


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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

L2



FILE: [REDACTED]
MSC 02 018 62015

Offices: NEW YORK CITY

Date: **JUN 11 2009**

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:
[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

John F. Grissom
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the director in New York City. It is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application on the ground that the applicant failed to establish that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988.

On appeal counsel asserts that the director did not properly evaluate the documentation submitted by the applicant in support of his application. In counsel's view, the evidence in the record is sufficient to demonstrate the applicant's continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.

To be eligible for adjustment to permanent resident status under the LIFE Act applicants must establish their continuous unlawful residence in the United States from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, as well as their continuous physical presence in the United States from November 6, 1986 through May 4, 1988. See section 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) and (C)(i) of the LIFE Act, 8 U.S.C. § 245A(a)(2)(A) and (3)(A).

"Continuous unlawful residence" is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.15(c)(1), as follows: "An alien shall be regarded as having resided continuously in the United States if *no single absence* from the United States has *exceeded forty-five (45) days*, and the aggregate of all absences has not exceeded one hundred and eighty (180) days between January 1, 1982, and May 4, 1988, unless the alien can establish that due to *emergent reasons*, his or her return to the United States could not be accomplished within the time period allowed." (Emphases added.)

"Continuous physical presence" is described in section 1104(c)(2)(C)(i)(I) of the LIFE Act, 8 U.S.C. § 245A(a)(3)(B), and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.16(b), in the following terms: "An alien shall not be considered to have failed to maintain continuous physical presence in the United States by virtue of *brief, casual, and innocent absences* from the United States." (Emphasis added.) The regulation further explains that "[b]rief, casual, and innocent absence(s) as used in this paragraph means *temporary, occasional trips abroad* as long as the purpose of the absence from the United States was consistent with the policies reflected in the immigration laws of the United States." (Emphasis added.) 8 C.F.R. § 245a.16(b).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility, and its amenability to verification. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the

factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant’s employment must: provide the applicant’s address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant’s duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The applicant, a native of India who claims to have lived in the United States since October 1981, filed his application for legal permanent resident status under the LIFE Act (Form I-485) on October 18, 2001.

In a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID), dated May 4, 2007, the director indicated that the applicant had not submitted sufficient credible evidence to establish that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and resided continuously in the country in an unlawful status through May 4, 1988. The applicant was granted 30 days to submit additional evidence.

The applicant timely responded with additional documents. On June 1, 2007, the director issued a Notice of Decision denying the application on the ground that the information and documentation submitted in response to the NOID were insufficient to overcome the grounds for denial.

On appeal counsel asserts that the director did not properly evaluate the documentation submitted by the applicant in support of his application. In counsel’s view, the evidence in the

record is sufficient to demonstrate the applicant's continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).

The documentation submitted by the applicant in support of his claim that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and resided continuously in the country in an unlawful status through May 4, 1988 consists of the following:

- A letter of employment from Bose Trucking in Carlstadt, New Jersey, dated December 8, 1989, stating that the applicant was employed from October 1981 to the present (1989) as a "helper" and was paid \$150.00 per week.
- A letter from [REDACTED], who identified himself as the head priest of the Sikh Center of New York, Inc. stating that the applicant had been attending services at the temple for the past "20-25" years.
Photocopied envelopes addressed to the applicant at [REDACTED], Queens, New York, some with illegible postmark dates and some with postmark dates that appear to have been altered by hand.
Several photocopied merchandise receipts and "rental receipts" with handwritten notations of the applicant's name and no address, dated in 1981 through 1987.
- Several photographs of the applicant and some other individuals with no date stamp or other official markings to establish when and where they were taken.
- A series of notarized letters and affidavits – dated in 1989, 1990, 2001 and 2004 – from individuals who claim to have rented an apartment to, or otherwise known the applicant in the United States during the 1980s.

The AAO has reviewed each document in its entirety to determine the applicant's eligibility.

The letter of employment from Bose Trucking does not comport with the regulatory requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) because they did not provide the applicant's address during the periods of employment, did not indicate whether the information was taken from company records, and did not indicate whether such records are available for review. The signatories of the letters did not identify their positions in the company or the authority they possess to author the documents. The letters were not supplemented by any earnings statements, pay stubs, or tax records demonstrating that the applicant was actually employed during any of the years claimed. Finally, the originals of the letters are not in the file. Thus, the employment letters have limited probative value. They are not persuasive evidence that the applicant resided continuously in the United States from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, as required for legalization under the LIFE Act.

The letter from [REDACTED], head priest of The Sikh Center of New York, Inc. in New York City, does not comport with the regulatory requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v), which specifies that attestations by religious and related organizations (A) identify the applicant by name, (B) be signed by an official (whose title is shown), (C) show inclusive dates of membership, (D) state the address where the applicant resided during the membership period, (E) include the organization seal impressed on the letter or the letterhead of the organization, (F) establish how the author knows the applicant, and (G) establish the origin of the information about the applicant. The letter merely stated that the applicant had been attending services at the temple for the past 20-25 years, but did not specify whether the applicant was a member of the temple and the dates of membership, did not indicate where the applicant lived at any point in time between 1981 and 1988, did not indicate how and when he met the applicant, and whether his information about the applicant was based on personal knowledge, the temple's records, or hearsay. Since the letter does not comply with sub-parts (C), (D), (F), and (G) of 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v), it has little probative value. The letter is not persuasive evidence of the applicant's continuous residence in the United States from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988.

The photocopied envelopes addressed to the applicant at [REDACTED] Astoria, New York, some have illegible postmarks which look like they may have been altered by hand. One envelope has a postmark date of "30-10-82." The original envelopes have not been submitted in the file for a verification of the date. The envelopes do not bear a United States Postal Service date stamp or other markings to show that they were received and processed in the United States before delivering to the applicant's address. Thus, the envelopes do not appear to be genuine. They have little probative value and are not persuasive evidence of the applicant's continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period for legalization.

The photocopied merchandise receipts from Kakkar International dated May 10, 1985 and November 15, 1985, and from WIZ Home Entertainment Center that appears to be dated May 8, 1986, and several generic receipts with various dates in 1981-1987, all have handwritten notations of the applicant's name, some with incomplete name and no address, with no stamps or other official markings to authenticate the dates they were written. The generic receipts were all signed by UK Bose, but did not identify the rental property for which rent was collected. The receipts are not accompanied by any rental agreement to verify that the applicant resided at the address during the periods indicated. For the reasons discussed above, the receipts have little probative value. They are not persuasive evidence of the applicant's residence in the United States during the years 1981 through 1988.

The photographs have no probative value as evidence of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. There are no notations on the photographs or date stamps as to when and where they were taken, and even if they were taken during the 1980s they would not establish that the applicant resided in the United States at the time the photographs were taken much less his continuous residence in the country for the requisite period.

The notarized letters and affidavits in the record from individuals who claim to have rented an apartment to or otherwise known the applicant during the 1980s, all have minimalist or fill-in-the-blank formats. Although some of the notarized letters and affidavits provided some basic information such as the address claimed by the applicant during the 1980s, however, considering the length of time they claim to have known the applicant – in most cases since 1981 – the authors provided very few details about the applicant’s life in the United States, and the nature and extent of their interactions with him over the years. Nor are the letters and affidavits accompanied by any documentary evidence of the authors’ personal relationships with the applicant in the United States during the 1980s. In view of these substantive shortcomings, the AAO finds that the notarized letters and affidavits have little probative value. They are not persuasive evidence of the applicant’s continuous unlawful residence in the United States from before January 1, 1982.

Based on the foregoing analysis of the evidence, the AAO concludes that the applicant has failed to establish that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, as required under section 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act. Accordingly, the applicant is ineligible for permanent resident status under the LIFE Act.

The appeal will be dismissed, and the application denied.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.