

identifying data deleted to  
prevent clearly unwarranted  
invasion of personal privacy



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

PUBLIC COPY

L2

FILE:

MSC 01 326 60160

Office: NEW YORK

Date: DEC 17 2008

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the National Benefits Center. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. Grissom".

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, New York, New York. It is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application on the ground that the applicant failed to establish that he had entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and had resided continuously in the United States from then through May 4, 1988.

Although a Form G-28, Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative, has been submitted, the individual named is no longer authorized under 8 C.F.R. § 292.1 or 292.2 to represent the applicant. Therefore, the applicant shall be considered as self-represented and the decision will be furnished only to the applicant.

On appeal, the applicant submits a statement.

Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act states:

(i) In General – The alien must establish that the alien entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he or she has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. In determining whether an alien maintained continuous unlawful residence in the United States for purposes of this subparagraph, the regulations prescribed by the Attorney General under section 245A(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that were most recently in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act shall apply.

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility, and its amenability to verification. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). *See* 8 C.F.R. 245a.15(b). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant’s own testimony. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(f). Affidavits indicating specific, personal knowledge of the applicant’s whereabouts during the relevant time period are given greater weight than fill-in-the-blank affidavits providing generic information.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant’s employment must: provide the applicant’s address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant’s duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v), states that attestations from churches, unions or other organizations should: identify the applicant by name; be signed by an official (whose title is shown); show inclusive dates of membership; state the address where the applicant resided during the membership period; include the seal of the organization impressed on the letter or the letterhead of the organization, if the organization has letterhead stationery; establish how the author knows the applicant; and, establish the origin of the information being attested to.

The applicant filed a Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Resident Status or Adjust Status, under the LIFE Act on August 22, 2001. On September 28, 2007, the director denied the application. The applicant filed a timely appeal from that decision on October 15, 2007.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review this matter on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.”); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp.*, NTSB, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The federal courts have long recognized the AAO’s *de novo* review authority. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has established that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988.

The record reflects that the applicant has submitted the following documentation in an attempt to establish his continuous unlawful residence in the United States during the requisite time period:

1. A letter, dated October 3, 1990, from [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] General Construction in Brooklyn, New York, stating that the applicant had been employed since February 1981.
2. A letter, dated February 14, 1991, from [REDACTED] stating that the applicant resided with him in Brooklyn, New York, from 1981 to 1986, and a similar affidavit, dated February 1, 1991, from [REDACTED] stating that the applicant had lived with him in Brooklyn since 1987.
3. A fill-in-the-blank affidavit, dated February 25, 1991, from [REDACTED] stating that she first met the applicant in October 1981 when he came to her house to see her first-born child and that she has seen him every October since then for her daughter's birthday.
4. Similar fill-in-the-blank affidavits from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] stating that they had known the applicant since May 1981 – that they used to meet and pray together in the Mosque. The affidavit from [REDACTED] is dated March 4, 1991; the affidavit from [REDACTED] is not dated nor is it notarized.
5. An affidavit, dated March 28, 1991, from [REDACTED] of Montreal, Canada, stating that the applicant visited him in Montreal from May 12, 1987, to June 29, 1987. The dates on the letter appear to have been altered.
6. An undated, un-notarized letter from [REDACTED], stating that the applicant had been his patient from November 1981 until March 1982; and, a billing statement from [REDACTED] dated April 25, 1982.

In summary, for the duration of the requisite time period, the applicant has provided no employment letters that comply with the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i)(A) through (F), no utility bills according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(ii), no school records according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(iii), no hospital or medical records according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(iv), and no church, union or other organization attestations that comply with the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v)(A) through (G). The applicant also has not provided documentation (including, for example, money order receipts, passport entries, children's birth certificates, bank book transactions, letters of correspondence, a Social Security or Selective Service card, automobile license receipts, deeds, tax receipts, insurance policies or other similar

documentation) according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(A) through (K). The documentation provided by the applicant consists solely of third-party affidavits (“other relevant documentation”). These documents lack specific details as to how the affiants knew the applicant – how often and under what circumstances they had contact with the applicant – throughout the requisite time period. Furthermore, one of the documents has been determined to be fraudulent and another contains alterations.

Doubt cast on any aspect of the evidence as submitted may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. Further, it is incumbent on the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence; any attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582. (Comm. 1988).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e) provides that “[a]n alien applying for adjustment of status under [section 1104 of the LIFE Act] has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods.” Preponderance of the evidence is defined as “evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1064 (5<sup>th</sup> ed. 1979). *See Matter of Lemhammad*, 20 I&N Dec. 316, 320, Note 5 (BIA 1991).

It is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, as required for eligibility for adjustment of status to permanent resident status under section 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b). Thus, he is ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.