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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
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


IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.


Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, New York. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record indicates that the applicant filed a Form I-687 Application for Temporary Resident Status on August 2, 2005. On May 15, 2006, the director denied the application for failure to appear for a scheduled interview on March 13, 2006. Thus, the director indicated that the application was abandoned.

On September 29, 2010, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) informed the applicant that, pursuant to a recent court order, applications for temporary resident status may not be denied based on abandonment.¹ The applicant was informed that he was entitled to file an appeal with the AAO which must be adjudicated on the merits.

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant failed to appear for her interview because her [REDACTED] never notified her and he was disbarred.² In the Form I-694, counsel states that he is attempting to retrieve the applicant's file and that he will submit a brief within 30 days. The applicant's Freedom of Information Act request was processed on December 9, 2011.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). Following *de novo* review, the AAO found that that the director's basis for denial of the Form I-687 was in error. However, the AAO identified alternative grounds for denial of the application. Specifically, the AAO noted that the applicant failed to submit sufficient evidence in support of his application.

On February 1, 2012, the AAO issued a notice of intent to deny (NOID) informing the applicant of the deficiencies in the record and providing him with an opportunity to respond. Counsel submitted a brief and two affidavits in response to the AAO's NOID.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant

¹ On December 14, 2009, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California ruled that United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may not apply its abandonment regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(13), in adjudicating legalization applications filed by CSS class members. *See, CSS v. Michael Chertoff*, Case 2:86-cv-01343-LKK-JFM.

² The applicant's former counsel of record, [REDACTED] was suspended from practice before the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the Immigration Court on September 24, 2009.

must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10. The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant established she (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status throughout the requisite period.

In an attempt to establish continuous unlawful residence since before January 1, 1982 through the end of the relevant period, the applicant provided written statements from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

In his form-letter affidavit, [REDACTED] does not indicate how he dates his initial meeting with the applicant, how frequently he had contact with her, or how he has personal knowledge of her presence in the United States.

In her affidavit, [REDACTED] states that she first met the applicant in November 1981 at a dinner party in honor of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] states that she and the applicant spoke by telephone several times and that the applicant visited her in Connecticut in October 1982. [REDACTED] states that she and her family moved to Dallas in 1983 and continued to speak to the applicant once or twice per month. [REDACTED] states that she did not see the applicant again until December 1988 in Karachi, Pakistan. [REDACTED] affidavit also states that the applicant left for Pakistan in 1989.

In her affidavit, [REDACTED] states that she first met the applicant in December 1981 at a shop in Queens and spoke nearly every day and met every few months at each other's homes. [REDACTED] does not indicate how she dates her initial meeting with the applicant.

The affidavits contain statements that the declarants have known the applicant for years and that attest to the applicant being physically present in the United States during the required period. These statements fail, however, to establish the applicant's continuous unlawful residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality; an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony; and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility.

The affidavits do not provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with the applicant, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence during the time addressed in the affidavit. To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. Upon review, the AAO finds that the witnesses' statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true. Therefore, they have little probative value.

In her statement dated December 14, 2005, the applicant stated that she has never had a proper job and was paid in cash for odd jobs such as babysitting. The AAO notes that the applicant did not list any employers in the Form I-687.

It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the applicant submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. See *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

The applicant has not submitted detailed evidence of her entry to the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and her continuous unlawful residence in the United States for the duration of the relevant period.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.