


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services




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Date:

AUG 02 2011

Office:



FILE:



IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the office that originally decided your case. If your appeal was sustained, or if your case was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

Elizabeth McCormack

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was terminated by the Director, [REDACTED]. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The application was approved on May 9, 2008. The director terminated the application on November 3, 2010, finding that the applicant did not submit sufficient evidence to establish that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and lived in the United States during the requisite period.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that he has established that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and his unlawful residence for the requisite time period.

The status of an alien lawfully admitted for temporary residence under section 245A(a)(1) of the Act may be terminated at any time if it is determined that the alien was ineligible for temporary residence under section 245A of the Act. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(u)(1)(i).

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10. The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant’s claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and lived in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of affidavits of relationship written by friends and employers, and postmarked envelopes.

The affidavits from [REDACTED] all contain statements that the affiants have known the applicant for years and that attest to the applicant being physically present in the United States during the requisite period. These affidavits fail, however, to establish the applicant’s continuous unlawful residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality; an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony; and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility.

Although the affidavits from [REDACTED] state that they met the applicant during or before the requisite period, the affiants do not state that they met the applicant in the United States.

The affidavits in the record of proceeding provide inconsistent information regarding the applicant's addresses during the requisite period. In his affidavit of prior residence, [REDACTED] states that the applicant lived at [REDACTED] from September 1987 to February 1988. This information is inconsistent with the applicant's Form I-687 application. In the Form I-687, the applicant listed his address as [REDACTED] during the same time period. Further, although the affidavit states that it is an affidavit of prior residence, [REDACTED] does not state whether he is the owner, manager, or landlord. In her affidavit of prior residence, [REDACTED] states that the applicant lived at [REDACTED] from May 5, 1985 to January 11, 1986. In the Form I-687, the applicant lists his address as [REDACTED] from April 1985 to November 1985 and [REDACTED] from December 1985 to November 1986. In a notarized statement dated March 8, 1988, the applicant stated that he lived at [REDACTED] from April 1985 to June 1985.

It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *See Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

None of the witness statements provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with her, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence during the time addressed in the affidavits. To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. Upon review, the AAO finds that, individually and together, the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true. Therefore, they have little probative value.

The record also contains a notarized employment letter dated October 17, 1989 signed by [REDACTED] states that the applicant worked for him as a contract laborer picking pecans from November 1984 to March 1985 and from November 1987 to March 1988. The letter fails to meet certain regulatory standards set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i), which provides that letters from employers must include the applicant's address at the time of employment; exact period of employment; whether the information was taken from official

company records and where records are located and whether USCIS may have access to the records; if records are unavailable, an affidavit form-letter stating that the employment records are unavailable may be accepted which shall be signed, attested to by the employer under penalty of perjury and shall state the employer's willingness to come forward and give testimony if requested. The letter from [REDACTED] does not include much of the required information and can only be accorded minimal weight as evidence of the applicant's residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period.

The AAO notes that the record of proceeding contains a notarized employment letter signed by [REDACTED] dated on July 24, 1987. The letter states that [REDACTED] worked from September 1981 to the present. There is no evidence in the record of proceeding that [REDACTED] is an alias used by the applicant. Further, in the Form I-687, the applicant stated that he has not used and is not known by any other names.

The affidavits presented provide contradictory information, and no explanation is provided for those contradictions. The contradictions are material to the applicant's claim in that they have a direct bearing on the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. The employment evidence provided by the applicant, therefore, is not deemed credible and shall be afforded little weight. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *See Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

The record of proceeding also contains portions of several postmarked envelopes dated August [day illegible], 1985; March 18, 1986; April 21, 1986; June 4, 1986; July 15, 1986; April 27, 1987; May [day illegible], 1987; and July 13, 1987. Although postmarked envelopes may indicate presence in the United States on the dates listed, they cannot be verified and therefore, can only be accorded minimal weight as evidence of residence.

The director issued a notice of intent to terminate (NOIT) on March 11, 2009. The director terminated the application for temporary residence on November 3, 2010, finding that the applicant did not establish that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and lived in the United States during the requisite period. The director also noted that the record contains inconsistent information.

On appeal, the applicant submitted evidence already in the record of proceeding and therefore, he has not established that he was physically present or had continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period or that she entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982.

There are many inconsistencies in the record of proceeding. These inconsistencies are material to the applicant's claim in that they have a direct bearing on the applicant's residence in the

United States during the requisite period. As stated previously, doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *See Matter of Ho, supra.*

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis. The director's decision terminating the applicant's temporary status is affirmed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.