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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

**PUBLIC COPY**

[REDACTED]

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Date: DEC 15 2011

Office: LOS ANGELES

FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the director of the Los Angeles office. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director erroneously denied the I-687 application, finding that the applicant abandoned the application, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(13), by failing to appear for a scheduled interview on November 6, 2006.<sup>1</sup> Because the director erred in denying the application based on abandonment, on October 6, 2010, the director of the National Benefits Center issued a notice advising the applicant of his right to appeal the decision to the AAO. On October 31, 2011, the AAO withdrew the director's decision. The matter is now before the AAO on appeal.

On October 31, 2011, the AAO issued a NOID regarding the I-687 application, informing the applicant of deficiencies in the record and providing him with an opportunity to respond. Specifically, the AAO requested that the applicant provide evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status since such date for the duration of the requisite period. In response to the AAO's request, counsel has submitted an additional statement from the applicant, and one additional document. The AAO has reviewed all of the evidence, and has made a *de novo* decision based on the record and the AAO's assessment of the credibility, relevance and probative value of the evidence.<sup>2</sup>

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988.

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<sup>1</sup> On December 14, 2009, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California ruled that United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may not apply its abandonment regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(13), in adjudicating legalization applications filed by CSS class members. See, *CSS v. Michael Chertoff*, Case 2:86-cv-01343-LKK-JFM.

<sup>2</sup> The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. The AAO's *de novo* authority is well recognized by the federal courts. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I & N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA).

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has established that he (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status throughout the requisite period. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and lived in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of one witness statement, and a document from the Social Security Administration. The AAO has reviewed the documents in their entirety to determine the applicant's eligibility; however, the AAO will not quote the witness statement in this decision. Some of the evidence submitted indicates that the applicant resided in the United States after May 4, 1988; however, because evidence of residence after May 4, 1988 is not probative of residence during the requisite time period, it shall not be discussed.

The applicant has submitted, as proof of his entry into the United States and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period, a witness statement from [REDACTED]. The witness's statement is general in nature, and states that the witness has knowledge of the applicant's continuous residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite statutory period.

Although the witness claims to have personal knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period, the witness's statement does not provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with him, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations, and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. To be considered probative and credible, witness statements must do more than simply state that a witness knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that it probably did exist and that the witness, by virtue of that relationship, does have knowledge of the facts alleged. For instance, the witness does not state how she dates her initial meeting with the applicant in the United States, or specify social gatherings, other special occasions or social events when she saw and communicated with the applicant during the requisite period. The witness also does not state how frequently she had contact with the applicant during the requisite period. The witness does not provide sufficient details that would lend credence to her claimed knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. For these reasons the AAO finds that the statement does not indicate that its assertions are probably true.

In response to the NOID, counsel has submitted an additional statement from the applicant that he was unable to obtain a certificate from the Department of Motor Vehicles, showing that he was issued a driver's license in 1981. The applicant also states that he was unable to obtain an employment verification letter from [REDACTED] stating that he was employed there when he first came to the United States. However, the applicant's statement is inconsistent with his testimony in the I-687 application, in which he failed to list any employment with [REDACTED] during the requisite statutory period. The applicant has not provided an explanation for this inconsistency.

Also in response to the NOID, counsel provides the address of two Hilton hotels which he asserts were the applicant's employment addresses when he worked as a parking valet and bellboy (from 1984 to 1986 and from 1987 through the end of the requisite period, respectively, according to the I-687 application.) However, the applicant did not provide the two hotel addresses in his additional statement on appeal. It is noted that the assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaighena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988).

In response to the NOID, the applicant has also submitted a benefit statement from the Social Security Administration, Pasadena District Office, stating that on November 16, 1981, the applicant was issued Social Security number [REDACTED]. However, this document is inconsistent with the applicant's testimony in the I-687 application at number six, where the applicant was asked to provide his U.S. Social Security number and he responded, "None". The applicant has not provided an explanation for this inconsistency. Due to this inconsistency, this document has minimal probative value.

The remaining evidence in the record is comprised of the I-687 application. As stated previously, to meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all the evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). Here, the applicant has failed to provide probative and credible evidence of his continuous residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period.

Based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.