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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
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
**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**



L1

Date: **AUG 29 2011**

Office: FRESNO

FILE: 

IN RE: Applicant: 

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the director of the Fresno office. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director erroneously denied the I-687 application, finding that the applicant abandoned the application, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(13), by failing to fully respond to a request for evidence (RFE).¹ Because the director erred in denying the application based on abandonment, on October 12, 2010, the director of the National Benefits Center issued a notice advising the applicant of the right to appeal the AAO. On July 13, 2011, the AAO withdrew the director's decision. The matter is now before the AAO on appeal.

On July 13, 2011, the AAO sent the applicant a follow-up communication informing him that additional documentation was required in order to complete the adjudication of his appeal, and requesting that the applicant provide additional evidence. Specifically, the AAO requested that the applicant provide evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status since such date for the duration of the requisite period. In response to the AAO's request, the applicant has submitted two additional statements from [REDACTED] an additional statement from [REDACTED] an attestation from an additional representative of Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church, and a copy of a statement from [REDACTED] the original of which has previously been submitted into the record.² The AAO has reviewed all of the evidence, and has made a *de novo* decision based on the record and the AAO's assessment of the credibility, relevance and probative value of the evidence.³

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2).

¹ On December 14, 2009, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California ruled that United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may not apply its abandonment regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(13), in adjudicating legalization applications filed by CSS class members. See, *CSS v. Michael Chertoff*, Case 2:86-cv-01343-LKK-JFM.

² Also in response to the AAO's request, the applicant has submitted three photographs taken after the requisite period, two of the applicant and one of Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church, respectively. The applicant has also submitted a joint statement from [REDACTED] stating that they first met the applicant after the requisite period. However, because evidence of residence after May 4, 1988 is not probative of residence during the requisite period, these additional documents shall not be discussed.

³ The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. The AAO's *de novo* authority is well recognized by the federal courts. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I & N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA).

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has established that he (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status throughout the requisite period. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and lived in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of witness statements and documents. The AAO has reviewed each document in its entirety to determine the applicant's eligibility; however, the AAO will not quote each witness statement in this decision. Some of the evidence submitted indicates that the applicant resided in the United States after May 4, 1988; however, because evidence of residence after May 4, 1988 is not probative of residence during the requisite time period, it shall not be discussed.

The record contains witness statements from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The statements are general in nature, and state that the witnesses have knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States for all, or a portion of, the requisite statutory period.

Although the witnesses claim to have personal knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period, the witness statements do not provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with him, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations, and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. To be considered probative and credible, witness statements must do more than simply state that a witness knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that it probably did exist and that the witness, by virtue of that relationship, does have knowledge of the facts alleged. For instance, the witnesses do not state how they date their initial meeting with the applicant in the United States, or specify social gatherings, other special occasions or social events when they saw and communicated with the applicant during the requisite period. The witnesses also do not state how frequently they had contact with the applicant during the requisite period, or, with the exception of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] state the address where the applicant was residing during that period. The witnesses do not provide sufficient details that would lend credence to their claimed knowledge

of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. For these reasons the AAO finds that the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true.

In addition, in a statement dated July 26, 2011, [REDACTED] states that the applicant resided at his farm on [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] California from February 1981 to February 1987. However, the testimony of the witness is inconsistent with the applicant's testimony at the time of his interview on August 10, 2006, at which time he amended the I-687 application to list a residence on [REDACTED] from February 1981 to January 1988. Due to this inconsistency, the statements of this witness will be given no weight.

Further, the applicant has submitted statements from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] both of Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church in [REDACTED] California, who attest to the applicant being a registered parishioner of the church from 1982 to 1987. However, the applicant failed to list his membership in the [REDACTED] church or any other religious organization on the initial Form I-687 application filed by him in 1991.⁴ At part 34 of the application, where applicants are asked to list their involvement with any religious organizations, the applicant did not list any organizations. This is an inconsistency which is material to the applicant's claim, in that it has a direct bearing on his residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. As stated above, doubt cast on any aspect of an applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho, supra*. This contradiction undermines the credibility of the applicant's claim of entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period. On appeal, counsel for the applicant asserts that the preparer failed to see the significance of answering part 34 of the application.

More importantly, the witness statements do not meet the requirements set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v), which provides requirements for attestations made on behalf of an applicant by churches, unions, or other organizations. Attestations must: (1) identify applicant by name; (2) be signed by an official (whose title is shown); (3) show inclusive dates of membership; (4) state the address where the applicant resided during membership period; (5) include the seal of the organization impressed on the letter or the letterhead of the organization, if the organization has letterhead stationery; (6) establish how the author knows the applicant; and (7) establish the origin of the information being attested to. These attestations fail to comply with the cited regulation. Therefore, these attestations are of little probative value.

The applicant has submitted copies of 12 photographs of himself and others. However, since the photographs are undated and the locations depicted in the photographs are not known, these photographs are not evidence in support of the applicant's continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.⁵

⁴ At the time of filing the instant I-687 application, the applicant listed his membership in a Catholic church in [REDACTED] from 1981 through the end of the requisite period.

⁵ As stated above, it appears that the three photographs submitted in response to the AAO's request were taken after the requisite statutory period and, therefore, are not probative of residence during the requisite period.

The remaining evidence in the record is comprised of the instant I-687 application and the initial I-687 application filed in 1991 to establish the applicant's CSS class membership. The AAO finds in its *de novo* review that the record of proceedings contains materially inconsistent statements from the applicant regarding the particular locations where he resided in the United States, as well as the dates of his absences from the United States, during the requisite statutory period.

At the time of completing the instant I-687 application, the applicant did not list any residences in the United States during the requisite period, and he listed two absences from the United States during the requisite period, in 1984 and 1987, respectively. At the time of his interview on August 10, 2006, the applicant amended the instant I-687 application to list residences in California during the requisite period as follows: from February 1981 to January 1988 on [REDACTED] in Riverside; and, from January 1988 through the end of the requisite period on [REDACTED] in Westminster.

However, in the I-687 application filed in 1991, the applicant did not list any residences in or absences from the United States during the requisite period.

Further, the AAO notes that the applicant was born in 1971 and was 10 years old in 1981, when he states he began residing in California. However, in response to the AAO's request, the applicant has not produced evidence of school attendance or vaccinations, nor has the applicant produced evidence of being cared for by an adult during the requisite period.

The applicant has failed to provide probative and credible evidence of his continuous residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. The inconsistencies in the record regarding the dates when the applicant lived at particular locations in the United States, whether he was a member of the Riverside church, and whether he had any absences from the United States during the requisite period are material to the applicant's claim, in that they have a direct bearing on his residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. No evidence of record resolves these inconsistencies. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. In response to the AAO's request, the applicant has not provided an explanation for the inconsistencies in the record. As stated above, doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho, supra*. These contradictions undermine the credibility of his claim of entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.

Upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO finds that the evidence submitted by the applicant has not established that he is eligible for the benefit sought. The various statements currently in the record which attempt to substantiate the applicant's residence and employment in the United States during the statutory period are not objective, independent evidence such that they might overcome the inconsistencies in the record regarding the applicant's claim that

he maintained continuous residence in the United States throughout the statutory period, and thus are not probative.

Based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.