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U.S. Citizenship  
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FILE: [REDACTED]  
MSC 03 239 63903

Office: NEW YORK

Date: **MAR 04 2009**

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John F. Grissom".

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, New York, New York, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director determined that the applicant failed to establish that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and resided in a continuous unlawful status from then through May 4, 1988, as required under section 1104(c)(2)(B) and (C) of the LIFE Act.

On appeal, the applicant submits a brief statement and an additional document.

Although a Form G-28, Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative, has been submitted, the attorney did not "Type or Print" his name as instructed and the attorney's signature on the form is not legible. Attempts made by the AAO to contact the attorney at the telephone number listed were unsuccessful. Therefore, the applicant shall be considered as self-represented and the decision will be furnished only to the applicant.

Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act states:

(i) In General – The alien must establish that the alien entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he or she has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. In determining whether an alien maintained continuous unlawful residence in the United States for purposes of this subparagraph, the regulations prescribed by the Attorney General under section 245A(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that were most recently in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act shall apply.

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). *See* 8 C.F.R. 245a.15(b). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(f). Affidavits indicating specific, personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the relevant time period are given greater weight than fill-in-the-blank affidavits providing generic information.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v), states that attestations from churches, unions, or other organizations should: identify the applicant by name; be signed by an official (whose title is shown); show inclusive dates of membership; state the address where the applicant resided during the membership period; include the seal of the organization impressed on the letter or the letterhead of the organization, if the organization has letterhead stationery; establish how the author knows the applicant; and, establish the origin of the information being attested to.

The applicant filed the current Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Resident Status or Adjust Status, under the LIFE Act on May 27, 2003. The director denied the application on August 8, 2007. The applicant filed a timely appeal from that decision on September 3, 2007.

The applicant, a national and citizen of Senegal, claims to have initially entered the United States in January 1981, and to have departed the United States on only one occasion – from May 30, 1989 to August 23, 1989, due to family problems.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review this matter on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp.*, NTSB, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The federal courts have long recognized the AAO's *de novo* review authority. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has established that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988.

In an attempt to establish his continuous unlawful residence in the United States during the requisite time, the applicant has submitted the following documentation throughout the application process:

1. A letter, dated May 25, 1990, from the [REDACTED], located at [REDACTED], New York, New York, stating that the applicant had resided at the hotel since 1981, rooming with a friend who shared the room rent.
2. An un-notarized letter, dated June 14, 1990, from [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] in New York, stating that the applicant had been a member, attending various prayer services, since 1981. The letter from [REDACTED] does not show the address(es) where the applicant resided throughout the membership period or establish the origin of the information being attested to (i.e., whether the information being attested to is anecdotal or comes from church membership records). Furthermore, although the letter contains [REDACTED] original signature, the letterhead stationary is a photocopy and there is no seal of the organization affixed to the letter.
3. Similar fill-in-the-blank affidavits, dated June 18, 1990 from [REDACTED] of Brooklyn, New York, and [REDACTED] of Bronx, New York, stating that they had met the applicant "selling in the street" and had personal knowledge that the applicant lived at [REDACTED], in New York since 1981.
4. An affidavit from [REDACTED] of Bronx, New York, stating that she had known the applicant in New York since 1981.
5. An undated and un-notarized letter from [REDACTED] of New York, New York, certifying that he had known the applicant "...since 1980 the date of his entrée in the United States, precisely in New York City..."

In summary, for the duration of the requisite time period, the applicant has provided no employment letters that comply with the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i)(A) through (F), no utility bills according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(ii), no school records according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(iii), no hospital or medical records according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(iv), and no church, union or organization attestations that comply with the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v)(A) through (G). The applicant also has not provided documentation (including, for example, money order receipts, passport entries, children's birth certificates, bank book transactions, letters of correspondence, a Social Security or Selective Service card, automobile license receipts, deeds, tax receipts, insurance policies or other similar documentation) according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(A) through (K). The documentation provided by the applicant consists of two third-party affidavits ("other relevant documentation"). These documents lack specific details as to how the affiants knew the applicant – how often and under what circumstances they had contact with the applicant – throughout the requisite time period from 1982 through 1988.

It is noted that [REDACTED] in No. 5, above, states that he had known the applicant in the United States since 1980. However, the applicant testified at an interview on July 10, 1990, that he did not initially enter the United States until January 1981. This discrepancy in the applicant's submissions has not been explained. Doubt cast on any aspect of the evidence as submitted may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. Further, it is incumbent on the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence; any attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582. (Comm. 1988).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e) provides that “[a]n alien applying for adjustment of status under [section 1104 of the LIFE Act] has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods.” Preponderance of the evidence is defined as “evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1064 (5<sup>th</sup> ed. 1979). See *Matter of Lemhammad*, 20 I&N Dec. 316, 320, Note 5 (BIA 1991).

Based on a review of the record, given the paucity of the documentation provided by the applicant and the discrepancies noted, the AAO determines that the applicant has not met his burden of proof. The applicant has not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, resided in this country in an unlawful status continuously since that time through May 4, 1988, as required under 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b). Thus, he is ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

As always in these proceedings, the burden of proof rests solely with the applicant. Section 245a.2(d)(5) of the Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.