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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
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**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**


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
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Date: **MAY 05 2011** Office: HOUSTON

FILE: 

IN RE: Applicant: 

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), *amended by* Life Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:


INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the director of the Houston office, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application because the applicant had failed to establish that she satisfied the “basic citizenship skills” required under section 1104(c)(2)(E) of the LIFE Act. In addition, the director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that she entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and resided in a continuous unlawful status through May 4, 1988.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant asserts that the evidence which the applicant previously submitted establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that she continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. Counsel also asserts that the applicant should be permitted a third opportunity to pass the civics test. The applicant has not submitted any additional evidence on appeal.

The AAO has reviewed all of the evidence, and has made a *de novo* decision based on the record and the AAO’s assessment of the credibility, relevance and probative value of the evidence.¹

Under section 1104(c)(2)(E)(i) of the LIFE Act (“Basic Citizenship Skills”), an applicant for permanent resident status must demonstrate that he or she:

- (I) meets the requirements of section 312(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1423(a))(relating to minimal understanding of ordinary English and a knowledge and understanding of the history and government of the United States); or
- (II) is satisfactorily pursuing a course of study (recognized by the Attorney General) to achieve such an understanding of English and such a knowledge and understanding of the history and government of the United States.

Under section 1104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the LIFE Act, the Attorney General may waive all or part of the requirements for aliens who are at least 65 years of age or developmentally disabled.

The applicant, who is neither 65 years old nor developmentally disabled, does not qualify for either of the exceptions in section 1104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the LIFE Act. Nor does she satisfy the “basic citizenship skills” requirement of section 1104(c)(2)(E)(i)(I) of the LIFE Act because she does not meet the requirements of section 312(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act). An applicant can demonstrate that he or she meets the requirements of section 312(a) of the Act by “[s]peaking and understanding English during the course of the interview for permanent resident status” and answering questions based on the subject matter of approved citizenship

¹ The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. The AAO’s *de novo* authority is well recognized by the federal courts. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

training materials, or [b]y passing a standardized section 312 test . . . by the Legalization Assistance Board with the Educational Testing Service (ETS) or the California State Department of Education with the Comprehensive Adult Student Assessment System (CASAS).” 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.3(b)(4)(iii)(A)(1) and (2).

In the alternative, an applicant can satisfy the basic citizenship skills requirement by demonstrating compliance with section 1104(c)(2)(E)(i)(II) of the LIFE Act. The “citizenship skills” requirement of the section 1104(c)(2)(E)(i)(II) is defined by regulation in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.17(a)(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.17(a)(3). As specified therein, an applicant for LIFE Legalization must establish that:

He or she has a high school diploma or general education development diploma (GED) from a school in the United States 8 C.F.R. § 245a.17(a)(2), or

He or she has attended, or is attending, a state recognized, accredited learning institution in the United States, and that institution certifies such attendance. The course of study at such learning institution must be for a period of one academic year (or the equivalent thereof according to the standards of the learning institution) and the curriculum must include at least 40 hours of instruction in English and United States history and government 8 C.F.R. § 245a.17(a)(3).

Both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.17(a)(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.17(a)(3) specify that applicants must submit evidence to show compliance with the basic citizenship skills requirement “...either at the time of filing Form I-485, subsequent to filing the application but prior to the interview, or at the time of the interview”

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.17(b) states that:

An applicant who fails to pass the English literacy and/or the United States history and government tests at the time of the interview, shall be afforded a second opportunity after 6 months (or earlier at the request of the applicant) to pass the tests or submit evidence as described in paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) of this section [8 C.F.R. § 245a.17(a)(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.17(a)(3)]. The second interview shall be conducted prior to the denial of the application for permanent residence and may be based solely on the failure to pass the basic citizenship skills requirements.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.17(b), the applicant presented herself at interviews twice in connection with her LIFE Act application, on March 6, 2003 and again on September 10, 2003. On both occasions, the applicant failed to demonstrate a minimal understanding of ordinary English. The applicant did not provide evidence of having passed a standardized citizenship test, as permitted by 8 C.F.R. § 312.3(a)(1). The applicant does not have a high school diploma or a GED from a United States school, and therefore does not satisfy the regulatory requirement of 8 C.F.R. § 245a.17(a)(2). Nor did the applicant provide, prior to or at the time of the second

interview, evidence to demonstrate that she had attended or was attending a state recognized, accredited learning institution in the United States that provides a course of study for a period of one academic year (or the equivalent thereof according to the standards of the learning institution) with curriculum including at least 40 hours of instruction in United States history and government as allowed under 8 C.F.R. § 245a.17(a)(3). This requirement is a mandatory time frame and clearly stated in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.17(a)(3).

Finally, counsel cites no statute or regulation that compels the director to schedule the applicant for a third interview. The regulation only provides *one* opportunity after the failure of the first test. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.17(b).

Therefore, the applicant does not satisfy either alternative of the "basic citizenship skills" requirement set forth in section 1104(c)(2)(E)(i) of the LIFE Act. Accordingly, the AAO agrees with the director that the applicant is ineligible for adjustment to permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act on this basis.

In addition, the director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that she entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and resided in a continuous unlawful status through May 4, 1988.

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act must establish that he or she entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and resided in continuous unlawful status since that date through May 4, 1988. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.15(a).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation

when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I & N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA).

The second issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that she entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that she continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of her claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and lived in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of witness statements and documents. The AAO has reviewed each document in its entirety to determine the applicant's eligibility; however, the AAO will not quote the witness statements in this decision. Some of the evidence submitted indicates that the applicant resided in the United States after May 4, 1988; however, because evidence of residence after May 4, 1988 is not probative of residence during the requisite period, it shall not be discussed.

The record contains witness statements from [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]. The witness statements are general in nature, and state that the witnesses have knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States for all, or a portion of, the requisite period.

Although the witnesses claim to have personal knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period, the witness statements do not provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with her, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations, and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence in the United States during

the requisite period. To be considered probative and credible, witness statements must do more than simply state that a witness knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that it probably did exist and that the witness, by virtue of that relationship, does have knowledge of the facts alleged. For instance, the witnesses do not state how they date their initial meeting with the applicant in the United States, or specify social gatherings, other special occasions or social events when they saw and communicated with the applicant during the requisite period. The witnesses also do not state how frequently they had contact with the applicant during the requisite period. The witnesses do not provide sufficient details that would lend credence to their claimed knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. For these reasons the AAO finds that the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true.

The remaining evidence in the record is comprised of copies of the applicant's statements, the I-485 application, a Form I-687, application for status as a temporary resident, signed by the applicant on April 24, 1991 and filed to establish the applicant's CSS class membership, a copy of an additional I-687 signed by the applicant on April 24, 1991, and a copy of the applicant's passport. The AAO finds in its *de novo* review that the record of proceedings contains materially inconsistent statements from the applicant regarding the date of her initial entry into the United States, the dates she worked at particular locations in the United States during the requisite period, and the dates of her absences from the United States during the requisite period.

At the time of completing the I-687 application signed by the applicant on April 24, 1991, the applicant listed residences in the United States as follows: from September 1981 to November 1985 on [REDACTED] from November 1985 to December 1987 on [REDACTED] and, from December 1987 through the end of the requisite period on [REDACTED]. The applicant listed membership in the Sikh Cultural Society in Richmond Hill, New York beginning in October 1981. The applicant did not list any employment in the United States during the requisite period. The applicant listed two absences from the United States during the requisite period, from August to September 1986, and from June to July 1987, respectively.

In a class member worksheet dated May 30, 1991, the applicant stated that she first entered the United States in September 1981.

In a copy of an I-687 application signed by the applicant on April 24, 1991, the applicant listed employment in the United States as follows: from December 1980 (which predates her stated initial entry date) to July 1985 as a sales associate with [REDACTED]; from July 1985 to June 1987 as a sales associates at [REDACTED] and, from December 1987 through the end of the requisite period as a sales associate at [REDACTED]. The applicant listed membership in the [REDACTED] Hill, New York beginning in October 1980 (which predates to her stated initial entry date). The applicant listed one absence from the United States during the requisite period, from June to July 1987.

In the I-485 application, the applicant states that she gave birth to her son, [REDACTED], in India in 1986. However, the applicant failed to list any absence from the United States in 1986 in the copy of the I-687 application signed by her in 1991.

In a Form G-325A, biographic information sheet, signed by the applicant on May 27, 2002 and filed with the I-485 application, the applicant stated she married [REDACTED] in 1985 in [REDACTED] Kashmir, India. However, the applicant failed to list any absence from the United States in 1985 in either of two I-687 applications signed by her in 1991.

The record contains a copy of the applicant's Indian passport number [REDACTED] issued to the applicant on January 8, 1988, in Srinagar, India. However, the applicant failed to list any absence from the United States in 1988 in either of two I-687 applications signed by her in 1991.

The applicant has failed to provide probative and credible evidence of her continuous residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. The inconsistencies regarding the date the applicant first entered the United States, the dates the applicant resided and worked at a particular locations in the United States, and the dates of the applicant's absences from the United States are material to the applicant's claim, in that they have a direct bearing on the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. No evidence of record resolves these inconsistencies. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I & N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA). These contradictions undermine the credibility of the applicant's claim of entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.

Upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO agrees with the director that the evidence submitted by the applicant has not established that she is eligible for the benefit sought. The various statements currently in the record which attempt to substantiate the applicant's residence in the United States during the statutory period are not objective, independent evidence such that they might overcome the inconsistencies in the record regarding the applicant's claim that she maintained continuous residence in the United States throughout the statutory period, and thus are not probative.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States for some time prior to January 1, 1982 and through May 4, 1988. The applicant is, therefore, not eligible for adjustment to permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act on this additional basis. The appeal is dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.