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U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

L2

FILE:

MSC 02 228 60152

Office: NEW YORK Date: FEB 24 2009

IN RE:

Applicant:


APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by Life Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

  
John F. Grissom, Acting Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, New York, New York, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application because the applicant had not demonstrated that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that the director failed to consider the evidence submitted in response to the Notice off Intent to Deny.

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b).

The applicant has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status during the requisite period. Here, the applicant has failed to meet this burden.

In an attempt to establish continuous unlawful residence since before January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988, the applicant provided the following evidence:

- An envelope postmarked August 31, 1987, and addressed to the applicant at Parkview [REDACTED] at [REDACTED], New York.
- An affidavit from [REDACTED] of New York, who attested to the applicant's New York residences from December 1981 to September 1986 at [REDACTED] and from September 1986 to October 1990 at [REDACTED]. The affiant claimed to be a close friend of the applicant.
- An affidavit from [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] in New York, New York, who indicated that the applicant was employed from June 1987 to August 1990.
- An affidavit from a representative of Electronic Plus in New York, New York, who indicated that the applicant was employed from May 1985 to June 1987.
- An affidavit from [REDACTED] of Quebec, Canada, who indicated that the applicant stayed with him "when he came to visit me from his country Ivory Coast" from January 15, 1988 to January 17, 1988.
- A furniture store receipt dated January 12, 1984.
- An affidavit from an acquaintance who attested to the applicant's residence in New York since 1986. It is noted that the acquaintance's name is indecipherable.

The applicant also submitted additional documents; however, they have no probative value in this proceeding as they serve to establish the applicant's residence in the United States subsequent to the period in question.

On July 7, 2007, the director issued a Notice of Intent to Deny, which advised the applicant that the affidavits submitted appeared to be neither credible nor amenable to verification and that no evidence was submitted demonstrating that the affiants had direct personal knowledge of the events testified in their respective affidavits.

The applicant, in response, submitted:

- A statement dated August 2, 2007, from [REDACTED] of Bronx, New York, who indicated that she first met the applicant at a car wash in Riverdale in 1986. The affiant asserted that she has “seen him, over the years, progress to a leadership role among his community.”
- An affidavit from [REDACTED] who attested to the applicant’s residence in New York since 1982.

The applicant’s claim on appeal that the director did not consider the affidavits submitted in response to the Notice of Intent to Deny is without merit. The director, in denying the application on August 18, 2007, noted that the affidavits from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did not establish that the applicant was present in the United States *prior to* January 1, 1982.

The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has determined that affidavits from third party individuals may be considered as evidence of continuous residence. *See Matter of E-- M--*, *supra*. In ascertaining the evidentiary weight of such affidavits, USCIS must determine the basis for the affiant's knowledge of the information to which he is attesting; and whether the statement is plausible, credible, and consistent both internally and with the other evidence of record. *Id.*

Following the dicta set forth in *Matter of E-- M--*, *supra*, the affidavits would not necessarily be fatal to the applicant's claim, if the affidavits upon which the claim relies are consistent both internally and with the other evidence of record, plausible, credible, and if the affiant sets forth the basis of his knowledge for the testimony provided. The statements issued by the applicant have been considered. However, the AAO does not view the documents discussed above as substantive enough to support a finding that the applicant entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982, and resided since that date through May 4, 1988.

The employment affidavits from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] failed to include the applicant’s address at the time of employment as required under 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i). Under the same regulations, the affiant also failed to declare whether the information was taken from company records, and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

None of the affiants provide any details regarding the nature of their relationship with the applicant or the basis for their continuing awareness of the applicant’s residence. The absence of sufficiently detailed documentation to corroborate the applicant’s claim of continuous residence for the entire requisite period seriously detracts from the credibility of his claim.

Doubt cast on any aspect of an applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence. It is incumbent upon an applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I. & N. Dec. 582 (BIA 1988).

The evaluation of the applicant's claim is a factor on both the quality and quantity of the evidence provided. While affidavits in certain cases can effectively meet the preponderance of evidence standard, the affidavits submitted by the applicant are lacking in probative value and evidentiary weight and, therefore, the applicant has not met his burden of proof. The applicant has not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and resided in this country in an unlawful status continuously from before January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988, as required under 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b). Given this, the applicant is ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).

Accompanying the Form I-485 application, is a Form G-325A, Biographic Information, signed by the applicant on May 8, 2002. The applicant indicated on his Form G-325A that he resided in his native country, Ivory Coast, from October 1962 to January 1988.

This factor further raises serious questions regarding the authenticity of the supporting documents submitted with the LIFE application and tends to establish that the applicant utilized the affidavits and the postmarked envelope in a fraudulent manner in an attempt to support his claim of *continuous* residence in the United States. The Form G-325A undermines the credibility of the applicant's claim to have continuously resided in the United States during the period in question and, therefore, it is concluded that he has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status from prior to January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988, as required.

The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for dismissal.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility