

identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

PUBLIC COPY



L1

DATE: OFFICE: NATIONAL BENEFITS CENTER FILE: [REDACTED]

MAR 01 2012

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C § 1255a.

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:
[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the National Benefits Center. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Perry Rhew".

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, or *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004, (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements) was denied by the Director, National Benefits Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record indicates that the applicant is a native of Mexico who claims to have resided in the United States since 1981. He filed an application for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act (Form I-687), together with a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman (LULAC) Class Membership Worksheet, on October 26, 2005.

On February 25, 2006, the director of the National Benefits Center erroneously denied the I-687 application, finding that the applicant had abandoned the application, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(13), by failing to respond to a notice of intent to deny (NOID) the application.¹ Because the director erred in denying the application based on abandonment, on October 12, 2010, the director issued a notice advising the applicant of the right to appeal the decision to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The decision is now before the AAO on appeal. The director's decision will therefore be withdrawn, and the AAO will consider the applicant's claim *de novo*, evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in the record, according to its credibility, relevance and probative value as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).²

On appeal, counsel asserts that the evidence previously submitted by the applicant establishes that he has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite statutory period.

On January 11, 2012, the AAO issued a NOID and requested that the applicant provide evidence demonstrating his continuous unlawful residence, and continuous physical presence, in the United States during the requisite period. The applicant was granted 21 days to submit a response. However, as of the date of this decision, the record does not reflect receipt of a response to the NOID. The AAO, will, therefore, decide the appeal on the record, as constituted.

An applicant for temporary resident status – under section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) – must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. See section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States

¹ On December 14, 2009, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California ruled that United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may not apply its abandonment regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(13), in adjudicating legalization applications filed by CSS class members. See, *CSS v. Michael Chertoff*, Case 2:86-cv-01343-LKK-JFM.

² The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. The AAO's *de novo* authority is well recognized by the federal courts. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

since November 6, 1986. See section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. See CSS Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through the date he attempted to file a Form I-687 during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988. After reviewing the entire record, the AAO determines that he has not.

At the time of completing the instant I-687 application, the applicant listed a residence in Colton, California from 1981 through the end of the requisite period, and employment in California from 1981 to 1987 as a fieldworker, and from 1987 through the end of the requisite period as a driver. The applicant did not list any absences from the United States during the requisite period. The applicant has submitted, as proof of his entry into the United States and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period, employment verification letters from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the former general manager of [REDACTED] states that the applicant worked for the company as a farm laborer from January 1981 to April 1987. However, the testimony of the witness is inconsistent with the applicant's statement in the I-687 application, at number 32, that he resided in Mexico from September 1963 to February 1981. The applicant has failed to provide a reasonable explanation for this inconsistency. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] states that the applicant worked for the company as a general laborer from 1987 through the end of the requisite period.

The employment verification letters of [REDACTED] do not meet the requirements set forth in the regulations, which provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) provides that letters from employers must include: (A) Alien's address at the time of employment; (B) Exact period of employment; (C) Periods of layoff; (D) Duties with the company; (E) Whether or not the information was taken from official company records; and (F) Where records are located and whether the Service may have access to the records. If the records are unavailable, an affidavit-form letter stating that the alien's employment records are unavailable and why such records are unavailable may be accepted in lieu of subsections (E) and (F).

The employment verification letters fail to comply with the above cited regulation because they lack considerable detail regarding the applicant's employment. For instance, the witnesses do not state the applicant's daily work duties, the number of hours or days the applicant was employed, the

³ The AAO notes that the two letters use almost identical language.

location at which he was employed, or his address at the time of employment. Furthermore, the witnesses do not state how they were able to date the applicant's employment. Although both witnesses state their company did not have "proper" employment records for the applicant, and that the information provided in the letters is based upon their personal knowledge, the witnesses do not state the basis for their knowledge, or whether they referred to any records they may have maintained. For these reasons, the employment verification letters are of little probative value.

The remaining evidence in the record is comprised of the I-687 application. As stated previously, the sufficiency of all the evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). Here, the applicant has failed to provide probative and credible evidence of his continuous residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period.

It is noted that in the NOID, we notified the applicant that it was imperative for the AAO to determine that the statements made in support of the instant application are consistent with the evidence in the record. Thus, in order to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had resided continuously in the United States since before January 1, 1982, the applicant was requested to provide this office with evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date when he attempted to file a Form I-687 application or was caused not to timely file. As noted above, however, the applicant has failed to submit the evidence requested and has failed to respond to the NOID.

As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, it is concluded that he has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988.

Based on the foregoing analysis of the evidence, the AAO concludes that the applicant has failed to establish his continuous unlawful residence in the United States throughout the requisite period. Thus, the record does not establish that the applicant entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status from that date through the date he attempted to file a Form I-687 during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988. Accordingly, the applicant is ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A(a)(2) the Act.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.