

(b)(6)

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

Date:

**MAY 21 2014**

Office: NORFOLK

FILE:

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case. This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency policy through non-precedent decisions.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ron Rosenberg", written over a large, light-colored rectangular area.

Ron Rosenberg  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the director of the Norfolk office. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

On March 28, 2005, the applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act). On March 24, 2006, the director erroneously denied the I-687 application, finding that the applicant abandoned the application, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(13), by failing to appear for scheduled interviews on December 8, 2005 and on March 6, 2006.<sup>1</sup> Because the director erred in denying the application based on abandonment, on January 8, 2014, this office withdrew the director's decision. The applicant was issued a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) and provided 21 days in which to respond or to provide additional evidence in support of her claim. A copy of the notice was sent to counsel of record on March 19, 2014 and additional time was given to respond. As of the date of this decision, no brief or additional evidence has been received; therefore, the record will be considered complete. The director's decision will be withdrawn and the applicant's claim will be considered *de novo*, evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in the record according to its probative value and credibility as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).<sup>2</sup>

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

---

<sup>1</sup> On December 14, 2009, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California ruled that United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may not apply its abandonment regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(13), in adjudicating legalization applications filed by CSS class members. See *CSS v. Michael Chertoff*, Case 2:86-cv-01343-LKK-JFM.

<sup>2</sup> The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. The AAO's *de novo* authority is well recognized by the federal courts. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I & N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA).

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has established that she (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status throughout the requisite period. The record does not contain independent, objective evidence submitted in support of the applicant's claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and to have resided in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of one affidavit.

At the time of completing her Form I-687 application, the applicant indicated that she began residing in the United States in 1981 and was self-employed. She listed no absences from the United States during the requisite period. She has not submitted any evidence in support of her asserted date of entry into the United States and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period. In addition, the record contains inconsistent statements from the applicant regarding her manner of entry and the dates of her residence. In the Form I-687 application, the applicant indicated that she entered the United States in 1981 without inspection and resided in the United States from 1981 through the end of the requisite period. However, in an unsigned statement given under oath before two U.S. Customs and Border Patrol officers on May 23, 2006, in Norfolk, Virginia, the applicant stated that she first entered the United States in 1981 with a visitor's visa, left the United States in 1985 and returned in 1995. The inconsistency in the record is material to the applicant's claim in that they have a direct bearing on the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period.

It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I & N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA). The contradictions undermine the credibility of the applicant's claim of entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period. For these reasons, the applicant's statements do not indicate that her assertions are probably true.

The remaining evidence in the record is comprised of the I-687 application and a Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, filed on the applicant's behalf by her sister. This evidence is not probative of residence during the requisite time period.

Based on the foregoing, the applicant has failed to submit evidence in support of her claim and to resolve the inconsistency in the record with independent objective evidence. Thus, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M-, supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.