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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
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FILE:



MSC 01 331 62117

Offices: GARDEN CITY

Date: NOV 20 2009

IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry J. Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the director in Garden City, New York. It is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application on the ground that the applicant failed to establish that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988.

On appeal counsel asserts that the director did not properly evaluate the documentation submitted by the applicant in support of his application. In counsel's view, the documentation in the record is sufficient to establish that the applicant meets the continuous residence requirement for legalization under the LIFE Act. Counsel requested a copy of the Record of Proceedings (ROP) and indicated that he will submit a brief/evidence within 30 days of receiving the ROP. The record reflects that the ROP has been processed and that counsel submitted a brief following receipt of the ROP but did not submit additional evidence of the applicant's continuous residence in the United States with his brief. The AAO will consider the record as complete and will adjudicate the application based on the evidence in the record.

To be eligible for adjustment to permanent resident status under the LIFE Act applicants must establish their continuous unlawful residence in the United States from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, as well as their continuous physical presence in the United States from November 6, 1986 through May 4, 1988. See section 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) and (C)(i) of the LIFE Act, 8 U.S.C. § 245A(a)(2)(A) and (3)(A).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility, and its amenability to verification. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of

something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The applicant, a native of Pakistan who claims to have lived in the United States since December 1980, filed his application for legal permanent resident status under the LIFE Act (Form I-485) on August 27, 2001.

In a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) dated February 22, 2007, the director indicated that the applicant has failed to submit sufficient credible evidence in support of his application. The applicant was granted 30 days to submit additional evidence.

The applicant timely responded to the NOID. On May 22, 2007, the director issued a Notice of Decision denying the application on the grounds that the information and documentation submitted in response to the NOID were insufficient to overcome the grounds for denial.

On appeal counsel asserts that the director did not properly evaluate the documentation submitted by the applicant in support of his application. In counsel's view, the documentation in the record is sufficient to establish that the applicant meets the continuous residence requirement for legalization under the LIFE Act.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988. The AAO determines that he has not.

The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and resided continuously in the country in an unlawful for the duration of the requisite period consists of a series of letters and affidavits from individuals who claim to have rented an apartment to, employed, worked with or otherwise known the applicant in the United States during the 1980s, as well as a photocopy of a savings account booklet from National Bank of Pakistan, bearing the applicant's name showing activities on the account from May 1981 onwards.

The AAO has reviewed each document in its entirety to determine the applicant's eligibility.

The record reflects that the applicant has submitted conflicting statements and documents in support of his application. The applicant has not provided any objective evidence to justify or reconcile the discrepancies. For instance, on a Form I-687 (application for status as a temporary resident) the applicant filed on March 6, 2001, the applicant indicated that he was a member of the Muslim Community Center in Coney Island, New York, from May 3, 1987 to June 3, 1990. The applicant submitted three separate letters from the Muslim Community Center attesting that the applicant has been participating in Friday congregation at the Center since 1983. The letters did not indicate whether the applicant has been a member of the organization and the precise dates of his membership. The letters signed by three different individuals, two of whom did not specify their titles or positions with the Center, were dated December 17, 1990, February 14, 1998, and March 10, 2007. The letters did not indicate where the applicant lived during the period of his association with the organization, did not specify how and when the authors knew the applicant, and whether their information about the applicant was based on their personal knowledge, organizational records, or hearsay. The authors did not provide any information about the applicant's whereabouts prior to 1983. Furthermore, the letters is contrary to the information provided by the applicant on the Form I-687 he filed in 2001. Since the letters did not comply with sub-parts (B), (C), (D), (F), and (G) of 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v), and is contrary to the applicant's prior statement of his association with the organization, the AAO concludes that the letters have little probative value. They are not persuasive evidence of the applicant's continuous residence in the United States from before January 1, 1982 through the requisite period.

The record includes a photocopy of a Savings Account Booklet from National Bank of Pakistan with the applicant's name and his address listed as [REDACTED]

The booklet shows deposits were made into the account from May 5, 1981 through March 9, 1983, and withdrawals on February 22, 1983 and March 9, 1983 – the last date transaction on the account. The savings booklet does not appear to be genuine because the address on the booklet is inconsistent with the address provided by the applicant for the same period. According to information on the Form I-687 the applicant filed in 2001, the applicant indicated his address in the United States as [REDACTED] from December 1988 to October 1989. The applicant did not claim the Jackson Height, New York address as one of his addresses in the United States during the requisite period. Thus, the savings account booklet has limited probative value. It is not persuasive evidence of the applicant's continuous unlawful residence in the United States from before January 1, 1982 through March 1983, much less for the requisite period through May 4, 1988.

The contradictory statements and documents discussed above cast considerable doubt on the veracity of the applicant's claim that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and resided continuously in the country through May 4, 1988. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice without competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *See Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt

cast on any aspect of the applicant's evidence also reflects on the reliability of other evidence in the record.

The record includes photocopies of letters two businesses (1) [REDACTED] in Brooklyn, New York, dated December 19, 1990, stating that the applicant was employed from 1982 to 1984 as a clerk; (2) [REDACTED] stating that the applicant was employed from June 1984 to September 1988 as a cashier and was paid \$150.00 per week.

The employment letters listed above do not comport with the regulatory requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) because they did not provide the applicant's address during the periods of employment, did not indicate whether the information was taken from company records, and did not indicate whether such records are available for review. The letters are not supplemented by any earnings statements, pay stubs, or tax records demonstrating that the applicant was actually employed during any of the years claimed. Additionally, the signatory of the letter from [REDACTED] is not identified and the letter from [REDACTED] is not on the company's letterhead. In view of these substantive deficiencies, the employment letters have limited probative value. They are not persuasive evidence of the applicant's continuous unlawful residence in the United States from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, as required for legalization under the LIFE Act.

As for the affidavits in the record – dated in 1990, 2003, and 2007 – from individuals who claim to rented an apartment to, worked with or otherwise known the applicant during the 1980s, they have minimalist formats with very little input by the affiants. The affiants provided very few details about the applicant's life in the United States and the nature and extent of their interactions with him over the years. The affiants do not have direct personal knowledge of the events and circumstances of the applicant's residence in the United States, and did not submit documents to establish their own identities and residence in the United States during the requisite period. Additionally, the affidavits are not accompanied by any documentary evidence – such as photographs, letters, and the like – of the affiants' personal relationships with the applicant in the United States during the 1980s. [REDACTED] claims that he rented the apartment at [REDACTED] Brooklyn, New York, to the applicant from 1980 to 1989. Neither the applicant nor [REDACTED] submitted any documents such as rent receipts, utility bills showing that the applicant actually resided at the address during the period in question. Also, [REDACTED] did not provide any documentation to establish that he owned the property. For all the reasons discussed above, the AAO finds that the affidavits have little probative value. They are not persuasive evidence of the applicant's continuous unlawful residence in the United States from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988.

Based on the foregoing analysis of the evidence, the AAO concludes that the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, as required under section 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act. Accordingly, the applicant is ineligible for permanent resident status under the LIFE Act.

The appeal will be dismissed, and the application denied.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.