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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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MAR 02 2010

FILE:

MSC-02-030-63151

Office: HOUSTON

Date:

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, Houston and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The district director denied the application because the applicant had failed to establish residence in the United States in an unlawful status from January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988 as required by section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that she has established her unlawful residence for the requisite time period. She provides further explanation regarding her eligibility.

An applicant for permanent resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 212(a) of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and, identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of her claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and lived in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of the following:

- Affidavits from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Although the affiants state that they met the applicant during the relevant period, their statements do not supply enough details to be considered probative. For instance, the affiants do not indicate how they date their initial meeting with the applicant, how frequently they had contact with the applicant, or how they had personal knowledge of the applicant’s presence in the United States. Given these deficiencies, these affidavits have minimal probative value in supporting the applicant’s claims that she entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and resided in the United States for the entire requisite period.
- The record of proceedings also contains two letters of employment verification. The first, from [REDACTED] indicates that the applicant was employed by her from November 1981 until February 1986 in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The second letter, from [REDACTED] indicates that the applicant was employed by her from March 1986 until the end of the relevant period. [REDACTED] indicates her address to be in Sugar Land, Texas. She indicates that the applicant served as a nanny for their household and that she was paid in cash. The letters fail to meet certain regulatory standards set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i), which provides that letters from employers must include the applicant’s address at the time of employment; exact period of employment; whether the information was taken from official company records and where records are located and whether CIS may have access to the records; if records are unavailable, an affidavit form-letter stating that the employment records are unavailable may be accepted which shall be signed, attested to by the employer under penalty of perjury and shall state the employer’s willingness to come forward and give testimony if requested. The statements noted above do not include much of the required information and can be afforded minimal weight as evidence of the applicant’s residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period.

- A letter from [REDACTED] from the Bartlesville Literacy Council in Bartlesville, Oklahoma. [REDACTED] indicates that she tutored the applicant for three months in 1987 and five months in 1988. This is inconsistent with the information provided by [REDACTED] who indicates that the applicant worked as a nanny in her home in Sugar Land, Texas from March 1986 until September 1991. It is also inconsistent with statements that the applicant made to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) officers in which she indicated that she traveled outside the United States in March 1986 with her employer, [REDACTED] and her G-325A filed on October 25, 2001 in which she indicates that she lived in Sugar Land, Texas from 1989 until 1991. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the applicant submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the application. *Id.* at 591.
- A letter from [REDACTED] in Tulsa, Oklahoma. [REDACTED] indicates that the applicant was a member of the church for several years, however, he does not designate which years.

As noted by the director, the application contains multiple material inconsistencies. For example, the applicant indicates on a Form I-687 signed by the applicant on October 19, 1990, that she departed the United States only one time following her entry, in 1987. However, on a Form I-687 application filed by the applicant on June 21, 2005, the applicant indicates that she went to Venezuela in March 1986 with her employer.

Furthermore, as the director noted, USCIS records indicate that the applicant entered the United States on April 2, 1986 at Miami, Florida, using a B-1 temporary visitor visa. This entry was not disclosed on the applicant's Form I-687 filed on October 19, 1990.

Upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO agrees with the director that the evidence submitted by the applicant as well as the multiple inconsistencies noted fail to establish that the applicant is eligible for the benefit sought.

Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, it is concluded that she has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988 as required under section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act on this basis.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.