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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
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
IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by Life Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, Atlanta, Georgia and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application based on the determination that the applicant was ineligible to adjust to permanent resident status under the provisions of the LIFE Act. The director found that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. Specifically, the director noted that the applicant submitted several affidavits which lacked sufficient detail to be considered probative and that the applicant submitted inconsistent testimony regarding his absences during the relevant period.

On appeal, through counsel, the applicant indicates that the director's decision was not supported by the evidence.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). Following de novo review, the AAO finds that the applicant has failed to establish his continuous residence in the United States from January 1, 1982 through the end of the relevant period.

An applicant for permanent resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 212(a) of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and, identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual

circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has established that he (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time.

The documentation contained in the record which pertains to the relevant period consists of the following:

- A letter from [REDACTED] who indicates that the applicant rented an apartment on March 28, 1980. The letter is accompanied by a copy of a lease agreement dated March 1980 which does not contain the applicant’s name. The applicant’s friend, Lucky Okoduwa is the only tenant listed on the lease document.
- A letter from [REDACTED] who indicates that the applicant lived with him “for a number of years” since [REDACTED]
- A letter from [REDACTED] who indicates that the applicant was his patient from 1982 until 2002.
- An affidavit from Christ Apostolic Church Mount Pleasant indicating that the applicant has been a member of the congregation since 1981. This letter does not conform to the statutory requirements for attestations by churches, unions, or other organizations, which is found at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2 ((d)(3)(v)). That regulation requires such attestations to “show the inclusive dates of membership and state the address where the applicant resided during the membership period.” The affidavit does not provide the applicant’s address during his membership or any other information that is probative of the issue of his initial entrance to the United States prior to January 1982 or his continuous residence for the duration of the statutory period. Thus, it can be given no probative weight.

- A letter from General Financial Services, Inc. indicating that the applicant has had an auto insurance policy since 1984. The applicant has not provided a copy of the policy or receipts or bills associated with the policy. In addition, the affiant does not indicate the applicant's address during the lifetime of the policy.
- Affidavits from [REDACTED]. Although the affiants state that they met the applicant during the relevant period, their statements do not supply enough details to be considered probative. Specifically, all of the affiants indicate that they met the applicant during the relevant period, however, none indicate how they date their initial acquaintance with the applicant, or how frequently they saw the applicant during the relevant period.
- A letter from the Consulate of Nigeria in New York indicating that the applicant received an emergency travel certificate on July 15, 1983. The letter is dated April 24, 1991. This absence coincides with the applicant's Form I-687 in which he states that he was absent from the United States from July 19, 1983 until August 28, 1983.

To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. Upon review, the AAO finds that, individually and together, the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true. Therefore, they have little probative value.

As is stated above, the "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). The applicant has been given the opportunity to satisfy his burden of proof with a broad range of evidence pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3).

Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, it is concluded that he has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988 as required under section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act on this basis.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.