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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



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FILE:

MSC 02 046 60528

Office: GARDEN CITY

Date: **MAR 30 2009**


IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), *amended by* LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the National Benefits Center. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

John F. Grissom  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, Garden City, New York. It is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application on the ground that the applicant failed to establish that he had entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and had resided continuously in the United States from then through May 4, 1988.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant submits a brief and additional documentation.

Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act states:

(i) In General – The alien must establish that the alien entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he or she has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. In determining whether an alien maintained continuous unlawful residence in the United States for purposes of this subparagraph, the regulations prescribed by the Attorney General under section 245A(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that were most recently in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act shall apply.

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility, and its amenability to verification. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the

director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). *See* 8 C.F.R. 245a.15(b). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(f). Affidavits indicating specific, personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the relevant time period are given greater weight than fill-in-the-blank affidavits providing generic information.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v), states that attestations from churches, unions, or other organizations should: identify the applicant by name; be signed by an official (whose title is shown); show inclusive dates of membership; state the address where the applicant resided during the membership period; include the seal of the organization impressed on the letter or the letterhead of the organization, if the organization has letterhead stationery; establish how the author knows the applicant; and, establish the origin of the information being attested to.

The applicant filed a Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Resident Status or Adjust Status, under the LIFE Act on November 15, 2001. On January 17, 2008, the director denied the application. The applicant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from that decision on February 19, 2008.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review this matter on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp.*, NTSB, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The federal courts have long recognized the AAO's *de novo* review authority. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has demonstrated that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988. With regard to this time period, the record includes the following documentation:

- Letters from [REDACTED], in Richmond Hill, New York. The first states the applicant had done volunteer work and is an active participant in community activities. The second states the applicant was married at the [REDACTED] on March 10, 1987.

The above letters do not comply with the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v), in that they do not show the applicant's inclusive dates of membership in the society, the address(es) where the

applicant he resided throughout the membership period, or the origin of the information being attested to (i.e., whether the information being attested to is anecdotal or comes from church membership records). The first letter merely attests to the applicant's participation in activities without specifying the beginning date of his membership, and the second merely attests to the applicant's marriage in 1987 without providing any corroborative documentation that the marriage was in any way registered with the society.

- Affidavits from [REDACTED] stating he drove the applicant to Tijuana, Mexico to meet his family in November 1987, and picked up the applicant in the Riverside bus station three weeks later after he was smuggled back into the United States; [REDACTED] stating the applicant lived at an unspecified address in Brooklyn, New York from August 1981 to December 1989; [REDACTED] stating he had known the applicant since childhood, that the applicant lived in Brooklyn from 1981 to December 1989 and visited the family several times for family get-togethers and religious ceremonies at the Gudawara in Richmond Hill; [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] stating they had known the applicant since 1985 and that they were present at his marriage in the Gurudwara in March 1987; [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] stating that they had been close friends of the applicant since August 1981 and that the applicant lived in Brooklyn from August 1981 to December 1989.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] claim to have known the applicant only since 1985. [REDACTED] merely attests to the applicant's presence in, and departure to and from the United States, in 1987. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] claim to have known the applicant since 1981. However, their affidavits generally lack details as to how they first met the applicant, what their relationships with the applicant were, and how frequently and under what circumstances they saw the applicant. As such, they can only be afforded only minimal weight as evidence of the applicant's residence and presence in the United States during the requisite time period.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e) provides that "[a]n alien applying for adjustment of status under [section 1104 of the LIFE Act] has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods." Preponderance of the evidence is defined as "evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not." Black's Law Dictionary 1064 (5<sup>th</sup> ed. 1979). See *Matter of Lemhammad*, 20 I&N Dec. 316, 320, Note 5 (BIA 1991).

Given the paucity of the documentation submitted, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and maintained continuous unlawful residence since such date through May 4, 1988, as required for eligibility for adjustment of status to permanent resident status under section 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b). Thus, he is ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.