

identifying data deleted to  
prevent clearly unwarranted  
invasion of personal privacy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

**PUBLIC COPY**

L1



FILE:



Office: NEW YORK

Date: FEB 23 2010

MSC 05 230 13350

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

*Elizabeth McCormack*

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, New York. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not provided credible evidence to establish that he had entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982, and thereafter continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period.

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant submitted sufficient documentation to warrant an approval.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10. The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

At issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant submitted sufficient credible evidence to meet his burden of establishing that he (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1, 1982 and lived in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of affidavits written by friends and other evidence. The AAO will consider all of the evidence relevant to the requisite period to determine the applicant’s eligibility; however, the AAO will not quote each witness statement in this decision.

The applicant claimed on his initial Form I-687 application, his legalization questionnaire and in a statement taken in conjunction with his CSS/LULAC appointment on September 9, 1997 that he first entered the United States without inspection on February 19, 1981. The USCIS adjudicating officer’s notes reveal that the applicant claimed to have first entered the United States in January, 1981, by crossing the Mexican border into Los Angeles.

In contrast, the applicant’s Form I-589 application, Request for Asylum in the United States, Form I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien and the applicant’s sworn statement taken in conjunction with Form I-213, which are all a part of the record of proceeding, indicate that he entered the United States without inspection on July 1, 1991 through San Diego, California. The applicant’s Form G-325 filed in conjunction with the Form I-589 is signed by the applicant and dated August 1, 1992. Form G-325 shows that the applicant resided at [REDACTED]

from January, 1980 to July, 1991. The applicant also states in the Form I-589 application at item 20 that he is an active member of “Sikh Human Rights Organization” since 1986; at item 21, he states that he was arrested in October, 1989, in June, 1990, he was kept in police custody for three weeks and in April, 1991, he was kept in police lockup for two weeks. At item 26,

the applicant states he left his country of nationality (India) on June 25, 1991 and traveled through Mexico.

The record also contains a copy of an admission stamp from a copy of the applicant's passport showing an entry at New York on April 1, 1991. The applicant does not submit a copy of any previous passport, Form I-94 Departure Record or other documentary evidence showing that he entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982.

The inconsistencies regarding the dates the applicant initially entered and resided continuously in the United States are material to the applicant's claim in that they have a direct bearing on the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. No evidence of record resolves these inconsistencies. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *See Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

The applicant submitted affidavits from and to establish his initial entry and residence in the United States during the requisite period. The affiants attest to personally knowing and being acquainted with the applicant and having knowledge that the applicant resided in the United States since the 1980s. The affiants provide no other information about the applicant.

In totality, the affidavits contained in the record do not include sufficient detailed information about the claimed relationship and the applicant's continuous residency in the United States throughout the requisite period. For instance, none of the witnesses supplies any details about the applicant's life, such as, knowledge about his family members, education, hobbies, employment or other particulars about his life in the United States. The affiants fail to indicate any other details that would lend credence to the claimed acquaintance with the applicant and the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period.

The affidavits do not provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted association with him, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of this association and demonstrate that the affiants had a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant during the time addressed in their affidavits. To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. Therefore, the affidavits have little probative value.

The application can not be approved for another reason. The AAO finds that the applicant disrupted any period of continuous unlawful residence<sup>1</sup> and physical presence in the United States during the statutory period of November 6, 1986 to May 4, 1988.

The applicant claimed on his initial and current Form I-687 applications that his absences from the United States were from June 18, 1987 to July 26, 1987 and from February 1, 1988 to March 9, 1988. On both absences, the applicant claimed that he went to India to visit family. A copy of his passport [REDACTED] bears a stamp stating that the applicant previously traveled on passport [REDACTED] issued at Jalandhar on August 20, 1987. Therefore, it appears that the applicant remained in India from June 18, 1987 until at least August 20, 1987.

An applicant shall be regarded as having resided continuously in the United States if, at the time of filing the application for temporary resident status, no single absence from the United States has exceeded 45 days, and the aggregate of all absences has not exceeded 180 days between January 1, 1982, through the date the application is filed, unless the alien can establish that due to emergent reasons the return to the United States could not be accomplished within the time period allowed, the alien was maintaining residence in the United States, and the departure was not based on an order of deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(c)(1)(i). “Emergent reasons” is defined as “coming unexpectedly into being.” *Matter of C*, 19 I&N Dec. 808 (Comm. 1988).

The AAO finds that the applicant disrupted any period of continuous unlawful residence in the United States during the statutory period of January 1, 1982 to May 4, 1988 and has not shown emergent reasons for the length of the absence. Absent an explanation, the applicant has not shown that he resided continuously in the United States with no single absence exceeding 45 days.

A legalization applicant must show continuous physical presence in the United States from November 6, 1986 through May 4, 1988. See Section 245A(a)(3)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3)(A). An absence during this period which is found to be brief, casual and innocent shall not break a legalization applicant’s continuous physical presence. Section 245A(a)(3)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3)(B). See e.g. *Espinoza-Gutierrez v. Smith, INS, et al.*, 94 F.3d 1270 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996). The *Espinoza-Gutierrez* court held that a legalization applicant’s absence would not represent a break in continuous physical presence if it was found that the absence was brief, casual and innocent as defined by the court in *Rosenburg v. Fleuti*, 374 U.S. 449 (1963) See also *Assa’ad v. U.S. Attorney General, INS*, 332 F.3d 1321 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003)(which affirmed the portion of the

---

<sup>1</sup> The regulation implementing the statutory requirement of “continuous unlawful residence” in the United States defines that term as no single absence from the United States exceeding 45 days and absences in the aggregate not exceeding 180 days. See, section 245A(a)(2)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(2)(A) and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(c)(1)(i). The term “continuous physical presence” suggests that a shorter time frame should be applied to determine the permissible length of single and aggregate absences from the United States during the period from November 6, 1986 to May 4, 1988.

holding in *Espinoza-Gutierrez* relied upon here, but disagreed with a different aspect of that holding.) The AAO finds that the applicant's absence from the United States in this case was not brief, casual and innocent in that the record indicates: that he was absent from the United States for over 45 days. See *Rosenberg, supra* (where the court looked to (1) the duration of the alien's absence; (2) the purpose of the absence; and (3) the need for special documentation to make the trip abroad to determine whether the absence was a brief, innocent and casual or meaningfully disruptive of the alien's residence in the United States.)

The applicant is inadmissible to the United States, as he was ordered removed on May 21, 1998. Section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II). Although this ground of inadmissibility may be waived, the waiver has neither been filed nor approved.

An applicant applying for adjustment of status under this part has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for adjustment of status under section 245a of the Act. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5). In the instant case, the applicant has failed to submit sufficient evidence to overcome the director's denial. The insufficiency of the evidence and the aforementioned inconsistencies call into question the credibility of the applicant's claim to have entered the United States illegally in February, 1981 and his continuous unlawful residence in the United States throughout the requisite period. The evidence submitted is insufficient to establish the applicant's entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the requisite period.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. Further, the applicant may have disrupted his period of required continuous residence and physical presence in the United States during the statutory period of November 6, 1986 to May 4, 1988. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.