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U. S. Department of Homeland Security  
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**

[REDACTED]

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Date: JUL 27 2012 Office: LOS ANGELES

File: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Temporary Resident Status under Section 245A of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

*Elizabeth McCormack*

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) was denied by the director of the Los Angeles Field Office. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act). The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had failed to respond to the director's notice of intent to deny (NOID) his application.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant asserts that the applicant did not receive the NOID and that he was only 14 years of age when it was issued. Counsel further asserts that the application should be approved. The applicant submitted additional evidence on appeal. The AAO has considered the applicant's assertions, reviewed all of the evidence, and has made a *de novo* decision based on the record and the AAO's assessment of the credibility, relevance and probative value of the evidence.<sup>1</sup>

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until May 4, 1988.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

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<sup>1</sup> The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

On September 9, 2008 the court approved a Stipulation of Settlement in the class action *Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, et al vs. USCIS, et al*, 88-CV-00379 JLR (W.D. Was.) (NWIRP). Class members are defined, in relevant part, as:

1. Class Members [include] all persons who entered the United States in a nonimmigrant status prior to January 1, 1982, who are otherwise *prima facie* eligible for legalization under § 245A of the INA [Immigration & Nationality Act], 8 U.S.C. § 1255a, who are within one or more of the Enumerated Categories described below in paragraph 2, and who
  - (A) between May 5, 1987 and May 4, 1988, attempted to file a complete application for legalization under § 245A of the INA and fees to an INS officer or agent acting on behalf of the INS, including a Qualified Designated Agency ("QDE"), and whose applications were rejected for filing (hereinafter referred to as 'Subclass A members'); or
  - (B) between May 5, 1987 and May 4, 1988, attempted to apply for legalization with an INS officer, or agent acting on behalf of the INS, including a QDE, under § 245A of the INA, but were advised that they were ineligible for legalization, or were refused legalization application forms, and for whom such information, or

- inability to obtain the required application forms, was a substantial cause of their failure to file or complete a timely written application (hereinafter referred to as 'Sub-class B' members); or
- (C) filed a legalization application under INA § 245A and fees with an INS officer or agent acting on behalf of the INS, including a QDE, and whose application
- i. has not been finally adjudicated or whose temporary resident status has been proposed for termination (hereinafter referred to as 'Sub-class C.i. members'),
  - ii. was denied or whose temporary resident status was terminated, where the INS or CIS action or inaction was because INS or CIS believed the applicant had failed to meet the 'known to the government' requirement, or the requirement that s/he demonstrate that his/her unlawful residence was continuous (hereinafter referred to as 'Sub-class C.ii members').

2. Enumerated Categories

- (1) Persons who violated the terms of their nonimmigrant status prior to January 1, 1982 in a manner known to the government because documentation or the absence thereof (including, but not limited to, the absence of quarterly or annual address reports required on or before December 31, 1981) existed in the records of one or more government agencies which, taken as a whole, warrants a finding that the applicant was in an unlawful status prior to January 1, 1982, in a manner known to the government.
- (2) Persons who violated the terms of their nonimmigrant visas before January 1, 1982, for whom INS/DHS records for the relevant period (including required school and employer reports of status violations) are not contained in the alien's A-file, and who are unable to meet the requirements of 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.1(d) and 245a.2(d) without such records.
- (3) Persons whose facially valid 'lawful status' on or after January 1, 1982 was obtained by fraud or mistake, whether such 'lawful status' was the result of
  - (a) reinstatement to nonimmigrant status;
  - (b) change of nonimmigrant status pursuant to INA § 248;
  - (c) adjustment of status pursuant to INA § 245; or
  - (d) grant of some other immigration benefit deemed to interrupt the continuous unlawful residence or continuous physical presence requirements of INA § 245A.

The AAO finds that the applicant is a member of the NWIRP class as enumerated above and will adjudicate the application in accordance with the standards set forth in the settlement agreement.

NWIRP provides that I-687 applications pending as of the date of the agreement shall be adjudicated in accordance with the adjudication standards described in paragraph 8B of the settlement agreement.

Under those standards, the applicant must make a *prima facie* showing that prior to January 1, 1982, the applicant violated the terms of his or her nonimmigrant status in a manner known to the government because documentation or the absence thereof (including, but not limited to, the absence of quarterly or annual address reports required on or before December 31, 1981) existed in the records of one or more government agencies which, taken as a whole, warrants a finding that the applicant was in an unlawful status prior to January 1, 1982, in a manner known to the government.

It is presumed that the school or employer complied with the law and reported violations of status to the INS; the absence of such report in government records is not alone sufficient to rebut this presumption. Once the applicant makes such a showing, USCIS then has the burden of coming forward with proof to rebut the evidence that the applicant violated his or her status. If USCIS fails to carry this burden, the settlement agreement stipulates at paragraph 8B that it will be found that the alien's unlawful status was known to the government as of January 1, 1982. With respect to individuals who obtained their status by fraud or mistake, the applicant bears the burden of establishing that he or she obtained lawful status by fraud or mistake. The settlement agreement further stipulates that the general adjudicatory standards set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.18(d) or 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(k)(4), whichever is more favorable to the applicant, shall be followed to adjudicate the merits of the application once class membership is favorably determined.

Following *de novo* review by the AAO, USCIS records reflect that the applicant entered the United States on December 23, 1981 in F-2 nonimmigrant status. The applicant's father violated his nonimmigrant status in a manner known to the government before January 1, 1982.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. In this case, the AAO finds that the applicant violated his nonimmigrant status before January 1, 1982.

Until Dec. 29, 1981, section 265 of the Act stated that any alien in the United States in "lawful temporary residence status shall" notify the Attorney General "in writing of his address at the expiration of each three-month period during which he remains in the United States, regardless of whether there has been any change in address." See section 265 of the Act (1980) and PL 97-116, 1981 HR 4327(1981) which confirms that section 265 was modified, effective December 29, 1981, such that lawful non-immigrants were no longer required to file quarterly address reports regardless of whether there had been any change in address.

The applicant established that he entered the United States on December 23, 1981. His father entered the United States on September 5, 1981. The applicant's father would have been required to provide written updates of his address at the expiration of each three-month period during which he remained in the United States, regardless of whether there was any change in

address, from the date of entry in 1980 until December 29, 1981. The record of proceedings is void of any address updates. Further, the applicant's father violated his nonimmigrant status in a manner known to the government as he worked without authorization before January 1, 1982.

Following *de novo* review by the AAO, USCIS records do not reflect that the applicant's father filed quarterly or annual address notifications as required prior to December 31, 1981. The records reflect that the applicant's father worked without authorization before January 1, 1982. In accordance with the terms of NWIRP, the AAO finds that the evidence establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant was unlawfully present in a manner known to the government prior to January 1, 1982. Consequently, the applicant has established that his unlawful status was known to the government prior to January 1, 1982.

However, an applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, *and* continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b).

In support of his application, the applicant submitted substantial evidence in the form of school records, dated during the requisite period.

The contemporaneous documents submitted by the applicant are credible. As stated in *Matter of E-M*, 20 I&N Dec. at 80, when something is to be established by a preponderance of the evidence, the proof submitted by the applicant has to establish only that the asserted claim is probably true. That decision also states that, under the preponderance of evidence standard, an application may be granted even though some doubt remains regarding the evidence. *Id.* at 79. The documents that have been furnished in this case may be accorded substantial evidentiary weight and are sufficient to meet the applicant's burden of proof of residence in the United States for the requisite period.

The applicant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and maintained continuous, unlawful residence for the duration of the requisite period. Consequently, the applicant has overcome the particular basis of denial cited by the director.

The appeal will be sustained.

ORDER:        The appeal is sustained.