identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

PUBLIC COPY

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

L1

[redacted]

DATE: DEC 30 2011 OFFICE: NATIONAL BENEFITS CENTER FILE: [redacted]

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.,* CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.,* CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, National Benefits Center. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

On January 9, 2006, the applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act). On May 8, 2006, the director of the National Benefits Center office erroneously denied the I-687 application, finding that the applicant abandoned the application, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(13), by failing to provide documentation establishing her eligibility for Temporary Resident Status.[1] Because the director erred in denying the application based on abandonment, on October 12, 2010, the director issued a notice advising the applicant of the right to appeal the decision to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO).

On January 10, 2011, the applicant submitted a Form I-694, Notice of Appeal of Decision Under Section 210 or 245A. On October 31, 2011, the AAO issued the applicant a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) and provided the applicant 21 days in which to respond or to provide additional evidence in support of her claim. As of the date of this decision, no response or additional evidence has been received; therefore, the record will be considered complete. The director's decision will be withdrawn and the AAO will consider the applicant's claim de novo, evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in the record according to its probative value and credibility as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).2

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to

---

[1] On December 14, 2009, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California ruled that United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may not apply its abandonment regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(13), in adjudicating legalization applications filed by CSS class members. *See, CSS v. Michael Chertoff,* Case 2:86-cv-01343-LKK-JFM.

[2] The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. The AAO's *de novo* authority is well recognized by the federal courts. *See Soltane v. DOJ,* 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10. The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-,* 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant established she: (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period. The relevant evidence submitted in support of the applicant's claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and to have resided in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of attestations from five individuals claiming to know the applicant during the requisite period. Some of the evidence submitted indicates that the applicant resided in the United States after the requisite period; however, because such evidence

is not probative of residence during the requisite time period, it shall not be discussed. The AAO has reviewed the relevant documents to determine the applicant's eligibility.

The attestations from are general in nature and state that the witnesses have knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States for all, or a portion, of the requisite period. The statements fail, however, to establish the applicant's continuous unlawful residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality; an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony; and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility.

The attestations fail to provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with her, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations and demonstrate that the witnesses have a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence during the time addressed in the statements. To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. Upon review, the AAO finds that, individually and together, the attestations do not indicate that the assertions are probably true. Therefore, the attestations will be given little weight as evidence in support of the applicant's claim of continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.

It is also noted that the affidavits from are inconsistent with the applicant's Form I-687. The affiants stated that the applicant resided at from 1982 through 1990. However, in the applicant's Form I-687, at Question 30, where asked to list her residences in the United States since her first entry, the applicant stated that she resided at from June 1981 through March 1984. The applicant did not list that she ever resided at . This inconsistency casts serious doubt on the veracity of the applicant's claim.

Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Here, the applicant failed to respond to the AAO's NOID.

Based upon the foregoing, the AAO finds that the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United

States from before January 1, 1982 through the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--, supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.