable and why such records are unavailable may be accepted in lieu of subsections (E) and (F). The employment verification letters fail to comply with the above cited regulation because they lack considerable detail regarding the applicant's employment. Furthermore, [REDACTED] does not state how she was able to date the applicant's employment. It is unclear whether she referred to her own recollection or any records she may have maintained. For these additional reasons, the employment verification letter of Luisa Gonzalez is of little probative value.

In addition, the record contains two witness statements from [REDACTED] in Houston, stating that the applicant was a member of the church from July 1981 through the end of the requisite period. However, the applicant failed to list his membership in San Alphonsus Church, or any other religious organization, in the initial I-687 application, filed in 1991 to establish the applicant's CSS class membership. At part 31 of the application, where applicants are asked to list their involvement with any religious organizations, the applicant did not list any organizations. This is an inconsistency which is material to the applicant's claim in that it has a direct bearing on the applicant's



residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. As stated above, doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. [REDACTED] This contradiction undermines the credibility of the applicant's claim of entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.<sup>3</sup>

More importantly, the witness statements do not meet the requirements set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v), which provides requirements for attestations made on behalf of an applicant by churches, unions, or other organizations. Attestations must: (1) identify applicant by name; (2) be signed by an official (whose title is shown); (3) show inclusive dates of membership; (4) state the address where the applicant resided during membership period; (5) include the seal of the organization impressed on the letter or the letterhead of the organization, if the organization has letterhead stationery; (6) establish how the author knows the applicant; and (7) establish the origin of the information being attested to. This attestation fails to comply with the cited regulation. Therefore, this attestation will be given no weight.

[REDACTED]

However, the applicant did not list this company as an employer in either of the two I-687 applications. Due to these inconsistencies, this document will be given no weight.

The remaining evidence in the record is comprised of copies of the applicant's statements, the instant I-687 application, the initial I-687 application, filed in 1991 to establish the applicant's CSS class membership and a Form I-485, application to adjust to permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act. The AAO finds in its *de novo* review that the record of proceedings contains materially inconsistent statements from the applicant regarding his marital status, and his absences from the United States during the requisite statutory period.


In the initial I-687 application, filed in 1991, and in a class member worksheet filed contemporaneously with the application, the applicant did not list any absences from the United States since the date of his entry into the United States on July 16, 1981. In addition, the applicant listed his marital status as "single".

In a Form G-325A, signed on September 12, 2001 and filed contemporaneously with the I-485 application, the applicant stated that he was married on February 8, 1985 in Mexico.

In the instant I-687 application, the applicant listed one absence from the United States during the requisite period, from December 12, 1987 to January 1, 1988.

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<sup>3</sup> In addition, the applicant submitted a witness statement from [REDACTED] Church in Chicago, who states that the applicant has been a member of the church since October 1994. However, the applicant failed to list his membership in this church on the instant Form I-687 application. While outside of the requisite period, this inconsistency calls into question the veracity of the applicant's testimony regarding his continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.



In a statement dated July 20, 2009, the applicant stated that he departed the United States two times during the requisite period, from January 12, 1985 to February 20, 1985 and from December 14, 1987 to January 14, 1988, respectively.

These contradictions are material to the applicant's claim in that they have a direct bearing on the applicant's residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. As stated above, doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho, supra*. The contradictions undermine the credibility of the applicant's claim of entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period. The applicant has failed to provide probative and credible evidence of his continuous residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. The inconsistencies regarding his marital status and the dates of his absences from the United States are material to the applicant's claim, in that they have a direct bearing on the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. No evidence of record resolves these inconsistencies. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho, 19 I & N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA)*. These contradictions undermine the credibility of the applicant's claim of entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.

Upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO agrees with the director that the evidence submitted by the applicant has not established that he is eligible for the benefit sought. The various statements currently in the record which attempt to substantiate the applicant's residence and employment in the United States during the statutory period are not objective, independent evidence such that they might overcome the inconsistencies in the record regarding the applicant's claim that he maintained continuous residence in the United States throughout the statutory period, and thus are not probative. Therefore, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status on this basis.

Based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E-M-*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.

