

identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy
PUBLIC COPY

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

L2

FILE:

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date: DEC 10 2010

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.


Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, Los Angeles, California and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The district director denied the application because the applicant had failed to respond to a Request for Evidence (RFE), Form I-72, instructing the applicant to file a Form I-690 Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility. On appeal, the applicant indicates that an associate in the law offices of his counsel of record did not receive the RFE. The applicant requests a copy of the record of proceedings. This request was closed on October 20, 2009 for failure to respond.¹

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). Following *de novo* review, the AAO agrees with the director that the applicant failed to respond to the RFE in a timely fashion. Beyond the director, the AAO finds that the applicant has failed to establish his continuous residence in the United States from January 1, 1982 through the end of the relevant period. He is also ineligible for benefits under the LIFE Act on this basis.

An applicant for permanent resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 212(a) of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and, identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the

¹ [REDACTED]

quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time.

The documentation contained in the record which pertains to the relevant period consists of the following:

- A letter from [REDACTED] International Baking Company, who indicates that [REDACTED] was employed by the company from October 1984 until April 1986 in the production department. The applicant has also submitted paycheck stubs that do not contain a name for the years 1984, 1985 and 1986. The applicant has indicated that he used the alias [REDACTED], his father’s name, in order to obtain employment. In cases where an applicant claims to have met any of the eligibility criteria under an assumed name, the applicant has the burden of proving that the applicant was in fact the person who used that name. The applicant’s true identity is established pursuant to the requirements of paragraph (b)(4)(1) and (ii) of this section. The assumed name must appear in the documentation provided by the applicant to establish eligibility. To meet the requirement of this paragraph, documentation must be submitted to prove the common identity, i.e., that the assumed name was in fact used by the applicant. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.4(b)(4)(iii). In this case, the only evidence contained in the record which speaks to common identity is the applicant’s own statements.
- An affidavit from Missionaries of the [REDACTED] Church indicating that the applicant has been a member of the congregation since 1981. This letter does not conform to the statutory requirements for attestations by churches, unions, or other organizations, which is found at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2 ((d)(3)(v)). That regulation requires such attestations to “show the inclusive dates of membership and state the address where the applicant resided during the membership period.” The affidavit does not provide the applicant’s address during his membership or any other information that is probative of the issue of his initial entrance to the United States prior to January 1982 or his continuous residence for the duration of the statutory period. Thus, it can be given no probative weight.

- Two State of California Identification cards dated 1982 and 1984. The cards provide some evidence of the applicant's presence in the United State during the relevant period.
- Envelopes containing postage and date stamps in 1984 and 1989.
- Numerous handwritten receipts which are not amenable to verification.
- Medical records dated December 1987;
- Affidavits from [REDACTED]

Although the affiants state that they met the applicant during the relevant period, their statements do not supply enough details to be considered probative. Specifically, all of the affiants indicate that they met the applicant during the relevant period, however, none indicate how they date their initial acquaintance with the applicant, or how frequently they saw the applicant during the relevant period.

To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. Upon review, the AAO finds that, individually and together, the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true. Therefore, they have little probative value.

Section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act renders inadmissible aliens who departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding and who seek admission within 10 years of the date of the alien's departure. Section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II). The record indicated that the applicant was ordered removed on May 30, 1995 pursuant to Section 244(a)(1). The applicant was deported to Mexico afoot via San Ysidro on November 21, 2001. The applicant filed his Form I-485 on April 26, 2003, less than 10 years from the date of his departure. Although this ground of inadmissibility may be waived pursuant to section 245A(d)(2)(B) of the Act, the applicant's waiver application is currently pending. Even if the waiver were granted, however, the applicant would not be eligible for benefits under the LIFE Act for the reasons stated above.

As is stated above, the "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). The applicant has been given the opportunity to satisfy his burden of proof with a broad range of evidence pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3).

Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, it is concluded that he has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988 as required under section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.