


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
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FILE:



Office: PHOENIX

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
IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), *amended by* LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the National Benefits Center. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert P. Wiemann".

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, Phoenix, Arizona. It is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application on the ground that the applicant failed to establish that he had entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and had resided continuously in the United States from then through May 4, 1988.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant submits a brief and copies of evidence previously provided.

To be eligible for adjustment to permanent resident status under the LIFE Act applicants must establish their continuous unlawful residence in the United States from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, and their continuous physical presence in the United States from November 6, 1986 through May 4, 1988. See section 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) and (C)(i) of the LIFE Act, 8 U.S.C. § 245A(a)(2)(A) and (3)(A).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility, and its amenability to verification. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the

submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). *See* 8 C.F.R. 245a.15(b). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.13(f). Affidavits indicating specific, personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the relevant time period are given greater weight than fill-in-the-blank affidavits providing generic information.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The applicant filed a Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Resident Status or Adjust Status, under the LIFE Act on September 27, 2002. On June 27, 2005 the director denied the application. The applicant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from that decision on April 3, 2006.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988.

The record reflects that the applicant has submitted the following documentation in an attempt to establish his continuous unlawful residence in the United States during the requisite time period:

1. An undated letter, from [REDACTED] of Apparel Imprints, Inc., Las Vegas Nevada, stating that the applicant had been employed since 1981. This employment letter is not notarized and does not comply with the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) in that it fails to provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.
2. Similar fill-in-the-blank affidavits, dated April 10, 1992, from: (a) [REDACTED] of Las Vegas, Nevada, stating that she had known the applicant since he first came to the United States - that they lived together at [REDACTED], until the applicant moved to [REDACTED] to live with his cousin. [REDACTED] further stated that the applicant had lived in Las Vegas since February 1980, and that the applicant had worked for Apparel since 1981; (b) [REDACTED] (who did not give his address), stating that the applicant had lived

in Las Vegas since November 1981 and that, while working at the Dunes Hotel, he () met the applicant when he was working for Apparel Inc. in Las Vegas; and, (c) () of Las Vegas, Nevada, stating that the applicant lived in Las Vegas since July 1981, and that he met the applicant when he was working for Apparel Imprints, Inc. The affiants did not provide documentation identifying them and/or their residences in the United States at the time the statements were made, and do not state in detail how they first met the applicant in the United States, what their relationships with the applicant were, or how frequently and under what circumstances they saw the applicant during the requisite period. As such, they can only be afforded minimal weight as evidence of the applicant's residence and presence in the United States throughout the requisite period.

3. A fill-in-the blank affidavit, dated December 11, 2002, from () Luevanos of Las Vegas, Nevada, stating that he had known the applicant since 1981. This affidavit suffers from the same deficiencies noted above.
4. Two letters that appear to have been written on the same typewriter: the first, dated November 29, 2002, from () of Las Vegas, stating that, to the best of his knowledge, he had known the applicant since 1981 and met him because he is a mechanic and the applicant was his customer; the second, dated November 30, 2002, from () of Las Vegas, stating that he had personally known the applicant since 1981 when he (the applicant) was living in El Paso, Texas. The affiants have provided little information for concluding that the affiants had direct and personal knowledge of the events and circumstances of the applicant's residence in the United States throughout the requisite period. As such, they also can only be afforded minimal weight.

In summary, the applicant has provided no employment letters that comply with the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i)(A) through (F), no utility bills according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(ii), no credible school records according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(iii), and no hospital or medical records according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(iv). The applicant also has not provided documentation (including, for example, money order receipts, passport entries, children's birth certificates, dated bank book transactions, letters of correspondence, a Social Security card, automobile contract, insurance documentation, tax receipts, insurance policies or letters according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(A) through (K). The documentation provided by the applicant consists solely of third-party affidavits ("other relevant documentation") that significantly lack details and are of minimal probative value.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e) provides that "[a]n alien applying for adjustment of status under [section 1104 of the LIFE Act] has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods." Preponderance

of the evidence is defined as “evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1064 (5th ed. 1979). *See Matter of Lemhammad*, 20 I&N Dec. 316, 320, Note 5 (BIA 1991).

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. It is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and maintained continuous unlawful residence since such date through May 4, 1988, as required for eligibility for adjustment of status to permanent resident status under section 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b). Thus, he is ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

It is noted that on September 4, 2002, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordered that the applicant be granted 30 days in which to voluntarily depart the United States (A75 763 261relates), with an alternate order of removal. That order remains outstanding.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.