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U.S. Citizenship  
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Services

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FILE: [REDACTED]  
MSC 01 331 61396

Office: NEW YORK Date:

**FEB 03 2009**

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), *amended by* Life Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the National Benefits Center. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John F. Grissom".

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, New York, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The district director denied the application because the applicant had not demonstrated that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status since before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988. The director noted an inconsistency in the applicant's testimony and application.

On appeal counsel for the applicant asserts the third party statements submitted are sufficient to establish eligibility.

An applicant for permanent resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

An applicant must establish eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit to establish presence during the required period. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.15(b)(1); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). Such evidence may include employment records, tax records, utility bills, school records, hospital or medical

records, or attestations by churches, unions, or other organizations so long as certain information is included. The regulations also permit the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document, but applications submitted with unverifiable documentation may be denied. Documentation that does not cover the required period is not relevant to a determination of the alien's presence during the required period and will not be considered or accorded any evidentiary weight in these proceedings.

On August 2, 2007, the director sent the applicant a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID), which stated that the evidence submitted by the applicant was insufficiently probative of continuous unlawful residence in the U.S. from prior to January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, and continuous physical presence in the U.S. from November 6, 1986 through May 4, 1988.

The applicant submitted a written response and additional third party statements.

On September 1, 2007, the director denied the application because the applicant had failed to establish his continuous unlawful presence during the required period.

On appeal the applicant asks that USCIS reconsider his application.

Relevant to the period in question the record contains the following evidence:

- (1) Statement from [REDACTED] asserting the applicant has been a member of the Sikh Cultural Society since 1981. The document does not indicate the source of its information such as business records or personal recollection, and the applicant did not list any such membership when asked on his application for temporary residence in 1990. This statement is not credible and does not support the applicant's assertions.
- (2) Statement from [REDACTED] asserting generically that the applicant worked for her company in Astoria, New York from June 1983 to March 1987. This document does not reveal the source of its information, makes only a single generic statement, and does not satisfy the criteria for an employment letter. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i)(A) through (F).
- (3) Statement by [REDACTED] asserting that the applicant worked for her as a seasonal laborer in Cantua Creek, California, from December 1981 to January 1985. This statement contradicts that of [REDACTED], as the dates of employment overlap and the companies are located in different states – New York and California.
- (4) Statements by [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] asserting the applicant has lived in the United States from “December 1981 to present.” It is clear from a cursory observation that these three statements were filled out by the same person, raising doubts about the manner of their production and authenticity. Even in a light most favorable to the applicant the statements are too general to support the applicant's assertions.

As stated above, the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the *extent* of the documentation. The minimal evidence furnished cannot be considered extensive,

and in such cases a negative inference regarding the claim may be made as stated in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

Documents which generically assert an affiant has known an applicant since a particular year are not sufficiently probative to support assertions of eligibility. Such casual knowledge of an applicant lacks the context to be sufficiently probative such that USCIS can make an informed determination that the applicant has been residing continuously in an unlawful status for the duration of the required period. In this case the documents provide list inconsistent areas of residence for the applicant, are generic in nature and fail to fully explain how the affiants came to know the applicant and what the nature of the relationships were. The documents and affidavits submitted are internally inconsistent, generic in nature, and lack credibility.

In this case the applicant has not submitted any primary evidence, and relied solely on statements by third parties discussed above. The applicant has provided an absolute minimal amount of information, much of it inconsistent, such that USCIS has no context within which to evaluate and corroborate his assertions. In addition, an examination of the record reveals several inconsistencies. Most notably the applicant listed that he had two children born in India during the required period, and has asserted that his wife and family resided in India. The birth dates of these children do not correspond to the applicant's asserted absences. In addition, when filing his application for temporary residence the applicant stated that he went to Canada in 1987 because his family was ill. The record indicates the applicant's family resided in India at the time. A copy of the applicant's passport indicates his prior passport had been issued in Jalandhar in November of 1989, yet the applicant has provided no evidence of his entry into the United States, or of his travels through Canada and Mexico to get to the United States. Finally, as noted above, the applicant submitted statements alleging that he was employed in two separate states during the same period, which is clearly implausible.

Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may undermine the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988). It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Id.* The applicant has failed to clarify these inconsistencies. In light of the inconsistencies noted above the statements submitted by the applicant are not sufficient to establish eligibility.

The discrepancies and errors catalogued above lead the AAO to conclude that the evidence of the applicant's eligibility is not credible. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the lack of credible supporting documentation and the inconsistencies noted in the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and maintained continuous, unlawful residence from such date through May 4, 1988, as required for eligibility for adjustment to permanent resident status under section 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.