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
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U.S. Citizenship
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
Office: GARDEN CITY

Date: FEB 04 2009

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), *amended by* LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, Garden City, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application because the applicant failed to demonstrate that he resided in the United States in a continuous, unlawful status from before January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988, as required by section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that the director failed to give sufficient weight to the evidence submitted in support of his application. The applicant also asserts that he did reply to the director's Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) and that he submitted additional evidence to establish his eligibility for adjustment of status under the LIFE Act. The record reflects that the applicant submitted a timely rebuttal to the NOID. No additional evidence was submitted on appeal. The AAO has reviewed all of the evidence and has made a *de novo* decision based on the record and the AAO's assessment of the credibility, relevance and probative value of the evidence.¹

Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act states:

(i) In General – The alien must establish that the alien entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he or she has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. In determining whether an alien maintained continuous unlawful residence in the United States for purposes of this subparagraph, the regulations prescribed by the Attorney General under section 245A(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that were most recently in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act shall apply.

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date through May 4, 1988. *See* § 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b). The applicant has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence

¹ The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n.9 (2d Cir. 1989).

produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(f). 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant’s claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and resided in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of attestations from individuals claiming to know the applicant. Some of the evidence submitted indicates that the applicant resided in the United States after May 4, 1988; however, because evidence of residence after May 4, 1988 is not probative of residence during the requisite time period, it shall not be discussed. The AAO has reviewed each document in its entirety to determine the applicant’s eligibility; however, the AAO will not quote each witness statement in this decision.

The declarations from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] all contain statements that the declarants have known the applicant for years and that they attest to the applicant being physically present in the United States during the required period. These declarations fail, however, to establish the applicant’s continuous unlawful residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality; an applicant must provide

evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony; and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility.

None of the witness statements provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with him, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations and demonstrate that they have a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence during the time addressed in the declarations. To be considered probative and credible, witness declarations must do more than simply state that a declarant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. It is noted that the declaration from [REDACTED] is not amenable to verification. Upon review, the AAO finds that, individually and together, the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true. Therefore, they have little probative value.

The record also contains a declaration from [REDACTED] (signature illegible). The declaration indicates that the applicant resided at [REDACTED] since 1987. Neither declaration provides sufficient information to indicate that the declarant had direct personal knowledge of the events or circumstances of the applicant's residency. The declaration lack credibility and provide minimal probative value as evidence of the applicant's residence during the requisite period.

The record also includes a declaration from [REDACTED] assistant to Imam, at Masjid Malcolm Shabazz. This declaration does not meet the requirements for organizations under the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v). The declarant failed to state where the applicant resided during membership period, established how the author knows the applicant, or established the origin of the information being attested to. Given the lack of relevant details, this declaration lacks credibility and provides minimal probative value as evidence of the applicant's residency during the requisite period.

Based upon the foregoing, the documents submitted in support of the applicant's claim have been found to lack credibility or to have minimal probative value as evidence of the applicant's residence and presence in the United States for the requisite period. The applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and maintained continuous, unlawful residence from such date through May 4, 1988, as required for eligibility for adjustment to permanent resident status under section 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

Beyond the decision of the director, the record reflects that on January 11, 1996, the applicant was charged with *theft*, a violation of Title 7, Subtitle 1, of the Annotated Code of Maryland in the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County (Case [REDACTED]). The applicant

was sentenced to six months, suspended six months and placed on two years supervised probation. On April 17, 1997, the case was closed satisfactorily. This single misdemeanor conviction does not render the applicant ineligible pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §245a.11(d)(1) and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.18(a).

An alien is inadmissible if he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense), or if he admits having committed such crime, or if he admits committing an act which constitutes the essential elements of such crime. Section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act.

The most commonly accepted definition of a crime involving moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. *Jordan v. De George*, 341 U.S. 223, reh'g denied, 341 U.S. 956 (1951).

Section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act provides for an exception to inadmissibility of an alien convicted of only one crime of moral turpitude if:

The maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of six months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).

(Emphasis added.)

It is well settled as a matter of law that the crime of theft is one involving moral turpitude, which renders the applicant inadmissible. *Da Rosa Silva v. INS*, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1011 (E.D. Pa. 2003). However, the applicant does qualify under the petty offense exception as the maximum penalty does not exceed imprisonment for one year, and he was sentenced to supervised probation for two years. Therefore, the above crime does not render the applicant inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.