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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

[REDACTED]

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DATE:

OFFICE: LOS ANGELES, CA

FILE: [REDACTED]

**JUL 10 2012**

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C § 1255a.

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the National Benefits Center. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, or *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004, (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements) was denied by the Field Office Director, Los Angeles, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record indicates that the applicant is a native of the Philippines who claims to have resided in the United States since May 1981. He filed an application for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act (Form I-687), together with a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman (LULAC) Class Membership Worksheet, on November 3, 2005.

On May 13, 2011, the director denied the application after determining that the applicant had failed to establish his eligibility for temporary resident status. The director noted that the evidence provided, including affidavits which were inconsistent and lacked sufficient detail, were insufficient to demonstrate the applicant's continuous unlawful residence and continuous physical presence in the United States during the requisite period.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that the evidence provided establishes his eligibility for temporary resident status. The applicant submits additional evidence.

The AAO has reviewed all of the evidence, and has made a *de novo* decision based on the record and the AAO's assessment of the credibility, relevance and probative value of the evidence.<sup>1</sup>

On April 11, 2012, the AAO issued a notice informing the applicant of the deficiencies in the record and providing him with an opportunity to respond and provide additional evidence. Specifically, the AAO requested that the applicant provide evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status since such date for the duration of the requisite period. The applicant has not submitted any evidence in response to the AAO's request.

The director's decision is withdrawn, and the AAO will consider the applicant's claim *de novo*, evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in the record, according to its probative value and credibility as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

An applicant for temporary resident status – under section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) – must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. See section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant

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<sup>1</sup>The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. The AAO's *de novo* authority is well recognized by the federal courts. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. See section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. See CSS Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through the date he attempted to file a Form I-687 during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988. After reviewing the entire record, the AAO determines that he has not.

At the time of completing his Form I-687 application, the applicant listed residences in the United States during the requisite period. He indicated on his Form I-687 that from June 1987 to June 1995 he was absent from the United States and on vacation in the Philippines.

The applicant has submitted as proof of his asserted date of entry into the United States and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period, witness statements from [REDACTED]. The witness statements are general in nature, and state that the witnesses have knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. The statements of the witnesses lack sufficient detail, because they fail to provide concrete information specific to the applicant which would demonstrate that the witnesses have a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. The witness statements provided lack sufficient details and cannot be afforded weight. This lack of detail in the evidence provided is material to the applicant's claim in that it has a direct bearing on his residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period.

In addition, the record reflects that during the requisite period the applicant had a single absence of over 45 days and an aggregate of over 180 days for all absences, from the United States. The applicant indicated on his Form I-687 that he departed the United States for the Philippines in June 1987, and returned to the United States in June 1995. This evidence indicates that the applicant had a single absence that disrupts his continuous residence. During the requisite period the applicant departed the United States in June 1987 and did not return until June 1995. The record does not include any evidence to explain the prolonged absence. This absence exceeds the 45 days allowed for a single absence and an aggregate of a 180 days for all absences, and disrupts the applicant's continuous unlawful residence and physical presence.

Continuous unlawful residence is broken if an absence from the United States is more than 45 days on any one trip, or an aggregate of over 180 days for all absences, unless return could not be accomplished due to emergent reasons. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(h)(1)(i). "Emergent reasons" has been defined as "coming unexpectedly into being." *Matter of C*, 19 I&N Dec. 808 (Comm. 1988). There is no evidence of record to establish that the prolonged absence was necessitated by an emergent reason.

The applicant's absence from the United States from June 1987 to June 1995, is clearly a break in any period of continuous residence and physical presence he may have established. As the applicant has not provided any evidence there was an "emergent reason" for his failure to return to the United States in a timely manner, he has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period, as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E-M-*, *supra*. Therefore, the applicant is ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, it is concluded that he has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988.

Based on the foregoing analysis of the evidence, the AAO concludes that the applicant has failed to establish his continuous unlawful residence in the United States throughout the requisite period. Thus, the record does not establish that the applicant entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status from that date through the date he attempted to file a Form I-687 during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988. Accordingly, the applicant is ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A(a)(2) the Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.