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U.S. Citizenship
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FILE:

MSC 05 036 10558

Office: NEW YORK

Date:

MAR 04 2010

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C § 1255a.

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the National Benefits Center. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, or *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004, (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements) was denied by the Director, New York, New York, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director determined that the applicant had not established that he resided in the United States in a continuous unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through the date of attempted filing during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant asserts that the applicant has submitted sufficient evidence to establish his eligibility for Temporary Resident Status. The applicant submits some of the same evidence earlier provided.

An applicant for temporary resident status – under section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) – must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. See section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. See section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. See CSS Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual

circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant’s employment must: provide the applicant’s address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant’s duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The applicant is a native of Bangladesh who claims to have resided in the United States since October 1981. He filed an application for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act (Form I-687), together with a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman (LULAC) Class Membership Worksheet, on November 5, 2004.

In the Notice of Decision, the director denied the instant application after determining that the evidence provided was insufficient to establish the applicant’s unlawful continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period. The director noted that the applicant had submitted evidence, including affidavits, that were not verifiable.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through the date he attempted to file a Form I-687 during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988. After reviewing the entire record, the AAO determines that he has not.

Contrary to counsel’s assertion, the applicant has submitted questionable applications, and documentation, including affidavits and letters in an attempt to establish his continuous residence since October 1981. For example, the applicant indicated on his Form I-687 applications that since

his entry in October 1981, he had departed the United States once, in June 1987, to visit family in India, and he returned to the United States in August 1987. However, the record reveals that the applicant's passport was renewed in Bangladesh on July 16, 1986. The applicant does not explain how his passport was renewed, in Bangladesh, although, as he claims, he was in the United States. Also, the applicant indicated on his Biographic Information Form G-325A, that he was married in Bangladesh on January 5, 1985; and, he indicated on his Form's I-687 applications that he had a child born in Bangladesh, on January 8, 1986. Yet, as noted above, the applicant claims that he had been in the United States since October 1981 and since his entry he did not depart the United States until June 1987; but, he does not explain how he was married in Bangladesh on in January 1985, and fathered a child, born in Bangladesh in January 1986, while he purportedly resided in the United States from October 1981 and did not depart the United States until June 1987.

These unexplained discrepancies cast considerable doubt on whether the contents of his Form I-687 application, and the evidence provided by the applicant in support of his application is genuine, and whether he has resided in the United States since October 1981, as he claims. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1988). The applicant has failed to submit any objective evidence to explain or justify the discrepancies in his testimony and in the record. Therefore, the reliability of the remaining evidence offered by the applicant is suspect and it must be concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status during the requisite period.

As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification.

In addition, the applicant has had a prolonged absence of over 45 days. This absence is evidenced from evidence provided by the applicant in support of his application. For example, affiant [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] attest to having known the applicant to have departed the United States, to visit family, on June 10, 1987, and that he returned on August 12, 1987. Also, as noted above, the applicant indicated on his Form I-687 applications that he had departed the United States once, in June 1987, to visit family in India, and he returned to the United States in August 1987. The evidence points to the applicant's absence for over 45 days from June 10, 1987 to August 12, 1987.

There is no evidence of record to indicate the applicant's absence was due to an emergent reason. The applicant did not provide any further evidence to explain his prolonged absence and what caused him to delay his return. As noted above, to meet his burden of proof, the applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his own testimony, and in this case he has failed to do so. This departure, therefore, represents a break in his continuous physical presence during the requisite period.

Continuous unlawful residence is broken if an absence from the United States is more than 45 days on any one trip unless return could not be accomplished due to emergent reasons. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(h)(1)(i). “Emergent reasons” has been defined as “coming unexpectedly into being.” *Matter of C*, 19 I&N Dec. 808 (Comm. 1988). The applicant’s absence for two months from the United States in 1987, a period of more than 45 days, is clearly a break in any period of continuous residence he may have established. As he has not provided any evidence other than his own attestation that it was his friend’s illness was the “emergent reason” for his failure to return to the United States in a timely manner, he has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he has continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period, as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E-M*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

Based on the foregoing analysis of the evidence, the AAO concludes that the applicant has failed to establish his continuous unlawful residence in the United States throughout the requisite period. Thus, the record does not establish that the applicant entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status from that date through the date he attempted to file a Form I-687 during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988. Accordingly, the applicant is ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A(a)(2) the Act.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.