

**identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy**

PUBLIC COPY



U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529 - 2090
**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

[REDACTED]

L1

DATE: **FEB 22 2012**

Office: TUCSON

File: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Tucson, Arizona. In a Service motion to reopen, the director's decision was withdrawn and the case was reopened in order to continue the processing of the application. The director subsequently denied the application. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The director denied the application on September 4, 2009, finding that the applicant had not submitted sufficient evidence to establish that she entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that she continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status since such date for the duration of the requisite period.

On appeal, the applicant requests a review of the determination made by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and asserts the director made an erroneous factual determination.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of

continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant’s whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant’s proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA).

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has established that she (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status throughout the requisite period.

The applicant claims on her Form I-687 application that she first entered the United States without inspection on January 25, 1981 and lived in California throughout the requisite period. She further indicated she worked as a farmworker throughout the requisite period and had three brief absences.

In the director's Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) dated June 11, 2009, the director noted that the applicant was interviewed in connection with her Form I-687 application. During the interview the applicant stated she was not in possession of documentation needed to establish her continuous residence in the United States from January 1, 1981 to November 1988. The applicant requested additional time to supply these documents but the NOID notes that after seven months, no additional evidence was submitted. The NOID gave the applicant an additional 30 days to submit evidence. The applicant responded to the NOID.

The applicant states in a letter that the evidence of her residence in this country for the years 1981 through 1988 is not in her name because all the time she has resided in the United States, she resided with other family members and never placed anything under her name. The applicant submits evidence under the name of her cousin, [REDACTED]. The record contains the electric bills under the name of [REDACTED] dated April 23, 1981, June 23, 1982, for the residence [REDACTED]; and May 23, 1985, June 23, 1987 and March 23, 1988 for the residence at [REDACTED]. This evidence will be given some weight.

The applicant submitted a copy of a letter from [REDACTED] dated December 14, 2005 and signed by [REDACTED], pastor. The letter certifies that the applicant is registered as a practicing catholic. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v) provides requirements for attestations made on behalf of an applicant by churches, unions, or other organizations. Attestations must (1) identify applicant by name; (2) be signed by an official (whose title is shown); (3) show inclusive dates of membership; (4) state the address where applicant resided during membership period; (5) include the seal of the organization impressed on the letter or the letterhead of the organization, if the organization has letterhead stationery; (6) establish how the author knows the applicant; and (7) establish the origin of the information being attested to. The letter does not state the dates of the applicant's membership and therefore, it will be given no weight.

Affiants [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] attest to having known the applicant in the United States for all or part of the requisite period. [REDACTED] states she met the applicant at her home in California because the applicant was a good friend of some of her relatives. She failed to indicate how frequently she saw the applicant.

[REDACTED] states she met the applicant in church in 1981 but fails to state how she dates her recollection.

[REDACTED] indicates he met the applicant in approximately January of 1983 because his mother has been a friend of the applicant since before then.

[REDACTED] indicates she recalled the date she first met the applicant with her parents' help, and she recalls seeing the applicant during her youth [REDACTED].

Romero state that the applicant told them that she entered the United States in 1981 by walking from Tijuana, Mexico to Chula Vista, California.

The affidavits will be given some weight but they do not provide detailed information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with her, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations, and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. To be considered probative and credible, witness statements must do more than simply state that a witness knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that it probably did exist and that the witness, by virtue of that relationship, does have knowledge of the facts alleged. For instance, the witnesses do not specify social gatherings, other special occasions or social events when they saw and communicated with the applicant during the requisite period. The witnesses also do not state how they keep in contact with the applicant and how frequently they had contact with the applicant during the requisite period. The AAO finds that the witness statements do not provide sufficient details that would lend credence to their claimed knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. For these reasons, the AAO finds that the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true.

While an applicant's failure to provide evidence other than affidavits shall not be the sole basis for finding that he failed to meet the continuous residency requirements, an application which is lacking in contemporaneous documents cannot be deemed approvable if considerable periods of claimed continuous residency rely entirely on affidavits which are considerably lacking in certain basic and necessary information. The affiants statements are significantly lacking in detail and do not establish that the affiants actually had personal knowledge of the events and circumstances of the applicant's initial entry and residence in the United States. The affidavits do not provide much relevant information beyond acknowledging that they knew the applicant for all or part of the requisite period. Overall, the affidavits provided are so deficient in detail that they can only be given nominal probative value.

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). The applicant has been given the opportunity to satisfy his burden of proof with a broad range of evidence pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3). The absence of sufficiently detailed documentation to corroborate the applicant's claim of entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and continuous residence for the entire requisite period seriously detracts from the credibility of this claim. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the evidence of record, it is concluded that the applicant failed to establish that she entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982 through the date she attempted to file a Form

I-687 application as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E-M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.