





U.S. Citizenship
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
SEP 09 2013

DATE: OFFICE: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

IN RE: 

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

FILE: 



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency policy through non-precedent decisions.

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

CC: Gibbs Houston Pauw
1000 Second Ave., Ste. 1600
Seattle, WA 98104

DISCUSSION: The Nebraska Service Center Director (director) denied the Application for Temporary Resident Status (Form I-687). In a separate action, the director certified its decision to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) for review. The director's decision will be affirmed. The application will be denied.

On May 4, 1988, the applicant filed a Form I-687, Application for Temporary Resident Status, pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1225a. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant's January 17, 1985 departure pursuant to a deportation order meant he failed to maintain the required continuous residence. *See* Section 245A(g)(2)(b)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(g)(2)(b)(i).¹

On March 29, 2013, the director granted the applicant's motion and reopened the Form I-690, Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility, and the Form I-687 application.

This matter has a complex procedural history. In *Proyecto San Pablo v. INS*, No. CIV 89-456-TUC-WDB (D. Ariz. Feb. 2, 2001), the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona held that the legacy Immigration and Nationalization Service (legacy INS) violated the due process rights of a class of applicants for legalization under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) when it denied those applicants access to their complete deportation or exclusion files and prevented them from seeking waivers to "cure" prior deportations or exclusions. On March 27, 2001, the court ordered the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to reopen legalization applications filed by class members and (1) accept waiver applications submitted by class members and adjudicate them in the same manner as waiver applications filed by other legalization applicants were adjudicated; and (2) prior to making a decision on a reopened legalization application, provide the applicant with complete copies of prior deportation files, including copies of tapes and/or transcripts of the hearings before the immigration court, to enable the applicant to bring a collateral challenge to the deportation order, if appropriate. Subsequently, in *Proyecto San Pablo v. Dept of Homeland Security*, No. CV 89-456-TUC-RCC (D. Ariz. June 4, 2007), the court reiterated its March 27, 2001 holding and ruled that, if the entire record cannot be located by the defendants, the following burden of proof will apply:

A legalization applicant who may be denied on the basis of 8 U.S.C. 1225a(g)(2)(B)(i), or because of a prior deportation or exclusion order, must make a *prima facie* showing that the prior deportation or exclusion order was not in compliance with the governing statute or regulations, or occurred in violation of due process, or was otherwise unlawful or involved a gross miscarriage of justice. If the applicant makes such a showing, then CIS has the burden of coming forward with a copy of the tape and/or transcript of the prior deportation or exclusion hearing . . . If

¹ The section provides that "an alien shall not be considered to have resided continuously in the United States, if, during any period for which continuous residence is required, the alien was outside the United States as a result of a departure under an order of deportation."

CIS does not produce such evidence from the prior deportation or exclusion file, then the prior deportation or exclusion cannot be used as evidence to support a denial of legalization benefits.

Neither counsel nor the applicant responded to the certified denial. However, we note that in a legal brief in support of the applicant's motion to reopen, counsel states that he has filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for the applicant's complete deportation records. In his brief, counsel acknowledges having received record material from the legacy INS. Further, the record shows that on December 29, 1998, legacy INS released record material to the applicant. However, from the documentary evidence in the record it does not appear that that the applicant ever received a tape recording and/or transcript of the deportation proceeding. The applicant's physical file (currently in the possession of the AAO) does not contain a tape recording or hearing transcript. As a result, USCIS has complied with the District Court's order to the extent that it has provided the applicant with a copy of his legalization file as it currently exists. As a result of the missing tape and/or transcript, however, the applicant's complete file is unavailable.

To invoke a shift in the burden of proof from the applicant to USCIS, the applicant must make a *prima facie* showing that his deportation order was either: the result of proceedings not in compliance with the governing law or regulations; or occurred in violation of due process; or was otherwise unlawful or involved a gross miscarriage of justice.

In this case, the director granted the applicant's Motion to Reopen and approved the applicant's previously filed Form I-690, Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility. The director denied the applicant's Form I-687, Application for Temporary Resident Status, on March 29, 2013, because it found that the applicant failed to satisfy the continuous residence requirement of section 245A(a)(2)(A) of the Act due to the applicant's departure pursuant to a deportation order dated January 17, 1985. The director, therefore, denied the application and certified the matter to the AAO for a ruling. The AAO notes that in rendering a decision, the director did not address whether the applicant was provided with a complete copy of his deportation file; nor did the director discuss whether the applicant submitted *prima facie* evidence that his deportation order was not in compliance with the governing statute or regulations, or occurred in violation of due process, or resulted in a gross miscarriage of justice, as required by the amended *Proyecto* order.

The standard for establishing a *prima facie* case means the evidence reveals a reasonable likelihood that requirements have been satisfied. *See Fernandez v. Gonzales*, 439 F.3d 592, n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (*citing Ordonez v. INS*, 345 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.2003) (citations omitted)). A reasonable likelihood means showing a realistic chance that the petitioner can establish the issue in question at a later time. *Guo v. Ashcroft*, 386 F.3d 556, 564 (3rd Cir. 2004) (discussing the *prima facie* standard in the context of motions to reopen).

In applying these standards, the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) and most Circuits employ a balancing test and weigh all evidence for and against in determining whether a *prima facie* case

has been made. See *Zheng v. Mukasey*, 546 F.3d 70, 72 (1st Cir. 2008) (discussing the issue in the context of a motion to reopen); *Wang v. BIA*, 437 F.3d 270, 276 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); *Matter of J-W-S-*, 24 I&N Dec. 185, 191-92; *Matter of C-C*, 23 I&N Dec. 899, 902-03 (BIA 2006) (same); *Guo v. Ashcroft*, 386 F.3d 556, 564-66 (3d Cir. 2004) (same).

In relevant part, under the terms of the *Proyecto* amended order, counsel has requested a copy of the applicant's complete deportation file, including the tape recording and/or transcript of the deportation hearing. The relevant regulation in existence at the time of the applicant's deportation hearing, 8 C.F.R. § 242.15, indicated that "[t]he hearing shall be recorded verbatim except for statements made off the record with the permission of the special inquiry officer." It is likely that the hearing was recorded, and possible that it was included among other hearings on one tape (as we understand was frequently the case); however, EOIR and USCIS searches have not produced a copy of the recording. The current entire USCIS record, which is before the AAO, does not contain a tape recording or transcript. However, counsel acknowledges receiving record material from USCIS. Therefore, it appears that USCIS and EOIR have fully complied with the court's order to provide the applicant with all records relating to his deportation proceeding. While the applicant does not appear to be statutorily eligible for legalization without the special rules of construction set out by the court in the *Proyecto* amended order and the outstanding deportation order appears valid under current ninth circuit case law (and has apparently never been challenged to EOIR or to the Court of Appeals), we are obliged to follow, to the letter, the 2007 amended *Proyecto* order.

We therefore find the evidence sufficient to determine that the applicant has made a *prima facie* showing that the proceedings which resulted in his deportation were not in compliance with the governing regulations. As a result, USCIS cannot use the prior deportation order as evidence to support a denial of legalization benefits. Consequently, pursuant to the terms of the 2007 amended *Proyecto* order the AAO is constrained to find that the applicant has overcome the particular basis of the denial cited by the director.

An applicant for temporary residence must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). An alien shall not be considered to have resided continuously in the United States if, during any period for which continuous residence is required, the alien was outside the United States under an order of deportation. Section 245A(g)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(g)(2)(B)(i).

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

In support of his Form I-687 legalization application, the applicant submitted documentary evidence in the form of a California DMV interim driver's license receipt, employment verification letters, witness affidavits, W-2 wage and tax statements, a letter certifying that the applicant was a part-time student in 1987 at [REDACTED] and a copy of a [REDACTED] all dated during the requisite period. The contemporaneous documents submitted by the applicant are credible. Upon review, the AAO finds that the documents furnished in this case may be accorded sufficient evidentiary weight to meet the applicant's burden of proof of establishing his continuous unlawful residence in the United States for the requisite period.

However, an alien who has been convicted of a felony or of three or more misdemeanors committed in the United States is ineligible for adjustment to temporary resident status. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(c)(1); section 245A(a)(4)(B) of the INA.

"Felony" means a crime committed in the United States punishable by imprisonment for a term of more than one year, regardless of the term such alien actually served, if any, except when the offense is defined by the state as a misdemeanor, and the sentence actually imposed is one year or less, regardless of the term such alien actually served. Under this exception, for purposes of 8 C.F.R. Part 245a, the crime shall be treated as a misdemeanor. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(p).

"Misdemeanor" means a crime committed in the United States, either (1) punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year or less, regardless of the term actually served, if any; or (2) a crime treated as a misdemeanor under 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(p). For purposes of this definition, any crime punishable by imprisonment for a maximum term of five days or less shall not be considered a misdemeanor. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(o).

In addition, an applicant is inadmissible, and therefore ineligible for temporary resident status, if he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense), or if he admits having committed such crime, or if he admits committing an act which constitutes the essential elements of such crime. Section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).

An issue to be determined in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence that he has no disqualifying criminal convictions, and is thus otherwise admissible to the United States.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

To determine if a crime involves moral turpitude, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals employs the categorical approach set forth in *Taylor v. United States*, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (1990). See *Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey*, 523 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008), *overruled on other grounds by Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder*, 58 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2009). The purpose of the categorical approach is to determine whether the full range of conduct encompassed by the statute constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. *Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzalez*, 430 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2005), *abrogation on other grounds recognized by Holder v. Martinez-Gutierrez*, 132 S.Ct. 2011, 2020-21 (2012). If the statute “criminalizes both conduct that does involve moral turpitude and other conduct that does not, the modified categorical approach is applied.” *Marmolejo-Campos*, 558 F.3d at 912 (citing *Fernando-Ruiz v. Gonzalez*, 466 F.3d 1121, 1163 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also *Castillo-Cruz v. Holder*, 581 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2009). However, there must be “a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that did not involve moral turpitude.” *Nicanor-Romero*, 523 F.3d at 1004 (quoting *Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). To demonstrate a “realistic probability,” the applicant must point to his or her own case or other cases in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute to conduct not involving moral turpitude. 523 F.3d at 1004-05. A realistic probability also exists where the statute expressly punishes conduct not involving moral turpitude. See *U.S. v. Vidal*, 504 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007).

Once a realistic probability is established, the modified categorical approach is applied, which requires looking to the “limited, specified set of documents” that comprise what is known as the record of conviction – the charging document, a signed plea agreement, jury instructions, guilty pleas, transcripts of a plea proceeding and the judgment – to determine if the conviction entailed admission to, or proof of, the elements of a crime involving moral turpitude. *Castillo-Cruz*, 581 F.3d at 1161 (citing *Fernando-Ruiz*, 466 F.3d at 1132-33); see also *Marmolejo-Campos*, 558 F.3d at 912 (citing *Cuevas-Gaspar*, 430 F.3d at 1020). The Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed that courts may not examine evidence outside the record of conviction in determining whether a conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude. See *Olivas-Motta v. Holder*, --- F.3d ---, 2013 WL 2128318 (9th Cir. May 17, 2013) (rejecting *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008)). Where the burden of proof is on the applicant, as in the present case, the applicant cannot sustain that burden where the record of conviction is inconclusive. *Young v. Holder*, 697 F.3d 976, 989 (9th Cir. 2012).

The record reflects that on [REDACTED] the applicant was convicted in the State of California, County of Los Angeles, of receiving stolen property, a misdemeanor in violation of section 496 of the California Penal Code. The applicant was placed on probation for a period of 24 months and the imposition of a sentence was suspended. [REDACTED]

Cal. Penal Code § 496(a) provides that:

Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison, or in a county jail for not more than one year. However, if the district attorney or the grand jury determines that this action would be in the interests of justice, the district attorney or the grand jury, as the case may be, may, if the value of the property does not exceed four hundred dollars (\$400), specify in the accusatory pleading that the offense shall be a misdemeanor, punishable only by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year.

U.S. Courts have held that the crime of theft or larceny, whether grand or petty, involves moral turpitude. See *Matter of Scarpulla*, 15 I&N Dec. 139, 140 (BIA 1974) (stating, “It is well settled that theft or larceny, whether grand or petty, has always been held to involve moral turpitude . . .”); *Morasch v. INS*, 363 F.2d 30, 31 (9th Cir. 1966)(stating, “Obviously, either petty or grand larceny, i.e., stealing another's property, qualifies [as a crime involving moral turpitude].”) A conviction for theft is considered to involve moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended. *Matter of Grazley*, 14 I&N Dec. 330 (BIA 1973).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether Cal. Penal Code § 496(a) constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude in the recent case, *Castillo-Cruz v. Holder*, 581 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court determined that Cal. Penal Code § 496(a) does not require a perpetrator to have the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his or her property, but rather permits conviction for an intent to deprive the owner of his or her property temporarily. *Id.* at 1160. The Court applied the methodology articulated in *Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez*, *supra*, for a determination of whether there is a “realistic probability” that Cal. Penal Code § 496(a) would be applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* The Court concluded that lower courts have upheld convictions under Cal. Penal Code § 496(a) in cases where there was no permanent intent, and as such, a conviction under the statute is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude. *Id.* at 1161. The Court held that the alien’s conviction is not a crime involving moral turpitude under the modified categorical analysis because the government conceded that there is no evidence in the record establishing that his offense involved an intent to deprive the owner of possession permanently. *Id.* It is noted that the court apparently reviewed only the record of conviction in making this determination. *Id.* (citing *Fernando-Ruiz v. Gonzalez*, 466 F.3d 1121, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2006).

In the instant case, the record of conviction, which consists of a criminal history transcript, does not reflect that the applicant was convicted under Cal. Penal Code § 496 for intending to deprive the owner of his or her property permanently. Additionally, the applicant submitted a certification

dated August 19, 2005 and prepared by the Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles, which provides that the remaining documents comprising the record of conviction were destroyed pursuant to Government Code Section 71008. Without evidence that a permanent taking was intended, the AAO cannot find that the applicant's offense constitutes conduct involving moral turpitude, pursuant to the holding in *Castillo-Cruz*. Therefore, the applicant's 1990 conviction for receiving stolen property, a misdemeanor in violation of Cal. Penal Code §496 does not render him inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act.

However, the record reflects that on [REDACTED] the applicant was convicted in California of misdemeanor "violation of promise to appear in court or before a person authorized to receive a deposit of bail," in violation of section 40508(a) of the California Vehicle Code. The record further reflects that on [REDACTED] the applicant was again convicted in California of misdemeanor violation of promise to appear, in violation of section 40508(a) of the California Vehicle Code.

Cal. Vehicle Code § 40508(a) provides that:

A person willfully violating his or her written promise to appear or a lawfully granted continuance of his or her promise to appear in court or before a person authorized to receive a deposit of bail is guilty of a misdemeanor regardless of the disposition of the charge upon which he or she was originally arrested.

Cal. Penal Code § 19 provides that:

Except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by any law of this state, every offense declared to be a misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars (\$1,000), or by both.

Therefore, for immigration purposes, the applicant stands convicted of misdemeanor receipt of stolen property in violation of section 496 of the California Penal Code and of two separate offenses regarding the violation of a promise to appear in court, misdemeanors under the California Vehicle Code. As the applicant has been convicted of three misdemeanors, he is ineligible for temporary resident status pursuant to section 245A(a)(4)(B) of the Act. *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(d)(1). There is no waiver available to an applicant convicted of three or more misdemeanors committed in the United States. Therefore, based on the foregoing, the applicant is ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act.

ORDER: The director's March 29, 2013 decision is affirmed. The Form I-687 application is denied.