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U.S. Citizenship  
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[REDACTED]

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FILE:

[REDACTED]

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date:

**FEB 25 2009**

MSC 02 142 60647

IN RE: Applicant:

[REDACTED]

APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), *amended by* LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the National Benefits Center. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, Los Angeles, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director determined that the applicant had not established that he resided in the United States in a continuous unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, as required by section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant asserts that the applicant has submitted sufficient credible evidence to establish the requisite continuous residence. Counsel does not submit additional evidence on appeal.

Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act states:

(i) In General – The alien must establish that the alien entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he or she has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. In determining whether an alien maintained continuous unlawful residence in the United States for purposes of this subparagraph, the regulations prescribed by the Attorney General under section 245A(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that were most recently in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act shall apply.

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

On June 16, 2004, the director issued a notice of intent to deny (NOID) informing the applicant of the Service's intent to deny his LIFE Act application because he had failed to establish the requisite continuous residence. The director noted that the applicant failed to submit sufficient evidence to support his application. The applicant was granted thirty days to respond to the notice.

In the Notice of Decision, dated April 18, 2007, the director denied the instant application because the applicant failed to establish the requisite continuous residence. The director noted that the applicant responded to the NOID. However, the information submitted was insufficient to overcome the grounds for denial.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant reasserts that the applicant has provided sufficient credible evidence in the form of affidavits from individuals who attest to having known the applicant since 1981.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status during the requisite period. The applicant submitted letters and affidavits as evidence to establish the requisite continuous residence in support of his Form I-485 application. The AAO reviewed the entire record. Here, the submitted evidence is neither probative, nor credible.

Contrary to the applicant's assertion, he has failed to submit sufficient credible evidence to establish his continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period. The applicant submitted affidavits from [REDACTED]

and [REDACTED] attesting to the applicant's continuous residence in the United States since 1981. However, these affidavits are questionable as the applicant has submitted conflicting Form I-687 applications and supporting documents. On his initial Form I-687 application, and as stated on the Form For Determination of Class Membership in *CSS v. MEESE*, the applicant indicated that he had departed the United States for India, once, to visit his family in June 1987 and returned to the United States in September 1987. There is no indication on that form that the applicant was married, or, had any children. However, on his subsequent Form I-687 application, signed on October 22, 2000, the applicant indicated that he had departed the United States for India, once, to visit his family in December 1987 and returned to the United States in February 1988. It is noted that on that application the applicant does not specify the exact date of his December 1987 departure, nor the exact date of his February 1988 return. On

that from the applicant listed his wife, [REDACTED] and a child born in 1988. It is also noted that the applicant stated on his Form G-325A, signed on February 12, 2002, that he married [REDACTED] in Pandorikad, India, on January 25, 1988.

The above unresolved discrepancies cast considerable doubt on whether the applicant's claim that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and resided continuously in an unlawful status in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988, is true. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1988). Therefore, the reliability of the remaining evidence offered by the applicant is suspect and it must be concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status during the requisite period.

It is also noted that the record of proceedings points to a prolonged absence of over 45 days. As noted above, the applicant indicated on his initial Form I-687 application, and on the Form For Determination of Class Membership in *CSS v. MEESE*, that accompanied his initial Form I-687 application, that he had departed the United States for India, to visit his family in June 1987 and returned to the United States in September 1987. This represents a single absence of over 2 months.

In the absence of additional evidence from the applicant, it is determined that the absence from June 1987 to September 1987 exceeded the 45 day period allowable for a single absence. The applicant does not claim that his prolonged absence was due to an "emergent reason." Although this term is not defined in the regulations, *Matter of C-*, 19 I. & N. Dec. 808 (Comm. 1988) holds that *emergent* means "coming unexpectedly into being." There is no record of evidence to support a conclusion that the applicant's prolonged absence was for an emergent reason.

The record reflects that the applicant had a single absence from the United States that exceeded 45 days during the requisite period. In the absence of evidence that the applicant intended to return within 45 days, it cannot be concluded that an emergent reason "which came suddenly into being" delayed or prevented the applicant's return to the United States beyond the 45-day period.

The applicant has, therefore, failed to establish that he resided in a continuous unlawful status in the United States from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, as required under section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act. Given this, he is ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.