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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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[redacted]

FILE: [redacted] Office: GARDEN CITY, NY Date: DEC 10 2010

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), *amended by* LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, Garden City, New York and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application based on the determination that the applicant was ineligible to adjust to permanent resident status under the provisions of the LIFE Act. The director found that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. Specifically, the director noted that the applicant testified inconsistently regarding his absences from the United States during the relevant period and that his noted absences were in excess of a single absence of 45 days, thereby breaking any continuous residence that the applicant may have established.

On appeal, through counsel, the applicant indicates that the director applied an improper evidentiary standard. The applicant requests a copy of the record of proceedings. This request was processed on September 15, 2010.[1]

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). Following *de novo* review, the AAO finds that the applicant has failed to establish his continuous residence in the United States from January 1, 1982 throughout the relevant period.

An applicant for permanent resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 212(a) of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and, identify the location of

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such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has established that he (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and lived in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of one affidavit from [redacted] indicates that she has been acquainted with the applicant since October 1981. She does not indicate how she met the applicant, how she dates their initial acquaintance, where he lived during the relevant period or any other details of their relationship. To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. Upon review, the AAO finds that [redacted] statement does not contain sufficient detail to be considered probative.

The director also noted that the applicant submitted inconsistent testimony regarding his absences from the United States. On his Form I-687 filed in 1989, the applicant indicated that he departed the United States only once during the relevant period, from August 1986 until October 1986. However, at his October 16, 2002 interview with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the applicant indicated that he traveled to Gambia from November 12, 1985 to August 8, 1986. Finally, at his October 11, 2007 interview with USCIS the applicant indicated that he returned to Gambia once from June 1986 to October 1986. The applicant submits a copy of his B-1 visa indicating that he entered the United States via New

York City of October 7, 1986. His visa was issued August 8, 1986. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.15(d), this absence is in excess of 45 days and represents a clear break in any continuous residence that the applicant may have established. Furthermore, the applicant's inconsistent statements regarding his absences during the relevant period cast doubt on the reliability of his testimony.

Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1988).

As noted above, the "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). The applicant has been given the opportunity to satisfy his burden of proof with a broad range of evidence pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3).

Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, and his inconsistent statements, it is concluded that he has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982 through the relevant period as required under section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act on this basis.

Finally, on January 19, 1995 the applicant was ordered excluded and deported from the United States pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. The applicant filed a timely appeal which was dismissed by the Board of Immigration Appeals on August 22, 1995. While it is unclear from the record if the applicant actually departed the United States, the applicant has not established his admissibility as required by 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.