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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE: [REDACTED]
MSC 06 073 13922

Office: CHICAGO

Date: FEB 04 2010

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the National Benefits Center. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Chicago, Illinois. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director determined that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status throughout the requisite time period.

In support of the appeal, the applicant submits additional documentation.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the

director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). *See* 8 C.F.R. 245a.15(b). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(f). Affidavits indicating specific, personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the relevant time period are given greater weight than fill-in-the-blank affidavits providing generic information.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident Under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, on December 12, 2005.

The application was initially denied by the director on September 22, 2006, and the applicant filed an appeal from that decision on October 19, 2006. The AAO remanded the record to the director on August 15, 2008, for further consideration and action. The director issued a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) the application on September 5, 2008, and issued a Notice to Deny (NOD) the application on October 7, 2008. On December 28, 2008, the applicant submitted the instant appeal from the director's second denial of the application, asserting that the NOID and NOD had been mailed to him at an incorrect address – that he had never received the NOID and that he did not receive the NOD until after November 18, 2008. Therefore, on December 8, 2009, the AAO issued a letter to the applicant, providing him with a copy of the NOID setting for the director's reasons for his intent to deny the application. In response to that letter, the applicant submitted additional documentation.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has established that he resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite time period.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review this matter on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also*, *Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp.*, NTSB, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The federal courts have long recognized the AAO's *de novo* review authority. *See*, e.g. *Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).

The applicant, a native and citizen of Mexico, claims to have initially entered the United States without inspection in February 1981 (at 13 years-of-age), having traveled through the border near Chula Vista, California with his family, and to have resided in California from 1981 through 1990. At an interview on September 14, 2006, the applicant stated under oath that he returned to Mexico due to family problems in 1990 (his parents separated) where he remained until 1994. He

then returned to the United States (to reside in Chicago) in 1994. During the time period from 1981 through 1988, the applicant claims to have departed the United States for brief visits to Mexico due to family business and emergency issues on three occasions: from January 1983 to February 1983; from October to November 1984; and, from January to February 1986.

The applicant submitted the following documentation in support of his application: utility bills in his father's name dated December 1981, April 1982, July 1983, and July 1994; utility bills in his name dated December 1985, August 1986, and December 1988; and documentation indicating his presence in the United States in or after 1994. The applicant also submitted affidavits from individuals that are general in nature and state the affiants have knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States for all, or portions of, the requisite time period. Only two of the affiants ([REDACTED] and [REDACTED]) claim to have knowledge of the applicant's presence in the United States prior to January 1, 1982.

In summary, for the time period from prior to January 1, 1982, through 1985, the applicant has provided no employment letters that comply with the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i)(A) through (F), no utility bills according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(ii), no school records according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(iii), no hospital or medical records according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(iv), and no attestations from churches, unions, or other organizations that comply with the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v). The applicant also has not provided documentation (including, for example, money order receipts, passport entries, children's birth certificates, bank book transactions, letters of correspondence, a Social Security card, Selective Service card, automobile, contract, and insurance documentation, deeds or mortgage contracts, tax receipts, or insurance policies) according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(A) through (K). The documentation provided by the applicant to establish his continuous unlawful residence in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982 through 1985 consists solely of third-party affidavits ("other relevant documentation"). These documents lack specific details as to how the affiants knew the applicant, how often and under what circumstances they had contact with the applicant, and provide no basis for concluding that the affiants actually had direct and personal knowledge of the events and circumstances of the applicant's residence in the United States. As such, the statements can only be afforded minimal weight.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the paucity of the documentation submitted, it is concluded that he has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982 through the date he filed a Form I-687 application as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

As always in these proceedings, the burden of proof rests solely with the applicant. Section 245a.2(d)(5) of the Act.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.