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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529

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U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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FILE:

MSC 02 071 61766

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date: AUG 05 2009

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by Life Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

  
John F. Grisson  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, Los Angeles, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application after determining that the applicant had not demonstrated that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988.

On appeal, the applicant submits additional evidence and asks that his appeal be considered.

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date through May 4, 1988. See § 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also states that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence, or if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

Here, the applicant submitted evidence that is not relevant, probative and credible. The applicant submitted the following information in support of his claim that he resided continuously in the United States from a date prior to January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988:

- The applicant submitted affidavits from 6 individuals in support of his claim. The affidavits are general in nature and indicate that the affiants have knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States for all, or a portion of, the requisite.

As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality; an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony; and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. The witness statements submitted do not provide detailed evidence establishing how the witnesses knew the applicant, the details of their association or relationship, or detailed accounts of an ongoing association establishing a relationship under which the witnesses could be reasonably expected to have personal knowledge of the applicant's residence, activities and whereabouts during the requisite period covered by the applicant's Form I-687. To be considered probative, witness statements must do more than simply state that a witness knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. The statements must contain sufficient detail, generated by the asserted contact with the applicant, to establish that a relationship does in fact exist, how the relationship was established and sustained, and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts asserted. The witness statements submitted by the applicant, therefore, are not deemed probative and are of little evidentiary value.

- It must further be noted that the following affiants submitted affidavits stating that they had knowledge of the applicant's residence in Los Angeles County, California during the requisite period: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The applicant does not assert that he ever resided in Los Angeles County, California and in fact states in his letter of October 5, 2006 to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security that he did not. This is further confirmed by the applicant's Form I-687. The applicant asserts that the listed witnesses did not state that he lived in Los Angeles County, but that they met him in Los Angeles County. That is not the case. The affidavits issued in 2001 by those affiants clearly state that they had personal knowledge that the applicant resided in Los Angeles County during the requisite period. On appeal, the applicant submitted new affidavits by those same witnesses who now state that the applicant resided at the addresses listed by him on the Form I-687 during the requisite period, none of which are in Los Angeles County.

The inconsistencies noted have not been explained and are material to the applicant's claim because they have a direct bearing on the applicant's activities and whereabouts during the requisite period. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the

remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

- The applicant submitted an employment affidavit from [REDACTED] who states that he has personal knowledge that the applicant resided in San Bernardino, CA from March of 1981 until October of 1986, and that the applicant was employed by him in the affiant's gardening service from March of 1981 until October of 1986.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable. The employment statement submitted by the applicant fails to provide the information required by the above-cited regulation. The statement does not provide: the applicant's address at the time of employment; show periods of layoff (or state that there were none); state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information provided was taken from company records; or identify the location of such company records and state whether they are accessible or in the alternative why they are unavailable. As such, the employment statement is not deemed probative and is of little evidentiary value.

Thus, it is found that the applicant has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988. Accordingly, the applicant is not eligible for adjustment to permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.